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ABSTRACT 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THAILAND 
~y 
Angkana Kunpalin 
This study of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Thailand 
fills a gap since no such studies exist for Thailand. After 
an introduction to Thailand's economy, the thesis presents a 
brief survey of the theories of FDI with reference to the 
less-developed countries. It is followed by a study of the 
country-wise and sector-wise pattern of FOI in Thailand. The 
next two chapters carry out empirical tests of the 
capital-intensity hypothesis and the raw-material 
availability hypothesis respectively. Both the hypotheses 
are found to be statistically acceptable in the case of 
Thailand. This is followed by a simple test of the 
tariff-jumping hypothesis which does not explain FOI in 
Thailand. This should be viewed with caution as only 
nominal rates (as opposed to effective rates of protection) 
are used. Then, a test of a joint hypothesis (capital 
intensity, raw-material availability, and tariff rates) 
confirms the relative prominence of the capital- intensity 
hypothesis. The relative wage-cost hypothesis (i.e., Thai 
wage-rates relative to the Japanese and West German 
wage-rates) is found to be statistically unacceptable in the 
case of Thailand. lastly, welfare effects of FOI are 
examined. A brief survey of the literature and a critical 
appraisal have been presented. So far as Thailand is 
concerned, the general weight of the various arguments leans 
to the conclusion that foreign direct investments have 
ameliorative effects. This conclusion is based on (i) an 
analytical examination of the welfare implications of 
Thailand's over-all pattern of FOI, (ii) a statistical 
analysis of the macroeconomic effects, (iii) an analysis of 
the environmental issues by examining the chemical 
properties of the products produced by foreign firms in the 
Chemical Sector, and (iv) a study of the desired pattern of 
investment in the Thai economy as envisaged in the Five Year 
Plans and the ~ ~ sectoral pattern of FOI. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a study of some aspects of foreign direct 
investment in Thailand. Our studies include 'pattern', 
'causes' and 'welfare effects' of foreign direct investment. 
To the best of our knowledge, no such studies on Thailand 
hitherto have been done; and it is hoped that this work will 
fill a gap. However, Panchareon (1980) and Lecraw (1977, 
1979) have done some work on specific issues of 
multinational firms in Thailand. Panchareon (1980) studied 
three industries (viz., textiles, food processing and 
electronics) and found that a statistically significant 
difference existed between the technology used by local 
firms and that used by foreign firms. Lecraw (1979) found 
that the foreign-owned firms in Thailand do not choose less 
"appropriate" technology than the domestically owned firms. 
In connection with the FDI from the LDCs to Thailand, Lecraw 
(1977) found evidence that the LDC firms tended to use 
relatively more labour-intensive technologies than the local 
firms. 
It is generally believed that Thailand's extensive natural 
resources and low-cost labour make it an attractive 
proposition for foreign investors. The Thai government 
welcomes foreign investment and through the Board of 
Investment (BOI) encourages it, particularly in import-
substitution industries, export-oriented ventures, 
especially those whose labour-intensive technology is 
beneficial to the agriculture sector. The Investment 
Services Centre (ISC) of the Board of Investment in Bangkok 
2 
can help investors to obtain all necessary licences and 
permits for setting up or expanding business in Thailand. 
The BOI has three investment promotion centres abroad in New 
York, Frankfurt and Sydney. It has major discretionary 
powers in granting relief on import duties, exemption from 
taxation and other benefits. 
This introduction summarises the findings and conclusions of 
the thesis. The first chapter presents a brief outline of 
Thailand and her economy. The second chapter presents a 
brief survey of the theories of foreign direct investment, 
namely, those theories which deal with the determinants of 
foreign direct investment. An attempt is made to highlight 
the aspects of the theories which are relevant to the 
less-developed countries. Furthermore, the survey includes 
a discussion of the relevant empirical tests of the 
theories. The state of the literature is such that nothing 
specifically can be pin-pointed as the cause of foreign 
direct investment although a host of 'determinants ' jointly 
explain foreign direct investment. 
The third chapter analyses the pattern of foreign direct 
investment in Thailand. Using time-series aggregate flow of 
foreign direct investment, we have found that a 
statistically significant trend exists. So far as aggregate 
flow from a specific country is concerned, we could (because 
of data non-availability) examine only the flows from 
Germany and Japan. There is a significant trend for the 
flow of German investments to Thailand, although a similar 
result does not hold for the Japanese flow. By using the 
3 
Bor cross-section cumulative data (1961-1981), we have 
analysed the sector-wise and country-wise pattern of 
investment. Eight per cent of the firms from the 
less-developed countries are in the 51-100% 
foreign-ownership category while twenty-five per cent of the 
firms from the developed countries are in the 51-100% 
foreign-ownership category. About thirty-one per cent of the 
firms (LOC & DC) are in the 41-49% foreign-ownership 
category which is by far the most popular category. The 
largest proportion (twenty-eight per cent) of the foreign 
direct investments has been channeled to the mineral sector 
which is not surprising in view of the relative abundance of 
mineral resources in Thailand. The second largest 
proportion (nineteen per cent) has gone to the "Other 
Industries' sector which includes 
industries such as Wood Products 
natural resources-based 
and relatively labour 
intensive industries such as spinning, weaving and knitting. 
The leading investors in Thafla-nd are Japan, USA and Taiwan. 
About twenty-seven per cent of the total investments in the 
agricultural sector, about thirty-nine per cent of the total 
investments in the mineral sector, and about sixty-nine per 
cent of the total investment in the mechanical sector comes 
from Japan. (Similar figures are calculated for other 
countries such as USA, Taiwan, UK, India, Hong-Kong, 
Singapore, Netherlands and West Germany.) Ranking the 
propositions of investments going to different sectors for 
the DCs and LOCs separately, we find that they are different 
except for the mineral sector. The hypothesis that a country 
with higher per capita income will have a larger share of 
foreign direct investment in a less-developed country is not 
statistically significant for Thailand. 
4 
The fourth chapter carries out an empirical test of the 
capital-intensity hypothesis in the case of Thailand. For 
various reasons, as discussed in the chapter, foreign direct 
investments are associated with projects using relatively a 
larger quantity of capital. We have analysed the 
country-wise and sector-wise capital-labour ratios. Our 
study shows that the capital-labour ratios differ greatly 
between sectors and also between investing countries. Most 
of the capital-labour ratios of the DCs are larger than 
those of the LDCs. Also, we have found significant 
differences in the capital-labour ratios between the 
primarily foreign-owned firms and the primarily Thai-owned 
firms. However, in two sectors, viz., Mineral and 'Other 
Industries' sectors, high capital-labour ratios are observed 
in the primarily Thai-owned firms. The conclusions regarding 
the firms in 0.1-49% foreign-ownership category having a 
lower capital-intensity than the firms in 51-100% 
foreign-ownership category have been further reinforced by 
our simple econometric tests. It is empirically acceptable 
that sectoral capital-labour ratios are associated with 
sectoral foreign direct investments in Thailand, although no 
causal relationship is implied. 
The -fifth chapter tests the raw-material availability 
hypothesis in the case of Thailand. Here a distinction is 
made not only between the primarily Thai-owned firms but 
also between the use of domestically available raw-materials 
and the use of imported raw-materials. The analysis here is 
carried out in terms of the raw-material/labour ratios. In 
the Agricultural sector, the domestically available 
5 
raw-material/labour ratios (r) of the Des are generally 
higher for the primarily foreign-owned firms than those for 
the primarily Thai-owned firms. But in the case of LDCs, 
the domestically available raw-material/labour ratios (r) 
for the primarily Thai-owned firms are in general relatively 
higher than those for the primarily foreign-owned firms. In 
the mineral sector, the r ratios in the primarily 
foreign-owned firms from the DCs are in general lower than 
the r ratios of those from the LOCs. In general, we find 
that firms (51-100% foreign-ownership category) from the 
LOCs use less raw-materials 
the firms (in the same 
countries. The pattern of 
per unit of labour relative to 
category) from the developed 
the imported raw-material/labour 
ratios are remarkably similar to that of the domestically 
available raw-material/labour ratios. There is a problem 
here. Why should foreign firms import raw-materials if they 
are abundantly available in Thailand? In order to answer 
this question, we examined some specific firms which import 
raw-materials. It is revealed that most of the raw-
materials are imported from the neighbouring countries (e.g. 
Malaysia) and not from the investing developed countries 
like USA or Japan. Therefore, the hypothesis still holds 
although an additional hypothesis is required to explain why 
a foreign firm invests in Thailand and imports from Malaysia 
while the same firm would have invested in Malaysia. This 
aspect is beyond the scope of our present work. Simple 
econometric tests have been carried out, and these simply 
reinforced the importance of raw-materials. Our conclusion 
is that the availability of raw-materials does playa 
crucial role in explaining foreign direct investment in 
Thailand. 
6 
The sixth chapter carries out a simple econometric test of 
the tariff-jumping hypothesis by regressing sectoral 
investments on nominal rate of tariffs. The hypothesis is 
rejected in the case of Thailand. In saying so, we should 
emphasize that results could be different if effective rates 
of tariff are used. This proved impossible because of lack 
of data. However, we note that our conclusion is in line 
with several other studies. 
The seventh chapter tests a joint hypothesis by regressing 
sectoral foreign direct investments on capital-labour ratio, 
raw-material/labour ratio and tariff rates. The conclusion 
is that capital-labour ratio is by far the most significant 
variable. Tariff rates are again found to be insignificant. 
The eighth chapter tests the hypothesis that foreign direct 
investment in Thailand is explained by relatively abundant 
labour (hence, relatively low labour wage-rates). This is 
done by using time-series data for two countries, viz., 
Japan and West Germany. It is found that relative wage rates 
do not explain the flow of direct investment either from 
Japan or from West Germany to Thailand. It may be because 
foreign direct investment (which brings new technology with 
it) requires skilled labour which is relatively scarce in 
Thailand. 
The ninth chapter carries out a brief survey of the 
literature on welfare effects of foreign direct investment 
with reference to the LDCs. We also present a critical 
appraisal of the various arguments put forward in favour of 
7 
foreign direct investment. So far as Thailand is concernerl, 
we apply some of the arguments on a broad basis. It appears 
that, on a 'broad-brush' basis, Thailand obtains benefits 
from foreign direct investment. However, it is also fairly 
clear from our study that there are environmental problems 
in so far as many foreign firms investing in the Chemical 
sector use poisonous, dangerous, hazardous materials. 
Considering aggregate flow of foreign direct investment, we 
found evidence that foreign direct investments have some 
impact on exports. However, comparing the desired pattern 
of investment in the economy as laid out in the Five Year 
Plans with the ~ ~ pattern of foreign direct investment 
for four Five Year Plans, we found that there are 
considerable differences in each Plan period. There are, 
thus, favourable and unfavourable effects of foreign direct 
investment. We venture the judgement that the over-all 
effects of foreign direct investments in Thailand are 
ameliorative. 
8 
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SECTION 1.1: THE COUNTRY 
The Kingdom of Thai'an~ means 'Land of Freedom'. Previously 
the country was known to the West as 'Siam'. Thailand is 
strategically situate~ in South Asia in the middle of the 
Indo-China Peninsula. Its border adjoins Kampuchea 
'Cambodia' to the east, Laos to the north-east and Burma to 
the west. The Peninsula of Tr.ai1and faces the Gulf of 
Thailand with the South China sea to the east and on the 
west by the Indian Ocean, whi1e to the extreme south lies 
Malaysia. 
SECTION 1.2: GEOGRAPHY 
Thailand covers an area of 209,411 square miles (542,373 
square kilometres), approximately the same size as France. 
It has over 2,600 kilometres of coastline. The country can 
be divided into four regions. The central plain, with its 
fertile alluvial soils, is dominated by the largest river, 
the Chao Phya river, on which lies the capital city of 
Bangkok. Also it is in the central plain that most of the 
country's grain crops are grown. The northern region is 
mountainous and has valuable teak forests. The north-east 
region has many plantations and is an important area for the 
production of cash crops such as kenaf, cassava and cotton. 
The southern peninsula is an area important for fruits 
agriculture, mining and coastal fisheries. 
Thailand has a tropical climate with temperatures ranging 
10 
o 0 
from 13 c to 38 c according to the season. There are three 
distinct seasons: the winter or cool season from November to 
February, summer from March to May, and the rainy season or 
monsoon period from June to October, which brings heavy rain 
to the central part causing occasional widespread flooding. 
SECTION 1.3: POPULATION 
The population in 1983 totalled about 49 million with a 
growth rate of 2.1% per annum. The United Nations estimates 
the Thai birth rate at 39.6 per 1,000 in 1970-1975 and the 
death rate at 10.5 in the same period. The death rate in 
1983 is 5.1% - a considerable fall. More than 4 per cent of 
the population live in Bangkok and this is the most populous 
province. The majority of the population belongs to the Thai 
ethnic group with 4 million Chinese representing the largest 
minority but generally well assimilated. There are also 
700,000 Moslem - Malays in the far south and about 300,000 
scattered hill people in the northern region. The 
predominant religion is Buddhism but there is a Muslim 
minority concentrated in four southern provinces and one per 
cent of the people belong to various Christian Sects. The 
national language is Thai. But in some parts of the south 
and north of the country, related dialects are spoken. A11 
education is carried on in formal Thai. English is taught as 
a second language and is widely used in government and 
commercial circles. 
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SECTION 1.4: GOVERN~ENT 
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy similar to the United 
Kingdom, the reigning monarch being King Bhumiphol 
Adulyadej. The King is head of state and head of the armed 
forces. He exercises his legislative power through the 
National Assembly, executive power through the council of 
ministers and judicial power through the courts. In terms of 
government, the country is principally ruled by strong 
bureaucratic institutions. The national interest operates in 
terms of the National Assembly which consists of an elected 
house of representatives and senate overseen by the 
military. 
An uneasy situation prevails along the Thai-Kampuchean 
border, with periodic outbreaks of fighting reported between 
Vietnamese-led troops and Khmer Rouge guerrillas. Thai 
troops remain on full alert to discourage the spread of such 
incidents into Thai territory. The threat posed by 
Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea remains and the presence of 
an estimated (1982) 100,000 Kampuchean refugees in holding 
centres just within Thai territory, and a further 200,000 
along the frontier, is both a drain on Thailand's resources 
and a factor heightening its sense of vulnerability. 
SECTION 1.5: INTERNATIONAL LINK 
Thailand is a member of the United Nations and of several 
regional organisations such as the Colombo Plan, the Asian 
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Deve 1 0pment Bank, the IMF and a founder member of The 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Bangkok is 
the headquarters of the Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). 
SECTION 1.6: RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Thailand has had a long economic relationship with the UK 
since the 17th century. Thai exports to the UK are primary 
products such as silver and agricultural produce. In return 
the UK exports to Thailand electrical machinery, power 
generating machines, and industrial machinery. Over the last 
10 years the volume of trade between Thailand and the UK has 
been increasing. But the balance of trade between the two 
) 
countries has always been in deficit from Thailands point of 
view. Also the UK, by far, is the largest European investor 
in Thailand and UK ranks fourth in the league table of all 
foreign investment in Thailand. Most of the British 
companies in Thailand are engaged in the fo 11 0\'11 n g 
industries:- chemical and pharmaceutical products, 
industrial machinery, primary products and metallic mineral 
manufacturing. In October 1980 the EEC arranged for quotas 
to be imposed on imports of certain Thai garments into the 
UK. Thai exports of tapioca to EEC are also regulated under 
this agreement. 
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SECTION 1.7: TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION 
Thailand has some 25,000km of highways and provincial roads. 
Road building has been given high priority under the 
development plans, a project to improve highways with 
assistance from the World Bank is underway. Roads now play 
an important part in the country's transport and 
communication system. In 1980, Thailand has a railway 
consisting of 5,186km of track, connecting Thailand with 
Malays;a and Singapore. All lines are state-owned. The state 
railways has drawn up a plan for the expanding of the rail 
network over the five-year period ending in 1986. Navigable 
waterways are about 1,100km long in the dry season and 
1,600km in the wet season. Rivers, particularly the Chao 
Phya and its tributaries are used for the carriage of a 
large proportion of inland traffic. The port of Bangkok, at 
the mouth of the Chao Phya River, handles 95 per cent of the 
country's exports, despite the fact that it ;s unable to 
accommodate vessels exceeding 10,000 tons. Larger vessels 
must anchor in deep water and have their cargoes loaded and 
unloaded by lighters ones. The government is negotiating 
with the Asian Development Bank for a loan for the 
construction of deep-sea ports in the south of the country. 
In addition, a new deep-water port is being developed in 
conjunction with the development of the eastern seaboard as 
a major industrial zone. 
Bangkok has a modern airport which caters for more than 
thirty international airlines operating over 800 flights 
into Bangkok each week. There is also an international air 
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network serving 16 provincial destinations. Expansion is 
taking place at two major airports, which wil" when 
finished, be upgraded to international airports. Thailand 
has a modern worldwide telex, telegraph and telephone 
facilities. There are, also, radio and television stations 
carrying commercial advertising. 
SECTION 1.8: ECONOMIC PLAN 
The Thai economy from the post-war period into the 1950's 
was poorly developed. Plans for economic development were 
virtually non-existent. Before the first economic plan was 
officially launched in 1961, the country deve10ped very 
slowly. Without a definite national policy and framework 
each ministry and governmental unit carried out their tasks 
under their own direction. There was little connection or 
commitment among each unit. In addition to economic 
difficulties, the country was faced with political turmoil 
until 1957 when finally there was a coup led by Sarit. The 
new government approvec an institutional framework for 
economic growth. In 1961 the First National Plan was 
promulgated and development planning in Thailand has 
continuously been improved since then. The first Plan 
(1961-1966) dealt exclusively with public sector 
expenditure. The Second Plan (1966-1971) was expanded to 
include planning for man-power and private sector 
development. The Third Plan (1971-1976) attempted to improve 
the economic and social systems especially in rural areas. 
It also put forward policies concerning population and 
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employment, as well as promoting the role of the private 
sector in Thailand's economic development. The Fourth Plan 
(1976-1981) was geared to the development and conservation 
of critical economic resources ego land, forests, water, 
mineral and the environment. At the same time the plan 
sought to raise rural output and income and to develop 
industrialisation, foreign trade and tourism in the country. 
The Fifth Economic Plan (1982-1986) was officially launched 
on 1st October 1981, being designed to build up economic 
order . through amending and enacting laws concerning 
financial institutions, insurance companies, and by 
introducing fiscal monetary reforms. The plan also gives 
special attention to major economic objectives including 
Thailand's financial stability, energy policy, agricultural 
productivity, domestic economic stability, improvement of 
industrial development policies, income and employment 
policy, regional economic programme and economic monopoly. 
During the 
plan up to 
20 years of planned development from the first 
the fourth plan (1961-1981), Thailand has 
sustained impressive economic growth with structural changes 
in production. On the whole during this period the country's 
economy grew at an average rate of more than 7 per cent per 
year. This was accomplished by expanding the agricultural 
sector and diversifying production and exports of both 
agricultural and industrial goods. However, the high growth 
rates have been accompanied by rapid deterioration of 
forests, land, water and marine resources. At the same time 
the benefits of growth have not been evenly spread among all 
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areas and sectors of the economy. 
high growth while other areas have 
growth at all. Thus, this pattern 
income disparity. 
SECTION 1.9: ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Some areas have enjoyed 
not experienced any 
of growth has led to 
The annual average rate of real economic growth has been 
9.5% over the period 1977-1980 despite year-to-year 
fluctuations due largely to drought, flood etc. But growth 
has not spread evenly in the regions and this has led to 
wide regional disparities in incomes. Rapid economic 
expansion, particularly in the manufacturing and mini'ng 
sectors, has also led to an acceleratior. of imports which, 
coming on top of oil price increases, has resulted in 
balance of payment deficits. This will be taken up in 
Section 1.14. 
Table 1 presents figures on real GOP, per-capita income, 
export performance, and inflation. Real per-capita income 
has increased consistently during the seventies. Prices 
have increased by almost 60% during the five year period 
(1975-1980). There has been a steady increase of exports 
during the decade 1970-1980. The rate of growth of exports 
is somewhat uneven. Thi~ is further discussed in Section 
1 . 14. 
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TABLE 1.1 
· ... .. .. .. .. 
e ... .. .. .. .. 
: 1970 : 1971 : 1972 : 1973 : 1974 : 1975 : 1976 : 1977 : 1978 : 1979 : 1980 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
GDP 
BILLION $ 
(1975 =100) 
: 9.85 
· 
: 10.49 
· . · . . . . 
· . · . . . . . 
: 10.98 : 11. 67 : 12.93 : 13.64 : 14.61 : 15.89 :18.81 : 19.87 :20.94 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
RATE OF GROWTH 
OF GDP 
PER CAPITA 
INCOME ~ 
(1975 = 100) 
EXPORT PERFORMANCE 
MILLION US $ 
(1975 =100) 
EMPLOYMENT ( THOUSAHD) 
· 
· : 6.5% 
· . 
: 3613 : 3701 
· · 
: 930 : 1039 
· . 
: 16477 : 16618 
· 
: 4.7% : 6.3% 
· 
: 4034 : 5445 
· 
: 1293 : 1712 
· . 
· . 
: 16058 : 16754 
· . . . . . 
· · . . . . 
: 10.8% : 5.5% : 7.1% : 8.8% : 18. 4 % : 5. 6% :5.4% 
.... ... 
: 6640 : 7079 : 7713 : 8879 :10300 : 11843 :14475 
· 
. . . 
. . 
: 2577 : 2177 : 2722 : 2964 :3153 
. 
. 
: 3847 
· 
· :4482 
.. .. .. .. .. . .. 
.. .. . .. .. .. .. 
: 17159 : 18182 : 18411 : 20308 :21738.: 21230 :22523 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
CONSUMER PRICES 
INDEX 
(1975 = 100) 
· . 
: 62. 8 .: 63. 1 : 66.2 
· 
.. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. 
: 76.4 : 95.0 : 100.0 : 104.2 : 112.1 :120.9 : 139.9 :159.1 
==========================:============================================================================================= 
SOURCE: United Nations Year Book. 
SECTION 1.10: INCO~ES AND LABOUR 
The estimated figure for the labour force in 1980 put the 
total at about 23.88 million with unemployment officially 
estimated at 5.7%. It should be noted that 70% of the 
employed work force was in agriculture, 6% in manufacturing 
and the remainder in construction, trade and services. 
However, figures released recently by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives reveal a more disturbing 
picture. In 1979, 45% of the work force in the agricultural 
sector was fully employed, 24.9% underemployed, 28.8% were 
seasonally unemployed (ie. for up to 8 months of the year) 
and 0.8% unemployed throughout the year. In the 
non-agricultural sector only 36.1% was fully employed, 55.3% 
suffered seasonal unemployment, 7.6% was under-employed and 
1% unemployed. 
The Trade Union movement is not very militant in Thailand; 
and strikes have been permitted by the Ministry of Interior 
since 1980. Minimum daily wage rates are 54 Bahts in the 
Bangkok City, 47 Bahts in the south and central provinces, 
and 44 Bahts for those in the north and north-east. A 
compensation programme has been enforced since 1974. 
Employers are required to contribute to the Fund at rates 
varying from 0.2% to 4.5% of total payroll depending on the 
risks of the job. If the employee suffers injury, sickness 
or death in the course of employment, the empioyer must pay 
compensation. Medical expenses, compensation for injury and 
disability must be paid according to a notification of the 
Ministry of the Interior. However, this regulation has not 
been adequately exercised. 
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Incomes within Thailand vary greatly between urban and rural 
workers and from region to region as can be seen from the 
figures given below. 
Per Capita Income in 1979 (baht: ~) 
By region. 
Northeast 4,491 
North 8,781 
South 12,683 
Central 14,706 (excluding Bangkok) 
East 23,774· 
Bangkok 30.161 
National average 12,067 
SECTION 1.11: AGRICULTURE 
By EmEloyment 
Agriculture 
Manufacturing 
Commerce 
Sel"V i ce 
7,113 
44,215 
70,339 
32,665 
Thailand's economy is primarily based on agriculture. It is 
self-sufficient in most basic foodstuffs and the country is 
one of the world's leading net exporters of food products. 
In 1980 the agricultural sector accounted for 25% of GOP, 
and employs 70% of the labour force. Some 27 million acres, 
a quarter of the total land area, are under cultivation and 
this sector is the most important for the country's 
prosperity. It should be emphasised that the increase in 
agricultural production was due almost entirely to 
extensions of the area under cultivation rather than 
increases in yields per acre. Yields per acre of rice, 
maize, tapioca have in fact remained virtually static since 
1960. The main crops are rice, tapioca, maize, sugar, rubber 
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and tobacco. Rice growing in Thailand is very 
labour-intensive employing about 10 million people. The 
country is a main supplier of rice to many parts of 
South-East Asia, The Middle East and Africa. Rice remains 
the country's most important export crop. Cassava (tapioca) 
production has increased five times over the last 10 years. 
In 1980 Thailand was the largest exporter of tapioca 
products in the world. Moreover, Thailand is the world's 
third largest exporter of rubber after Malaysia and 
Indonesia. A fifth of the rubber plantations have been 
replanted with high-yielding plants. Sugar is also a major 
export earner, fluctuating widely in line with world prices. 
Maize is a comparatively new crop for the country, but it 
could become a major export item in the future, the USSR and 
Japan being the main importers. 
SECTION 1.12: MINING 
Mining has been making an increasing contribution to the 
economy in recent years. Thailand is the most important tin 
producer in the world after Malaysia. Plans have recently 
been announced for the construction of a large tantalum 
processing plant in the Phuket province in the south-west. 
Thailand also produces lignite, fluoride, iron, lead and 
wolfram. 
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Main Mineral Production (tonnes): 1978 1979 1980 
Tin concentrates 41,210 46,366 45,986 
Fluorite 175,531 177,730 172,784 
Barite Ore 274,564 378,654 305,057 
Gypsum 280,904 352,398 411,977 
Iron Ore 88,121 103,101 84,966 
Manganese 65,498 29,496 51,583 
SECTION 1.13: INDUSTRY 
The industrial sector of Thailand is comparatively small and 
is involved primarily with processing of agricultural 
commodities and production of textiles and garments with 
relatively small-scale plants. But over the last decade 
1970-1980, there has been a +.rend towards large scale 
production. Textiles led the earlier period of growth but 
world recession hit the industry hard. At present the 
textile industry is returning to its former peak. The other 
industries which play an important part in the economy are 
paper, chemical, metal, glass, cement, electrical 
appliances, and automobile spare parts and accessories. In 
common with many other countries Thailand, with its growing 
process of industrialisation, has felt the effects of rising 
oil prices. However, there have been extensive natural gas 
finds in the Gulf of Thailand, which when fully developed 
will have an important impact on the country's balance of 
payments. The supply of natural gas is now being used by 
electricity generating plants. Plans have been approved by 
the government to develop the eastern sea-board into a major 
industrial area to include downstream gas-dependent 
22 
industries such as ethylene, soda ash, and sponge iron 
plants. Encouraging discoveries of oil of a high viscosity 
have also been made recently in inland areas, although it is 
too early to assess the size and commercial potential of the 
field. Thailand is heavily dependent on oil with a total 
consumption of 86 million barrels in 1980. So far no 
substantial oil reserves have been found but completion of 
the natural gas pipeline in 1981 brings gas onshore from the 
Gulf of Thailand that should last about 50 years. This can 
provide some relief from oil imports and also stimulate 
progress on several other major projects, including a new 
deep-sea port, a railway extension, a sponge iron plant, and 
oil refinery expansion. 
SECTION 1.14: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND TRADE 
Thailand has experienced a growing trade deficit ever the 
past few years, which is due largely to the rise in oil 
prices. Since the country has also run a deficit on 
invisible account, there has been a parallel deterioration 
in the current account balance, although this has been 
mostly offset by net capital inflows as can be seen from the 
following figures: 
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Balance of Payments (US $: ~illion) 
Export; Lo.b. 
Imports; c.i.f. 
Trade balance 
Services (net) 
Transfers: private 
official 
Current account balance 
Direct investment 
Portfolio investment (nie) 
Other long-term capital ( n i e) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
· . . . 
· . . . 
4045: 5233: 6449: 6902: 6835 
· . . . . 
· . . . . 
:-4913:-6828:-8364:-8931:-7565 
· . . . 
· . . . 
-868:-1595:-1915:-2029: -730 
· · · 
· · · · 
-329: -558: -584:-1185:-1076 
· · · · 
· 6 : 23: 77: 526: 693 
· · · · 
· · · 35: 39: 133: 119 : 108 
· · · · · 
· · · · :-1156:-2091:-2298:-2569:-1005 
· · · · 
.. 
· · 50: 52: 188: 288: 
· · · · 
· · · 76: 180: 96: 44: 
· · · · 
· · · 527: 1240: 1819: 1553: 
· · · · 
· · · Other short-term capital (nie): 714: 503: -105: 594: 
189 
68 
1131 
58 
· · · 
· · SDR allocation 24: 25: 23: 
· · : 
· · Net errors and ommissions -237: 25: 88: 133: -521 
· · · · 
· · · · Total of above items -26: -67: -178: -66: -80 
nie = not included elsewhere 
The rate of exchange has not fluctuated widely as can be 
seen from Table 1.2. It has been about ~20 to one US dollar 
throughout the seventies. A similar picture does not hold 
against the pound sterling the Baht price of which has 
fallen from about ~50 to ~31. 
Thailand has long been one of the world's leading exporters 
of rice, rubber, and tin. Primary products still account for 
over half of total Thai exports. However, recent years have 
seen the rise to prominence of new items as diverse as 
tapioca products and integrated circuits. 
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TABLE 1.2 
Rates of exchange: 
:Buying one S:Selling one S:buying one £:Selling one £: 
1970 20.83 21. 00 4·9.89 50.31 
1971 20.83 21. 00 50.89 51.31 
1972 20.83 21.00 52.12 52.56 
1973 20.49 20.72 50.23 50.84 
1974 20.25 20.45 47.36 47.88 
1975 20.26 20.45 45.00 45.48 
1976 20.35 20.45 34.34 36.65 
1977 20.35 20.44 35.32 35.63 
1978 20.24 20.38 38.80 39.16 
1979 20.33 20.46 43.09 43.46 
1980 20.38 20.53 47.34 47.80 
1981 21.72 21.87 43.84 44.35 
1982 22.90 23.05 40.03 40.44 
1983 20.90 23.05 34.69 35.02 
1984 23.54 23.69 31. 33 31. 65 
SOURCE: Bank of Thailand. Monthly Bulletin, 1978-1984. 
Published by The Department of Economic Affairs. 
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Value of Principal Exports (~ million) 
Rice 
Tapioca products 
Rubber 
Tin 
Maize 
Sugar 
Crude materials 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
. . . .. .. .. .. 
.. . .. .. .. .. " 
:15360:15592:19508:26366:22510:20135: 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. . .. . .. .. 
:10892: 9891:14887:16446:19752:15387: 
· · · · · · 
· · · · · 8000:12351:12351:10841: 9490:11822: 
· : · · · · · · · · · 7229: 9250:11347: 9091: 7773: 5263: 
· · · · 
: · 
· · · · · 4275: 5643: 7299: 8349: 8330: 8485: 
· · · · · · 
· · · 3969: 4797: 2975: 9572:12932: 6331: 
. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
:10469:15193:16681:16722:15134:16270: 
The increase in the value of exports is explained more by 
increases in prices than quantities. This is especially true 
of rice and rubber exports. Japan ;s still the most 
important market for Thailand's pxports. Trade with 
Netherlands has shown a marked expansion. The United States 
is a purchaser of a wide range of Thai products, 
particularly tin and ready-made garments. Indonesia, 
Singapore, Hong-Kong and Malaysia buy most of Thailand's 
exported rice. 
Principal Destinations of Exports (~ million) 
Japan 
Netherlands 
United States 
Singapore 
Hong-Kong 
Ma 1 ay s i a 
West Germany 
Indonesia 
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1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
-- -- -- --
.. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. . .. .. 
:16866:22901:20098:21704:21948: 
.. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. 
:12185:12260:17639:18674:21014: 
.. . . . . 
.. .. .. .. .. 
9153:12106:16834:19794:20257: 
· · · · · 
· · 6723: 9222:10292:11991:11652: 
· · · · : 
· · · 4436: 5260: 6754: 6g68: 8343: 
· · · · · 
· · 4296: 4769: 5990: 7350: 7933: 
· · · · · 
· · · · 3441: 4391: 5516: 4934: 5354: 
1394: 3862: 4835: 2958: 4251: 
· · · : · 
· · United Kingdom 1283: 1989: 2493: 2464: 3041: 
: · · 
. 
· 
· 
. 
Saudi Arabia 1161: 1810: 2320: 3118: 3388: 
· · · : · 
· · · France 1638: 2009: 2192: 2833: 3030: 
Among imports, the fuels and lubricants category records by 
far the largest rise, due primarily to price increases. 
Value of Principal Imports (~ million) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
. 
· · : · · · , . 
· · · · Fuels & Lubricants 22851: 32647: 58667: 65100: 60765: 53741: 
· · · · · · 
· · · · · Non-electric machinery 15894: 18648: 20386: 25842: 21172: 26379: 
· · · 
· · · Base meta 1 s 11607: 16133: 16184: 18804: 17134: 18681: 
· · · · · · 
· · · · Chemicals 9573: 14856: 14919: 18011: 16138: 13362: 
· · · · · · 
· · · · Electrical machinery 5836: 7355: 11169: 10867: 11008: 17940: 
· · · : · · 
· · Vehicles & Parts 7500: 7126 : 6888: 9568: 7687: 13539: 
· : · · · 
· · · Food & beverages 3104: 4263 : 6227 : 6447: 5638: 6888: 
· : · · · · 
· · · Fertilizers & pesticides 2937: 3972: 4304: 5180: 4723: 5473: 
· · · · · · 
· · · · · · Metal manufacturers 2272: 2987: 3198: 5147: 2986: 4133: 
. 
· · · · · · 
· · · · · Total, including others :108899:146161:188686:179334:161593:178731: 
Thailand's leading source of imports ;s Japan, followed by 
the United States and Saudi Arabia. The near doubling of 
imports from Saudi Arabia was accounted for by the rise in 
oil prices; Saudi Arabia supplies half of Thailand's oil 
requirements. 
Licences are required for certain imports, including all 
kinds of wood and wood conversions, used motor vehicle 
bodies, certain paper products, electronic games, all kinds 
of sugar, motor cars and motorcycles for private use. At 
present, ten categories of 'luxury goods' are banned 
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including certain fresh and dried fruits, pastries, building 
materials, porcelain, and motor vehicles and motorcycles 
other than for private use. The customs tariff is based on 
the Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature. 
Principal Sources of Imports (~ million) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
-- -- -- --: 
· · · · · 
· · · Japan :33461:37636:39984:52521:46086: 
· · · · · · · · · · · United States :14831:22754:27208:28087:26220: 
· · · : · · .. · · · · Saudi Arabia 6076: 9403:19103:29395:29819: 
· · · : · 
· · · · Singapore 4419: 6848:12261:14949:12455: 
· · · · · 
· · · West Germany 6300: 7936: 8237: 9336: 7624: 
· · · · · 
· · · United Kingdom 4164: 4708: 5033: 5851: 5023: 
· · · 
· · · Netherlands 1314: 1749: 4676: -na.. : 'fla : 
· · · : · 
· · · · Taiwan 3690: 4072: 3955: 4589: 5501: 
· · : · · · .. · · · Australia 2457: 3268: 3549: 4223: 4338: 
· · : · · 
· · · Ma 1 ay s i a 1367: 2491: 3383: 5891:10214: 
· · · France na · 'na 1911: 3918: 2917: 
· · · 
· · Hong-Kong na na 1792: 1942: 2059: 
============================================================ 
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SECTION 2.1: INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment occurs when a firm of one country 
carries out production in another (host) country instead of 
exporting to the 1atter. The objective of this chapter is to 
explain (a) the characteristics of the firms who invest in a 
foreign country, (b) the determinants of foreign direct 
investments and the various hypotheses which high-light 
these determinants, and (c) the findings of various 
empirical studies. 
Foreign direct investment has become a major phenomenon 
during the post-war years, particularly during the sixties 
and the seventies. Edwards (1977) estimated that the value 
of the output of the multinational corporations (other than 
American) in host countries was $300b in 1975. The output 
figure increases to $550b if the U.S multinationais are 
included. The sheer magnitude of the output is brought home 
when it is realised that, $550b in 1975 was about a ~ of 
world gross production and about ~ of world volume of trade. 
Furthermore, the economic power wielded by the mUltinational 
enterprises is understood when it is realised that about six 
multinationals control about % of the entire oil trade in 
the world market. 
The increasing importance of foreign direct investment in 
the world economy has stimulated economists to carry out 
various theoretical and empirical studies. These studies are 
important (a) in terms of government policy of the host 
country towards direct foreign investment, and (b) in terms 
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of expansion of world trade, and (c) in terms of North-South 
dialogue. The investing as well as the recipient countries 
have become more aware of the impact of outward and inward 
flow of foreign direct investment on their economies as the 
volume of international investment increases. Naturally, 
therefore, research on the causes and effects of foreign 
direct investment is thriving. 
Foreign direct investment takes place through the activities 
of the multinational firms. Litvak and Maule (1969) 
attempted to define a multinational firm. According the the 
authors: 
IIA company is multinational when it no longer 
distinguishes between domestic and international 
business. Domestic business is subordinated to and 
fully integrated with a global plan of action. The 
head office management staff becomes mUltinational 
in outlook and responsibility. Such a company would 
be receptive to moving towerds both international 
ownership and control of the corporate structure ll 
(P.318). 
SECTION 2.2: FORMS OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND TYPES OF 
INVESTMENTS 
The forms of international operations can be divided into 
(a) economic forms and (b) ownership forms. On the economic 
forms of mUltinational firms, we have vertical integration, 
horizontal integration and conglomerates. A multinational 
firm is vertically integrated if its foreign branch produces 
inputs required by the firm, and it is horizontally 
integrated if its foreign branch produces and sells the same 
product. It is a conglomerate if the foreign branch produces 
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entirely a different product. For example, a large U.S. firm 
in the electronic industry can invest in Malaysia to produce 
high-quality rubber. Regarding the ownership forms. Hymer 
(1976) points out that 'the forms we observe, are branch 
plant, wholly owned subsidiary, majority-owned subsidiary, 
joint venture majority interests, licensing arrangement, and 
tacit collusion' (P.65). 
On a different conceptual level, one can also distinguish 
between various types of direct investment. Following Re'uber. 
(1973) we can divide foreign direct investments into three 
types, viz., export-oriented investment, ~arket-development 
investment, and government-initiated investment. Most 
export-oriented investment is made to produce inputs or 
component parts which, then are exported to the parent 
company or elsewhere. This fits into the vertical 
integration form. So far as the market-development 
investment is concerned, Reuber (1973) says: 
From 
"The distinguishing features of this type of 
investment are (i) the output of the project is 
intended primarily for sale in the host country, and 
(ii) the investment is made primarily in response to 
underlying economic considerations such as the size 
of the local market and its long-run potential, 
local production costs, and so on. Such investment 
is usually based on long-term considerations and 
implies a long-run commitment to the country. In the 
short and medium term, it is frequently 
unprofitable" (~74). 
the above statement we can clearly see that 
market-development investment fits into the horizontal 
integration. The third type of investment is the 
government-initiated investment, the main feature of which 
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is that foreign investment takes place as a result of the 
initiative taken by the host-country government. 
Multinational corporations respond to government subsidies, 
tax benefits etc. R~ube~ (1973) points out ,that LDCs do 
promote foreign investment in this manner with the 
objectives of (a) encouraging particular industries, (b) 
developing specific regions or (c) improving the balance of 
payments situation. In many situations, the home- country 
government may also take part in the negotiations between 
the multinational firm and the host-country government. 
Empirical studies carried out by Rellb-e;r (1973) show that the 
degree of foreign control is highest in the export-oriented 
investments. Ownership is normally shared with a host 
country's firm. There is evidence that the policies of the 
investing companies towards investments in the LDCs have 
changed in that "there has been a widespread shift away from 
insisting on 100 per cent ownership and absolute control by 
investors" (P.99). This is most prevalent in market-oriented 
investments and in government initiated investments. 
Investing firms still try to keep 100 per cent control in 
the case of export-oriented investment. 
SECTION 2.3: TRADE VERSUS FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
The question about why a firm invests in a foreign country 
instead of exporting its products to the host country is not 
easy to answer. It depends on a whole set of factors ranging 
from a firm's long-run strategy, objectives and motives to 
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beating the tariff walls built by the host country. Clearly, 
the question of trade versus direct investment does not 
arise in the case of direct investment which is an exte~sion 
~ 
of a corporation in the shape of vertical integration. If a 
Japanese firm invests in Thailand to procure much-needed 
raw-materials for its own use, then the question of trade 
versus direct investment becomes redundant. However, in the 
case of horizontal investment, the question is quite 
relevant. Hirsch (1976) has discussed this problem in terms 
of a simple model where he compares the costs of two 
alternatives for a firm. Assume that a firm in country A 
wishes to supply its product to country B. The following 
conditions must be met if the firm in A produces (and 
invests) in B instead of exporting to B. These are: 
Pb + C < PB + M { 1 } 
Pb + C « Pb + K ( 2 ) 
In {I} and (2), P
a 
and Pb are the unit costs of production 
respectively in country A and B, C is the cost of operating 
a foreign concern, M is the excess of international over 
domestic marketing costs (M ~O), and K is the investment 
required to have the know-how so that the firm can produce 
and market the products. Inequalities (1) and {2} simply 
imply that foreign direct investment takes place if the host 
country can be supplied at a lower cost by producing on 
location than by exporting from the firms production unit in 
the home country. Agmon and Hirsch (1979) have extended 
this model to include "specific conditions of lOCs by 
* * * replacing parameters K, M and C by K, M and C 
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respectively where the starred parameters relate to the 
original parameters plus LDC cost premium" (P.335) 
The existence of profitable (low cost) investment 
opportunity in the host country via the lower cost factors 
such as labour or raw-materials are presumably available to 
local entrepreneurs as well as foreign investors. The 
question which then arises is: Why do local producers not 
exploit these low cost advantages themselves? One 
explanation put forward is that it is not comparative cost 
advantage alone which brings a high rate of return to 
multinational firms. Firms combine the cost advantage with 
other specific advantages (to be discussed later in this 
chapter) which are not available to the local entrepreneurs. 
Related to the above discussion is the question about 
licensing. If a firm has specific advantages over firms of 
other countries, it may decide to license a local firm in 
the host country instead of investing in the host country. 
Hymer (1970) thinks that local firms may have their own 
advantages which could help towards building up a more 
profitable and efficient local unit producing products under 
license. It also avoids "problems of long-distance 
co-ordination" (Hymer (1970), P.53). Hymer (1976) provides 
some empirical evidence that the total receipts of the U.S. 
companies from rents, royalties etc., from unaffiliated 
foreign firms ;s only marginally significant ($128.4m) as 
compared to the earnings from direct investments ($3.13 .b) 
in 1956. 
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SECTION 2.4: MACROECONOMIC APPROACH 
The earlier work of MacDougall (1960) and Kemp (1961) used a 
macro-economic approach by making movement of'capital from 
country to the other country a function of the differential 
rates of return on capital. Assuming perfect competition and 
a single commodity produced by capital and labour, capital 
will move from the country with a relatively lower rate of 
return to the country with a relatively higher rate of 
return. This can be seen easily from Figure 2.1 where 
AB and CD are the marginal product of capital curves for 
country 1 and 2 respectively. The initial stocks of capital 
in country 1 and 2 are GH and EF with the rate of return of 
country 2 (viz., 02 F) being higher than that (viz., 0IG) 
for country 1. Given this difference between the rates of 
return, capital moves from country 1 to country 2. This 
process will go on till the rates of return are equalised at 
0IM = 02N so that SV amount of capital has moved from 
country 1 to country 2. This is a simple but a powerful 
argument. 
A 
Rate of 
return 
M 
Figure 2.1 
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MacDougall (1960) then attempts to assess the benefits and 
costs of private investment from abroad. He wishes to 
discover the effects of an increase in the foreign owned 
capital stock but only by examining relatively small changes 
in the stock of foreign capital. The study ignores certain 
dynamic considerations that may be important and assumes 
that the economy involved have had time to adjust itself in 
the long run. 
Although MacDougall IS analysis makes drastic assumptions, he 
nevertheless in the course of his article, examines the 
implications by eschewing the imposed assumptions viz., (I) 
the government maintains full employment, (2) there is no 
taxation; ( 3 ) there are no external economies; ( 4 ) 
production functions exhibit returns to scale; (5) perfect 
competition prevails. Additional'y the balance of payments 
is assumed to be always in equilibrium and the terms of 
trade effects are ignored. Finally, the size of the labour 
force and the stock of the domestically owned capital are 
assumed to be independent of the stock of foreign capital. 
Using the Cobb-Douglas production function, we have the 
following model: 
01.. L ; - "'" y = K ( 1 ) 
r = «.- Keto - i L'-c<.. ( 2 ) 
W = (1-~) K 
<>i:I L'-eX.. ( 3 ) 
P = rK ( 4 ) 
3~ 
W = 
y = 
wL 
rK + wL 
( 5 ) 
( 6 ) 
Equation (1) states that output Y is produced by using 
capital (K) and Labour (L). Equation (2) states that rental 
(r) paid for capital services is equal to the marginal 
product of capital. Equation (3) similarly, equates 
wage-rate (w) to the marginal product of labour. Equation 
(4) and (5) respectively give profits (P) and wage-income 
(W). Lastly, equation (6) states that total income (Y) is 
the sum of profits and wages. 
We treat (K) and (L) as exogenous variables. There are, 
therefore, five endogenously determined variables, viz, (r), 
(w), (Y), (P) and (W) in terms of which there are six 
equations. However, equation (3) follows from (1), (2) and 
(6). Therefore, there are five equations to determine five 
unknowns. We are interested in finding the effect of an 
exogenous increase in (K) on the endogenous variables. 
Differentiating (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) with 
respect to (K), holding (L) constant, we get the following: 
1 o 
o 1 
o -K 
o 0 
1 -K 
o 
o 
1 
o 
o 
o o 
o o 
o o 
1 -L 
o -L 
'>Y/~K 
or / oK 
oP / ~K 
~W/~K 
aw/o K 
= 
~Y 
K 
of... ( 0<. - 1) 12 
K 
r 
o 
r 
(7) 
Using Cramer's rule and denoting the determinant in the 
coefficient by IDf we get 
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'bY/oK = I YI 
101 
~r/oK = I r1 
lOt 
a P /?J K = I PI ( 8 ) 
lIT! 
~\UoK = 11~1/ 
nn 
aw/<lK = 1\>1\ 
lUI 
We find D = -L<'O (9) 
Using (8) and (9) appropriately, we get, 
'bY/oK = -o<.Y L 
K __ > a ( 10) 
-L 
Thus (10) states that if change of capital (K) is increased, 
income (Y) will increase. 
or/~K = - L (0(.- 1) Ye>t 
K::t <0 ( 11) 
-[ 
The result is that the marginal productivity of capital (r) 
will decrease if capital (K) is increased. 
oW 
OK 
= ee''( (0{.- i) 
K. 
~ a (12) 
Thus (12) states that if capital increases, the total wage 
income will decrease. 
~ = t:>e:.(i- oG )'( ) L a (13) 
And in (13) shows that if capital changes the wage rate will 
change in the same direction. It should be noticed that the 
results of this mathematical analysis are formally similar 
to those derived in diagramatic form by MacDougall (1960). 
Thus, while foreign investment does prove to be profitable 
in the investing country we must be able to observe more 
specific reasons behind direct investment in order to derive 
appropriate explanations as to why capital movement (in 
terms of technological knowhow and managerial expertise etcJ 
takes place initially. 
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SECTION 2.5: MODELS OF OLIGOPOLISTIC FIRM WITH SPECIFIC 
ADVANTAGES 
Clearly, capital can Imove l from one country to another only 
if an economic agent or a firm of one country invests in the 
other. Here we go away from the perfectly competitive macro 
world to a mic~o world with oligopolistic market structure 
and product differentiation. 
The recent major attempts to explain international 
investment are based on the loligopolistic l concept. It is 
characterfstic of oligopolistic theory that it covers many 
areas of analysis including the new theory of the firm, 
monopolistic competition, industrial organisation structure, 
capital theory, location theory and international trade 
theory. The oligopolistic theory it is hoped, will give a 
more realistic picture and a more adequate explanation of 
international investment. This theory has been built on 
micro-economic foundations. It seeks to explain direct 
foreign investment in terms of market imperfections, 
oligopolistic interdependence, and the possession of 
monopolistic advantages. Recent work in this field has been 
led by Hymer (1960, 1976) and followed by Kindleberger 
(1969, 1984), Johnson (1968), Caves (1971, 1973), Dunning 
(1971), Knickerbocker (1973), Horst (1972, 1973), and Hirsch 
(1976) among others. 
Oligopolistic theory starts with the fact that firms operate 
across national boundaries; and they are confronted with 
several difficulties and additional costs. These include 
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communication, culture, language, law, poor knowledge of 
local market conditions, and the risk of production in 
foreign countries. For a foreign firm to operate 
profitably, it must possess some sort of advantage which 
could offset the high cost of information, communication, 
organisation and management. Thus it is emphasised that 
direct investment firms must have some monopolistic and/or 
oligopolistic advantages not possessed by potential foreign 
or local competitors. 
The very nature of oligopolistic structure entails product 
differentiation, large scale production and economies of 
scale. The firm which is said to possess these advantages 
will rely firstly on product differentiation in terms of 
slight variations in presentation, appearance and 
performance in products manufactured by itself or by its 
rival firms. Caves (1974) gives a clear view of 'product 
differentiation' and says it is simply a collection of 
functionally similar goals produced by competing sellers, 
but with each seller's product distinguishable from its 
rivals by minor physical variations, brand name, or 
differences in terms of conditions of sale. Competition 
among sellers occurs primarily through advertising. As an 
industry grows more oligopolistic the market-oriented R&D 
becomes more important. R&D with the purpose of product 
differentiation is an obvious practice in many oligopolistic 
industries (Automobile industry, drugs industry). 
Large-scale production can bring certain advantages to the 
firm and lead to economies of scale. In general, economies 
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of scale can bring down the cost of production, e.g. by 
reducing the cost of input per unit of output. They also 
lower the cost of external finance, as financial 
institutions usually offer loans to large corporations at a 
lower rate of interest and often accompanied by favourable 
terms. Lower advertising costs may be obtained when a firm 
advertises on a large scale. Transport costs are often lower 
if the volume of commodities transported is large. Large 
scale production allows division of labour and 
specialisation at the managerial level, e.g. sales, finance 
and personel managers. The divisions of managerial tasks 
increases experience and leads to a more efficient working 
of the firm. Furthermore, larger firms use high level 
technicai innovation and mechanisation, e.g. high capacity 
machinery, telex machines, computers etc. It may be added 
that economies of scale is a source of market power for 
large firms. For, with sound finance and market expertise, 
whoever can set up and operate at a large scale will enjoy 
these advantages as barrier to entry of new competitors in 
the potential market. 
Thus we need to look at the nature of oligopolistic 
advantages that foreign firms may have over local firms. 
These could be called 'ownership specific' advantages. The 
source of oligopolistic advantages may lie in such factors 
as superior technology, management, and organisational 
enterprise, marketing skills, capital availability and 
financial skills, economies of scale, bargaining and 
political power. But these advantages will carry 
differential levels of potential usefulness. The most 
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decisive are usually taken to be superiority in technology 
and marketing skills. With the former the firm can function 
as an innovating leader in the market while the latter aids 
expansion opportunities and acts as a barrier to entry. 
The characteristics of a typical firm or corporation 
deciding to invest abroad then can be tested against the 
real world data. Vernon (1971) carried out a study of 187 
U.S. manufacturing corporations and found that typical 
multinational firms exhibit (i) large size, (ii) high R&D 
intensity, (iii) high advertising expenditure, (iv) high 
profitability and (v) a high degree of diversification. By 
using regression analysis, Horst (1972) found that the 
"size' of the firm and "type of industry" was the most 
important determinants. He regressed 'probability' of 
becoming a multinational interprise on profitability, R&D, 
Advertising, vertical integration, product diversification 
in addition to size and type of industry. However, Horst 
(1972) thinks that size 'absorbs' the power of the other 
explanatory variables so far as the oligopolistic firms tend 
to be of large 'size', these empirical studies do lend 
support to the oligopol;stic character of a multinational. 
Caves (1974) carried out an interesting cross-section study 
by taking 64 Canadian industries and 52 U.K. industries. He 
regressed foreign direct investment explicitly on 'specific 
advantages' in addition to size, tariffs and (comparitive) 
cost advantages. The 'specific advantages' considered by 
Caves were (i) product differentiation, as measured by R&D 
intensity and advertising intensity, (ii) relatively lower 
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cost finance, (iii) economics of scale, (iv) multi-plant 
economies, and (v) managerial skill advantages. Caves (1974) 
found 'specific advantages' and 'size' to be significant 
determinants of FDI, and the variables i~significant. 
Although relative cost was found to be significant in the 
matter of choosing between exporting and direct investment. 
Among the 'specific advantages', product-differentiation 
advantages are found to be significant both for Canada and 
U.K. Managerial advantages were found to be insignificant. 
From the empirical work discussed above, it appears that 
oligopolistic theories of FDI have reasonable empirical 
validity. However, critics point out that most of the 
empirical work is limited to the U.S. multinationals. These 
characteristics exhibited by the U.S. multinationals may be 
different from the multinationals of other countries. This 
indeed is shown by the work of Kojima (1977, 1978a, 1978b). 
They argue that the 'American type' of multinationals are 
oligopolistic with ownership advantages. The Japanese type 
of multinationals have other features, mainly, that (i) 
firms investing abroad are often small and medium-sized and 
(ii) the firms belong to a market structure which is close 
to 'competitive' market structure. This problably i s 
explained by Japan's unique industrial situation and 
geographical location. To quote from Ozawa (1979a). 
"In short, Japan's needs for low-cost labour, 
industrial sites, and natural resources and her 
neighbouring countries' need for industrialisation 
coincided with each other, and a closer and 
ever-deepening economic interdependence has 
developed between Japan and each of those Asian 
countries that adopted an outward-looking strategy 
for economic developme~t"(P.109-110). 
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Although the Kojima-Ozawa's hypothesis does carry some 
truth, it must not be concluded that the all the Japanese 
l\{J net 
multinational firms"belong to the 'American type'. However, 
casual observation of Japanese investments in the U.K. and 
Europe show that the 'American type' Japanese oligopolistic 
firms do exist. Despite the Kojima-Ozawa hypothesis it is 
fair to say that the oligopolistic model with specific 
advantages is generally acceptable on the basis of empirical 
evidence. 
SECTION 2.6: NECESSARY CONDITION, INTERNALISATION THEORY AND 
ECLECTIC THEORY 
It is important to note that the 'specific advantages' 
hypothesis tells us only about the likely nature of a 
multinational firm. This is a necessary condition but not a 
sufficient condition for foreign direct investment. The fact 
that a foreign firm possesses some monopolistic or 
oligopolistic advantage over the indigenous or foreign 
competitors gives the firm its unique character but does not 
explain why the production process need be located abroad. 
The multinational firm could exploit its advantage through 
producing at home and exporting or by licensing a foreign 
producer. To explain why firms should invest in foreign 
markets therefore, given the same degree of advantage, other 
factors need to be considered, such as the cost of 
production, foreign governments' policies, marketing 
strategy, and oligopolistic reaction or barrier to entry 
etc. These factors can be classified as location specific. 
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Several motivational hypotheses can emanate from location 
theory. Hhile low costs of production provide an obvious 
motive for foreign investment, (host) government 
intervention is also an important motive to be considered. 
This may take the form of import tariffs and other 
strategies employee by the LDC governments largely for 
inducing firms to set up local manufacturing. Threat of 
restrictions and loss of market can be a strong motive 
guiding firms to establish foreign affiliates. As Dunning 
(1973) says: 
"The answer to these questions to my mind, provides 
one of the keys to the unique character of the ME 
and lies at the core of the industrial structure 
approach to 'why international production?' For, 
rephrased, the question asks 'why is a market of a 
particular country served by the affiliates of 
foreign owned firms producing in that country rather 
than by indigenous firms? 
Location theory tackles this question from the 
viewpoint of individual firms; like capital and 
trade theory, however, it takes as data the 
imformation on costs and market size and structure. 
And, as we have suggested, given this data, it can 
not only explain actual location patterns, but can 
also indicate optimal patterns, subject to the 
uncertainties surrounding particular markets and 
future events" (P.401). 
The other related but major attempt i s to extend the 
'ownership specific' hypothesis, which constitutes a 
necessary condition, to what is sometimes known as the 
internalisation theory. The work of Penrose (1961) and 
Buckley and Casson (1976) have made significant 
contributions. This theory states that motivation of foreign 
direct investment is the internalisation of the imperfect 
markets. A firm's act of investing abroad implies that 
markets are internalised across international boundaries. 
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This theory asserts that benefits from internalisation arise 
because of being able to avoid imperfections in external 
markets. For example, if a future market does not exist to 
coordinate interdependent activities involving time lag, 
considerable benefits can be generated by internalising 
markets for interdependent activities. If a host country has 
location-specific advantages (e.g., low wages), then the 
ownership-specific advantages can be exploited by 
internalising the host country's labour market by investing 
in the host country. Internalisation may be triggered by 
government intervention, opportunity to use transfer pricing 
in the case of internalisation of markets for knowledge 
production. Magee's (1977) appropriability theory of 
foreign direct investment asserts that the multinational 
firms succeed in transferring technology (ownership-specific 
advantage) by internalising the market for production of 
information. 
Dunning (1977, 1979, 1980, 1981) summarised and synthesised 
various theories of foreign direct investment in an approach 
known as the eclectic theory of foreign direct investment. 
This appears to be a more elaborate version of the 
internalisation theory. How the different theories may be 
linked up is shown by Dunning (1981) in the following matrix 
form: 
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·----------------------~-----------------. ADVANTAGES 
----------------------------------------
:OWNERSHIP 
: SPECIFIC 
INTERNALISATION LOCATION: 
-----------------------------------------------------
:FDI YES YES 'YES 
-----------------------------------------------------
:EXPORTS 
:CONTRACTS, 
:LICENSING, 
:AGREEMENTS 
YES 
YES 
. YES NO 
NO NO 
The above shows that ownership-specific advantages make 
FDI, exports, and licensing equally feasible. {f 
ownership-specific advantages are internalised, then 
licensing is ruled out. If internalisation across 
international boundaries takes . pl ace because of 
location-specific advantages, then FDI will be the clear 
choice. 
Dunning {1979, 1980} has also taken into account 
country-specific 
advantages are not 
advantages. Ownership-specific 
independent of country-specific 
advantages. As economic growth takes place in a 
country, her country-specific factors are likely to 
change and it will lead to a change in her 
ownership-specific and location-specific advantages. 
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SECTION 2.7: MOTIVATIONAL HYPOTHESES 
The theoretical approaches, discussed in the previous 
section, do not put forward any causal hypotheses as such; 
they try to bring together various approaches to foreign 
direct investment. These approaches subsume various specific 
hypotheses based on preferred motives of multinational 
firms. We call these hypotheses motivational hypotheses 
which are often discussed separately, or which are used to 
justify inclusion of explanatory variables in regression 
analysis, or which are themselves subjected to empirical 
test. Some of the motivational hypotheses explain vertical 
foreign direct investment and some explain horizontal 
foreign direct investment. These hypotheses include: (i) the 
'Barriers to Entry' hypothesis, (ii) the 'Raw-materials 
Availability' hypothesis, (iii) the 'Capital intensity' 
hypothesis, (iv) the 'Relative-wage ' hypothesis, (v) the 
'Tariff'hypothesis, (vi) the ICurrency Area' hypothesis, 
(vii) the 'Risk and Uncertainty Minimisation' hypothesis, 
(viii) the 'Host Country Government Initiative ' hypothesis, 
(ix) the 'Avoidance of Environmental Restrictions ' 
hypothesis. A brief discussion on each hypothesis will be in 
order although some of the above hypotheses receive further 
treatment in the chapters to follow. 
(;) The 'Barriers to Entry' hypothesis: 
The 'Barriers to 
possibility that 
Entry' hypothesis 
a foreign firm, 
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emphasises 
possessing 
the 
no 
ownership-specific advantages as compared to the host 
country firms, can invest in the host economy where there 
are barriers to entry. Clearly, barriers to entry are 
expected to remain for the foreseeable future. If the 
investing firm is as efficient as the host country firms, it 
will have the same advantages that create the barriers to 
entry in the host country. The above assumes that the firm 
incurring foreign direct investment has enough spare liquid 
funds, excess technological knowledge, and excess managerial 
talents. These, if employed in an economic environment 
protected by barriers to entry, will earn higher return. 
Therefore, foreign direct investment is likely to take 
place. 
(ii) The 'Raw-materials Availability' hypothesis: 
This hypothesis is specifically relevant to the foreign 
direct investment in the LDCs. (See, for example, Turner 
(1973)). There are three ways in which availability of 
raw-materials in a host country may trigger a decision by a 
multinational firm to invest in the host country. First, the 
investment may be vertically integrated to the parent 
company so that raw-materials will be produced at the host 
country and exported to the parent company. Second, the 
investment may be a form of horizontal extension so that the 
parent company can now produce by using the raw-materials 
(available at a lower price) at the host country. This is 
particularly relevant for products with a high content of 
raw-materials. Third, the foreign direct investment can also 
take place in the horizontal form so that a parent company 
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(engaged, say in mining) can produce 'materials' in the host 
country to supply to the world market. A brief discussion 
about the empirical findings on this hypothesis is presented 
in Chapter 5. 
(iii) The 'Capital-Intensity' hypothesis: 
Technological innovation identified with capital intensive 
techniques has been gradually recognised as one of the main 
components of growth ;n foreign direct investment. 
Multinational firms are often engaged in transferring 
high-technology and capital-intensive manufacturing industry 
to developing countries. Ideally, foreign investment should 
concentrate on investing in 
developing countries which 
labour-intensive industries in 
will be appropriate to the 
relative factor-endowments of a country. Nevertheless it is 
capital and high-technology intensive industries which are 
often introduced by multinational firms. 
Most researchers are aware of these circumstances and in 
fact attempt to search for a 'rational' explanation of the 
close association between high-technology, capital-intensive 
investment and multinational enterprise. As Pavitt (1971) 
says, it is difficult to disassociate any decision of the 
multinational firm from technology and vice versa. 
Kindleberger (1971) also thinks that technology and the 
multinational firms are interdependent and interwoven from 
the beginning. Mansfield (1974) put forward the notion that 
technology and the multinational corporation are bound 
together, both because firms often become multinational to 
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exploit their techological superiority on a wider scale and 
because the multinational firm is an important agent in the 
production and diffusion of technology. 
Capital-intensity hypothesis is related to what is sometimes 
called the 'Research and Development ' hypothesis. Some argue 
(e.g. Gruber, Mehta and Vernon (1967)) that the cause of 
foreign direct investment is the research intensity. Gruber 
!! ~ (1967) found that sectoral R&D expenditure was 
highly correlated with the share of the subsidiaries of the 
parent company in those sectors. 
similar evidence. 
Horst (1972) also found 
It is fair to say that capital-intensity or R&D intensity 
i s subsumed in the 'ownership-specific ' hypothesis 
advantages. A further discussion of this hypothesis is 
carried out in Chapter 4 
(iv) The 'Relative-Wage ' hypothesis: 
This hypothesis is relevant specifically in the context of 
the less-developed countries most of which are characterised 
by excess supply of unskilled labour. Therefore, labour is 
expected to be relatively cheaper. It is likely that the 
multinationals will transfer production to the LDC host 
countries if the production process requires relatively more 
or semi-skilled workers. However, the of unskilled 
mUltinationals are mostly involved in high-technology 
industries so that the availability of unskilled workers 
will have limited effect, although this effectiveness could 
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be enhanced by on the job training ect.. A further 
discussion about this hypothesis appears in Chapter 8. 
(v) The 'Tariff' hypothesis: 
This hypothesis again has special relevance to the 
less-developed countries who often practise the strategy of 
import-substitution industrialisation. This, of course, 
implies a high tariff wall. If profitability is high in the 
host country and its market is relatively large (or if 
the market is expected to be growing in the future), then 
the (oligopolistic) mUltinationals incur direct foreign 
direct investment so that the market shares in the host 
country via exports are retained. Whether higr tariffs will 
enhance the flow of foreign direct investment depends on 
whether profitability in the industry is increased or 
decreased in the host country. Empirical evidence is found 
in the earlier work of Eastman and Skykolt (1967) and Brash 
(1966). A further discussion is carried out in Chapt~r 6. 
(Vi) The 'Currency Area' hypothesis: 
This hypothesis emphasises the role of exchange rate as a 
factor of which influences the direct investment decision. 
Aliber (1970, 1971) put forward the proposition that the 
flow of foreign direct investment can be explained in terms 
of hard currency areas and weak currency areas. Aliber 
(1970) asserts that portfolio investors tend to ignore the 
exchange rate risk on foreign earnings of a firm. This 
enables firms from harder currency areas to borrow at lower 
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costs in the weak currency area. The multinationals can 
capitalise the earnings on their foreign direct investments 
in weaker currency areas at relatively higher rates than the 
local firms. The foreign investors thus enjoy on advantage 
over the indigenous firms. This hypothesis has fair backing 
from various empirical 
(1975), and Alexander 
Alexander and Murphy 
discourages outflow 
encourages inflow. 
work, e.g., Boataright and Renton 
and Murphy (1975) among others. 
(1975) concluded that devaluation 
of foreign direct investment and 
(vii) The IRisk and Uncertainty Minimisation l hypothesis: 
In this oligopolistic market structure there are various 
risk and uncertainties which a firm has to face involving 
price comptetition and non-price competition. This may 
increase a oligopolistic firms desire to invest abroad, 
given ownership-specific advantage, so that the risk and 
uncertainties arising from competition are cushioned. A 
strong motive for vertical integration is to minimise 
uncertainty regarding supply conditions of raw-materials 
which may be affected by action of a firms rival. 
Furthermore, many raw-materials do not have close 
substitutes. This leverage on supply of raw-materials may be 
used to increase barriers to entry. Furthermore, firms may 
try to minimise uncertainty and risk by diversifying their 
products either by increasing the range of products or by 
increasing the number of various products produced. Foreign 
direct investment is one way out to introduce new products 
or a new variant of an old product in a foreign country away 
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from th e domestic competitors. It is because the 
'firm-specific ' advantages are likely to be more similar 
for firms in the same country than for the firms in the host 
country. The investing firms will normally have relative 
advantages over the host country firm. 
(viii) The 'Host Country Government Initiative ' hypothesis: 
This hypothesis emphasises the impact of policies of the 
host country government of the decision making process of a 
foreign firm. It is generally agreed that the lead taken by 
the LDCs in granting special privileges, is an attempt to 
promote foreign direct investment. Under careful control 
foreign direct investment can have beneficial impact - a 
subject discussed in Chapter 9. The advantages given by the 
LDCs to mUltinational firms are: (a) tax concessions, (b) 
facility to repatriate profits or to import capital goods in 
the presence of foreign exchange control, (c) favourable 
credit conditions and interest rates. Many LDCs, including 
Thai1and, have separate government departments to promote 
foreign direct investment. In many LDCs, government also 
helps the multinational by creation favourable labour-market 
conditions by making sure that trade unions are weak. The 
work of Krause Dam (1964) and Polk (1966) in the case of the 
U.S. and of Brash (1966) in the case of Australia, find 
only minor influence of government policies on the decision 
process of the mUltinationals. This is not surprising since 
the U.S. or Australia do not try to promote foreign direct 
investment with the same favour as the LDCs. It is true that 
government policies alone would not succeed in persuading a 
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foreign firm to invest in a LDC host country. However, 
given the other motives, LOC government's discriminatory 
treatment of the multinational firms would have some 
significant effect. Lall and Streeten (1977) do point out 
the role of government policies in inducing FOI to the LOCs. 
( i x ) The 'Avoidance of Environmental Restrictions' 
hypothesis: 
It is hypothesised that, as the developed countries have 
become more aware of the need to curb pollution and limit 
environmental damage, some firms of the industrialised world 
are inclined to locate production in a host LDC where the 
strict restrictions imposed by the home country do not 
exist. There is an example of this in the case of Japan; and 
Ozawa (1979) has discussed these issues. A further 
discussion of this hypothesis is presented in Chapter 9. 
SECTION 2.8: THE 'PRODUCT-CYCLE' HYPOTHESIS 
The product-cycle hypothesis is a dynamic theory which 
explains how international trade is generated by 'lead and 
lag' of industrial innovations and which also explains why 
location of production might change from one country to 
another. A good deal of research and development undertaken 
by industrial firms result in new and/or improved products 
which cater to the needs of the high-income consumers. Once 
a firm establishes a technological lead in a new product and 
introduces it into the market, multinational enterprises 
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will have to make a series of decisions. As production 
develops and becomes standardised, the pattern of production 
and input requirements is likely to change over time. This 
pattern is referred to as ·product cycle'. 
Vernon (1966, 1971, 1979), and Hirsch (1967) developed the 
product cycle model which appropriately attempts to find a 
sequence leading to foreign direct investment. Vernon (1966) 
studies the changes in the pattern of trade and investment 
in the following way. The life of a new product can be 
divided into three stages proceeding first from the 'new' to 
the 'mature' stage and then to be a 'standardised 
commodity'. His thesis relates these stages to the 
locational decisions made by firms and to the choice between 
exports and overseas production. 
In the new stage, the product is produced when the firm is 
already located. At this stage, the role of scientists and 
engineers is important 
relatively less important. 
and cost considerations are 
In the maturing stage, a certain 
degree of standardisation is obtained, products become known 
in the foreign countries, cost considerations bring in the 
question of location. Standardisation leads to economies of 
scale, and also leads to exports. Profitability leads to the 
consideration of foreign direct investment. In the last 
stage, when the product becomes a 'standardised commodity', 
direct investment becomes inevitable. Once exports reach a 
certain level, several other factors come into play so that 
FOr becomes inevitable. These factors include tariffs, 
exhaustion of economies of scale at home plant, need to 
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provide prompt back-up service. There is a fourth stage, 
when foreign subsidiaries will supply not only the host 
country but will also export to other countries (including 
the country of the parent company). 
Later, in 1979, Vernon comes up with a new theory that, as 
the world's environment was changing rapidly, the product 
cycle might not be appropriate to explain international 
trade and direct investment activities. He assumed that the 
product cycle would be less useful in explaining the 
relationship of the U.S. economy to other advanced 
industrialised countries, and would lose some of its power 
in explaining the relationship of the advanced 
industrialised countries to developing countries. 
strong trace of sequences is likely to remain. 
But a 
In terms of the product-cycle, new technology and products 
are developing first in the industrial countries with high 
levels of income. In due course, the production saturates 
the domestic markets, and so the next step is for the firm 
to start to export to foreign markets. In the meantime, 
production gradually shifts from the home country, to host 
country through direct investment and other means e.g., 
licensing, or joint-venture. The firms that develop 
multinationally tend to be well-endowed with capital, and 
they are in general large in size. Being a large 
corporation, having the ability to mobilise large amounts of 
capital, and having a high level of efficiency in 
organisation, enable these large corporations to concentrate 
in the high-technology industries. 
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Through access to knowledge about new products or technology 
the firms have an edge over their rivals. This means the 
first firm in the field often possesses temporary monopoly 
advantage. Then, the innovating firms may have power to 
control and supply the domestic market. Thus, the leading 
firms are likely to be in an oligopolistic market structure 
when supplying the foreign markets. The first firm in the 
field creates barriers to entry, as has been pointed out by 
Dunning (1970). 
It is thus clear that, once a firm has established a 
technological lead in some products, certain characteristics 
are likely to reveal themselves as the product grows more 
mature. Vernon (1971) makes the point that as the new 
product reaches the mature stage, overseas investment comes 
into existence. This is partly because the firm will be 
confronted with growing demand in the foreign market for 
highly technological and sophisticated products which 
require facilities and services; and also partly because of 
the need to protect the oligopoly position of the leading 
firm which is threatened by competition in the market. The 
threat may come from local firms or firms from the other 
countries. 
As the original technological 
well-known, imitation begins to 
temporary monopoly position of the 
know-how becomes more 
take place and so the 
leading producer for any 
given product begins to crumble. The acute problem which the 
firm now faces is how best to exploit the advantage of being 
an innovatory leader; and at the same time, what should the 
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firm do to protect and prolong a temporary monopoly position 
which was originally based on a technological lead. 
The studies done by Vernon and Wells (1981) suggest that 
there are two different patterns in the creation of foreign 
links which are adopted by various firms. The firm with very 
narrow product lines such as IBM or a motor-car company, may 
lean strongly towards wholly-owned subsidiaries. Firms with 
broad production lines such as Singer, Pepsi-Cola make 
greater use of joint-venture of licenses. Their goal is to 
obtain market information via the local share owner. 
Thirdly, there are firms which produce very sophisticated 
high-technology products (such as aero-space) or firms which 
produce military equipment. These firms need highly skilled 
labour and require continuous research and development; such 
firms are most likely to prefer to export. According to Hood 
and Young (1978) U.S. firms prefer to serve foreign markets 
by means of wholly-owned subsidiaries in order to retain 
control of key areas of decision making and to preserve 
proprietary technology. Also firms prefer direct investment 
over licensing when the technology is sophisticated; and 
foreigners lack the know-how to assimilate it. Also the firm 
is concerned about protecting quality standards. It is clear 
from the studies of Vernon and Wells that the firms with a 
narrow product line, which prefer to hold their 
technological skill and innovation know-how inside the firm 
and to maintain tight control over market strategy are 
likely to invest abroad. Again direct foreign investment 
with wholly owned subsidiary firms is likely to be favoured 
whenever the oligopoly advantage is of a kind that cannot be 
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easily handed over to a licensing agreement. 
Many studies have described the pattern of foreign 
investment by using 'product cycle theory'. But in one way 
or another some types of Japanese direct investment and 
investment from LDCs are distinct from those of the western 
world particularly, U.S. overseas investment. Studies of 
foreign direct investment have either ignored those firms 
from the less-developed countries or put them together with 
other mUltinational enterprises. In the so-called 'catching-
up-product-cycle ' theory, multinationals from Japan and LDCs 
are looked at as imitators rather than innovators. In 
addition, these firms have tended to use labour-intensive 
technology. 
In the 'catching-up' theory, the product cycle starts from 
the importation of a new product with superior quality. 
When demand increases, domestic production follows. By 
learning from practice and imitation and also from the 
importation of technological know-how, output expands and it 
leads to exploitation of economies of scale, increases in 
productivity, improvements in quality and reduction in 
costs. At this point, output is exported to the foreign 
markets as the cost becomes competitive. When exports 
expand, the domestic demand grows and encourages industrial 
development. At this stage, the firms from the LDCs will 
attempt to locate production in a foreign country. 
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SECTION 2.9: CONCLUSIONS 
The apparent conclusion from our brief survey is simple: 
there is no general theory of foreign direct investment. The 
firm likely to be a multinational is typically an 
oligopolistic firm with certain ownership-specific 
advantages. This is a necessary condition and not a 
sufficient one. There is a host of 'motivational' hypotheses 
which explain, singly, or jointly, why a firm invests. The 
'Product cycle' hypothesis is a dynamic one and has the 
potential to develop into a more general theory of trade and 
investment. We note here that our survey is not intended to 
be a comprehensive survey of the literature in the area of 
foreign direct investment. Materials are chosen to build a 
comprehensive structure of the work dealing mainly with the 
economic aspects. The literature dealing with the politics 
of FOI (including Marxist approach) are not discussed. 
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SECTION 3.1: INTRODUCTION 
During the last two decades (1960-1983) Thailand has been 
attracting foreign investment both from the developed and 
the developing countries. This flow of foreign investment 
involves several factors, e.g., Thailand's mineral 
resources, her relatively abundant labour supply, 
oligopolistic and monopolistic characteristics of the firms 
of the investing countries, Thailand's tariff structure, 
etc. 
The Thai government is increasingly aware of the need to 
develop appropriate national policies regarding foreign 
investments and to coordinate these in planned programmes in 
order to achieve a higher rate of economic growth and a 
better distribution of benefits so accrued. The government 
encourages foreign investment through the Board of 
Investment (BOI). The BOI is Thailand's central investment 
planning authority. It has wide discretionary powers to 
promote both foreign and domestic investment. The BOI is 
attached to the office of the Prime Minister, (who is also 
the Chairman of the Board). Seven members of the Board are 
Cabinet Ministers. This makes the BOI a politically powerful 
agent in Thai commercial and industrial affairs. It was 
established in 1959 with the objective of stimulating 
industrial expansion in Thailand. Above all the BOI's 
primary role is to regulate and direct foreign and domestic 
investments into sectors most appropriate according to the 
priorities of the Five Year Plans for Thailand's economic 
development. 
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Under the 1977 Investment promotion Act, BOI is empowered to 
grant various fiscal and other incentives to enterprises to 
which it issues promotion certificates after having approved 
their investment projects. Thus industrial investment may be 
promoted in projects which (a) are efficient in utilization 
of natural resources, (b) are consistent with Thailand's 
comparative advantage, and (c) are consistent with the 
emphasis placed by the government on the reduction of 
regional disparities. 
The target areas for foreign investment are clearly marked 
by the government. The agricultural base industries, the 
labour-intensive industries and the export-oriented 
industries are the prefered sectors into which foreign 
investments are channelled. Within this framework, 
investment opportunities are categorized into various 
sectors, viz; (a) Agro-products and commodities, (b) 
Mineral, Metal and Ceramics, (c) 'Other Products' (plastic, 
watches, toys, musical instruments etc.) (d) Chemical and 
Chemical products, (e) Mechanical and Electrical equipment, 
(f) Services Industries, (g) 'Other Industries' (i.e. 
industries which have not been classified elsewhere). 
Furthermore BOI helps investors to obtain all the necessary 
licences and permits for setting up or expanding business in 
Thailand. However, it should be noted that it is compulsory 
for investment applications to pass through this channel 
only if fiscal and other incentives are sought. Aliens may 
carry out any legitimate business which is not specifically 
preferred in the Alien Business Law N.E.C. Announcement No. 
281 (see Appendix 1) without having to apply for permission 
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from the BOr. (Although aliens, 
have to apply for appropriate 
business.) 
like indigenous investors 
permits to set up in 
The investment incentives and tax concessions which the BOI 
offer to investors can be summarised as follows. The 
government provides a guarantee against nationalisation and 
against various types of government intervention in the 
enterprise. BOr offers import protection when there is fair 
justification and provides special fiscal measures which are 
highly beneficial to the foreign investors. They also give 
special permission to bring in foreign nationals and to own 
land. (For full details of promotion incentives, see 
Appendix 2). Since 1960, over 600 companies involved in 
foreign investment have been granted promotion certificates. 
SECTION 3.2: TREND 
We first examine whether a statistically significant trend 
of the aggregate foreign direct investment in Thailand is 
discernible. Table 3.1 presents the aggregate time-series 
data. Chart 3.1 presents the same in graphics. 
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Table 3.1 (in millions of U.S. dollars at 1975 prices) 
$M $M 
1960 6.96 1971 50.33 
1961 16.53 1972 84.06 
, 
1962 19.12 1973 86.99 
1963 48.45 1974 202.49 
1964 39.93 1975 86.00 
1965 58.07 1976 74.51 
1966 49.19 1977 89.24· 
1967 72.69 1978 38.97 
1968 93.50 1979 37.48 
1969 73.64 1980 129.95 
1970 58.31 1981 185.99 
Source: Statistical Year Book for Asia and the Pacific 1982 
Regressing foreign direct investment (It) on times 
(T) and dummy variable (with pre-1973 0=0 and from 
1973-1981 0=1), we get the following results: 
( 1 ) It = 5.26 + 0.08 T + 1.42 0 R2= 0.37 
(2.64) (3.38) (0.26) OWS = 0.48 
(2) 10gI t = -1. 31 + 0.14 T + 0.08 0 R2 = 0.66 
( 2.24 ) (6.10) (0.16) OWS = 0.48 
It is fairly clear from regression equations (1) and (2) 
that a statistically significant positive trend exists 
although it is stronger in non-linear form. The dummy 
variable, purported to capture the effect of the oil crisis, 
is not significant. These results should be viewed with care 
as there is evidence of autocorrelation. 
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Chart 3.1 
It will be interesting to examine outflow of foreign 
investment from various countries to Thailand. We are 
fortunate to get reasonable data for Germany and Japan as 
shown in Table 3.2. For the U.S.A., we have got data only 
for six years. Regressing investment outflows from Germany 
and Japan to Thailand on time and a dummy (as before), we 
get the following regression equations. 
( 3 ) IGermany = t 0.09 + 0.19 T 0.79 D R2 = 0.32 
(0.16) (1.91) (0.16) DW S = 1. 97 
(4) 109I~ermany = -1.23 + 0.21 T 1.16 0 R2 = 0.49 
(3.37) (3.12) (-1.81) DWS = 1.95 
( 5 ) IJapan = 45.0 2.54 T + 8.5 D R2 = 0.13 t 
( 3 . 81) (1.63) (0.41) DWS = 1.38 
(6) 10grJapan 
= 3.53 0.06 T + 0.34 D R2 = 0.07 t 
(10.82) (-0.85) (0.60) DWS = 1.55 
It is once again clear that a non-linear positive trend 
exists for Germany, although the R21 s are low for time 
series data. On the logarithmic run for Germany, the trend 
coefficient is significant. For Japan again a weak 
non-linear negative trend is seen. This negative trend is 
determined by high real investment in 1968 and low real 
investment in 1980 and 1981. It may be because Japan 
invested in the sixties in sectors like mineral, chemical 
etc., of Thailand. But in the late seventies and early 
eighties, outflow of Japanese foreign investment perhaps is 
relatively channelled more to manufacturing (car, electronic 
equipment etc.) and perhaps, therefore, are flowing 
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TABLE 3.2 Outflows of investment from U.S.A., Japan and 
West Germany into Thai1and. (in Million dollar, 
at 1975 prices) 
YEAR 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
w. GERMANyl 
0.13 
0.46 
0.98 
0.66 
1. 15 
1.19 
1. 35 
1. 34 
0.29 
0.57 
1.17 
0.77 
4.54 
2.53 
1. 42 
1. 52 
Sources: 1. Deutsche Bank, Frankfurt 
JAPAN 2 
92.80 
29.10 
17.04 
11. 21 
36.57 
38.40 
33.19 
14.31 
17.76 
43.18 
24.67 
40.08 
22.44 
20.02 
3 U.S.A. 
203.36 
188.62 
146.98 
250.87 
355.85 
383.62 
2. The Bank of Tokyo, LTD. (Trade and Investment 
service office) 
3. U.S. Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic 
analysis) 
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relative1y more to the developed countries (Europe, and 
North America) rather than to the less-developed countries 
like Thailand. From Table 3.2 there appears to be a positive 
trend for the U.S.A., as far as we can see from the six 
observations. Unfortunately, outflow figures of the U.S. 
foreign investment to Thailand for the earlier years are 
not available. 
SECTION 3.3: DATA 
In this section we discuss the data of foreign direct 
investment in Thailand. We have nine industrialised 
countries (namely U.S.A., U .. K., West Germany, Japan, 
Switzerland, Netherlands, Australia, France, and Italy) and 
nine developing countries (viz., Taiwan, Hong-Kong, 
Singapore, Portugal, India, Malaysia, Panama, Korea and 
Philippines). These countries are selected because they are 
the leading foreign investors in Thailand. The analysis of 
the pattern of foreign direct investment will be based on 
data published by the Board of Investment. In 1981, the BOr 
published data of foreign and Thai firms which received 
promotion certificates from 1960 to 1981. The BOI data 
provides information about each firm's registered capital, 
capital assets, labour employed and raw-materials used (both 
domestic and imported). There are of course foreign firms 
who set up business in Thailand without the BOI promotion 
certificates, as mentioned earlier. Our analysis is thus 
limited to the sample of foreign firms registered with the 
BOI, some of whom register in order to obtain certain 
privileges. Other foreign firms do not register, being 
deterred by bureaucratic red-tape and cumbersome 
administrative processes. 
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According to the BOI data, different foreign investors have 
different shares in the firms in the sample. We have 
analysed these firms in Table 3.3. Table 3.3 shows the 
number of firms in each category of foreign ownership from 
0.1-100% share of investment. It also gives the value of 
registered capital (at constant prices 1975 = 100) in each 
foreign-ownership category. It is interesting to note that 
the number of investing firms from the developed countries 
in the 31-100% group is larger than the number of firms from 
less-developed countries. But the number of firms from the 
less-developed countries in the 0.1-30% group is larger than 
from developed countries. 
Charts 3.2 and 3.3 are constructed from Table 3.3. Chart 3.2 
shows the number of firms in each 10% category of foreign 
ownership starting from the 0.01-10% group and ending with 
the 91-99% group with the exceptions of two groups viz., 50% 
group and the 100% group. Chart 3.3 gives the value of 
registered capital involved in each similar category. 
The BOI da ta is our sample, 
population 
and it is taken as 
of foreign firms. The 
large (n=576 firms). 
representative of the 
number of firms in 
Therefore we assert 
the sample is 
that there are no good reasons to 
suspect a systematic and significant difference (with 
respect to technology, labour market, etc.,) between the BOI 
registered firms and firms not registered with the BOI. 
Furthermore, the BOI data are very useful as they are 
classified into seven main industrial sectors. These are: 
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Table 3.3 
· 
· . 
· . 
DC LOC : ALL COUNTRIES 
:SHARES OF: 
-------------------------------------------· . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . 
:FOREIGN :NUMBER :REGISTEREO:NUMBER :REGISTERED:NUMBER :REGISTERED: 
· . . . . · . 
· . . . . · . 
:INVESTORS:OF FIRMS:CAPITAL 
: (1000f,J) 
:OF FIRMS:CAPITAL 
(lOOOf,J) 
:OF FIRMS:CAPITAL 
: (l000f,J) 
· 
· 
10m 
· 
· 28 : 812,100 
(7.6%): (4.4%) 
2 : 10,120 
(1.0%) : (0.14) 
· 
· 30 : 822,220 
(5.2%) : (3.2%) 
91-99% 11: 266,108 2 : 52,532 13 : 318,o~n 
(3.0%) : (1.5%) (l.m): (0.73) (2.2%): (1.3%) 
:~8~1~-9~0%~--~9---:~28~5~,1~5~7--~1~--:~2~,2~4~O---:~10~--:~2~87-,~39-7~ 
(2.5%) : (2.1%)(0.5%) : (0.03%) : (1.7%) : (1.5%) 
71-80% 15: 463,990 4 : 88,918 19 : 552,908 
(4.1%) : (2.5%) (1.9%): (1.24%) (3.3%) :(2.2%) 
· 
:-6~1--7-m=---~14~--:~6~6~8,~0~46----~3----:~34~,~49~6~--~17----~1~O~2,~5~42~ 
(3.8%) : (3.8%) )1.4%): (0.48%) (2.9%) (2.8%) 
51~-:U-~8J~ 2 : 38,713 1~ :42"2,2ID 
: (3.0%) : (2.1%) (1.0%): (0.54%) (2.2%): (1.7%) 
5-0%-:--14 : 579,612 3 : 82,154 u--- -:--651,760 
: (3.8%) : (3.2%) (1.4%): (1.14%) (2.9%): (2.6%) 
· .~~=-~~--~~~~--~--~~~~~~--~~~~ : 41-49% 128 :6,104,305 50 :1,365,577: 178 :8,010,882 
(34.9%): (36.5%) (23.9%): (19.09%) : (30.9%): (31.6%) 
31'::-40% --:51-- :2,324,636 34 :1,037,941 85 :3,362,577 
: (13.9%): (12.6%) (16.3%): (14.35%) (14.7%): (13.2%) 
2T':~--:- 31 :3,326,989: 37 :1,212,194: 68 :4,5J~ 
: (8.4%) : (18.1%) : (17.7%): (16.87%) : (11.8%): (17.7%) 
11-20% 20 : 627,528 26 : 738,160 48 :1,365,688 
(5.5%) : (3.4%) (12.4%): (10.27%) (8.3%): (5.3%) 
. 
~0~.~1-~1~0%~:~35----:~1,~80~1-,~79~1---4~5--~:2~,5~2~3,~5~13~~80----:4~,~32~5-,3~1~0 : 
TOTAL 
(9.5%) : (9.8%) (21.5%): (35.11%) (13.9%): (16.9%) : 
· . 
· . 367 : 18 ,243,838: 209 
. 
. 
:7,187,558 576 
· . 
· . 
:25,431,396: 
(100%) (l00%) (l00%) (100%) (100%) (l00%) 
Sources: Compiled from The Board of Investment data. 
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0.1-10% 14.33 
11-20% J 1.37 
21-30% 14.54 
31-40% 13.36 
41-49% I 
50% J 0.66 
51-60% 
-.1 61-70% -I'-
P 0.42 
I 0.72 
n 71-80% =r 
III I-J 0.55 
~ 81-90% c+ I-J 0.39 
w 91-99% . 
w P 0.32 
100% 1 0.88 
~ 
00 
~-it 
:::s 
I"D-it 
~o 
(I)~ 
'::s"1"D 
-.I ....... 
"0 (Q 
:::s 
....... c+ (I) 
01llC+ 
O-'I"D 
o ~ 
(J) 
0. 
8.07 
'n 
=r 
III 
""S 
c+ 
W 
. 
N 
....... ....~ I-' t-' ~ 
2: 
o 
N ~ m ro 0 N ~ m ro 0 
o 0 000 0 0 0 0 -it 
-it 
-'. 
I~ ~ 
l~ m 
1m CD 
I CD 0' 
J 
I!::::; 
It; 
II-' 
....... 
I ..... to 
P8 
It; 
I~ 
~ 
00 
~-it 
:::s (1)-it 
""So (I)""S 
=r (J) 
-.I ........ 
"0 (Q 
:::s 
1) Agricultural products (large scale cultivation, animal 
feed, corn products, rubber products, animal products, 
fishing, etc.) 
2) Mining and Metal (processing of metal, smelting, mining 
or dressing of ores, and ceramic products industry, 
etc.) 
3) Chemical (chemical products, pharmaceutical products, 
fertilizer, petrochemicals, petroleum products, etc.) 
4) Mechanical and Electronic products 
assembly of engines, production 
electronic goods.) 
(production 
or assembly 
or 
of 
5) Textiles, plastic, and Other Products (Production or 
assembly of cameras, watches, manufacturing of sporting 
equipment, musical instruments or toys, synthetic fibre 
products, printing of textiles etc.) 
6) Services (comprising hotels, hospitals, international 
trading enterprises, silo and drying modern packages of 
vegetable and fruit for export, cold storage, transport 
etc.) 
7) Unclassified products (e.g., spinning, weaving, dyeing, 
knitting, assembly of vehicles industry, veneer 
industry, wood parquet products, gypsum products, etc.) 
(The complete lists of these seven main industrial 
sectors can be found in Appendix 3). 
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In our study of the pattern of foreign investment we are 
using each firm's registered capital with the BOI at 
constant prices (1975 = 100). The figures presented in 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 are computed from constant registered 
capital. Table 3.4 shows each country's sectorwise pattern 
of foreign direct investment in Thailand. Columns 1 to 7 in 
the table give the result of each country's share of their 
investment in each sector, e.g., agricultural sector. The 
figures will add up to 100% for each country along each row. 
Column 8 shows the results of each country's share of the 
total of foreign investment in Thailand. The results of 
this analysis will portray each developed or less-developed 
country's pattern of investment in Thailand. 
It should be pointed out here that the empty cells in Table 
3.4 do not necessarily imply that the investing countries 
concerned have never invested in those sectors. This is 
simply because our sample does not contain observations on 
these sectors. This does imply that investments by the 
relevant countries in the relevant sectors (i.e. the empty 
cells) are either small or negligible in the population. 
There may, however, be another explanation. It is the 
following. If there is a firm jointly owned by two or more 
countries, then that foreign direct investment is listed as 
coming from the country which owns the highest share. There 
are several firms in the sample with multiple ownership as 
shown in Chart 3.4. Furthermore, we should note that 'Other 
DCs' include Canada, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Denmark, Israel, Sweden, 
New Zealand and South Africa. And 
'Other LDCs' include Kenya, Bermuda, Romania and Indonesia. 
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TABLE 3.4 
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY'S SECTOR-WISE PATTERN IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- · 
· SECTORS :SUM OF · · . . . OHlER · . OTHER · EACH · 
· · 
. . . 
· 
. 
· · :COLUNNS: AGRICULTURAL · MINERAL :CHEMICAL : ~1ECHAN I CAL: PRODUCTS · SERVICES: INDUSTRIES · COUNTRY·S · 
· · · · :1 to 7 · · SHARE 
· · 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- · 
· COUNTRIES % % % % % % % % % 
:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
JAPAN 100 7.85 12.05 16.60 12.85 11.65 3.22 35.78 36.36 
U.S.A 100 12.06 53.42 14.44 4.75 2.59 5.62 7.12 12.00 
--l TAIWAN 100 12.06 20.55 29.52 3.78 20.61 6.11 7.37 10.65 
--l 
U.K. 100 4.17 10.92 4.09 3.60 1.24 33.53 42.45 6.86 
INDIA 100 0.34 59.21 23.52 8.65 8.28 5.37 
HONG-KONG 100 2.49 4.89 5.09 21.27 64.93 1.33 3.99 
SINGAPORE 100 28.31 19.48 10.04 11.31 30.86 2.75 
NETHERLANDS 100 18.22 64.45 6.63 5.32 4.38 2.51 
WEST GERMA~JY 100 12.09 40.11 20.12 2.78 12.69 3.40 8.81 2.30 
PORTUGAL 100 64.71 35.29 2.14 
MALAYSIA 100 39.06 30.92 9.17 11.69 9.16 1.93 
SWITZERLAND 100 60.98 0.97 18.57 2.63 3.46 0.39 13.00 1.49 
========================================================================================================= 
(Cont. ) 
-l 
co 
TABLE 3.4 (Cont.) 
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRylS SECTOR-WISE PATTERN IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
SECTORS 
COUNTRIES 
FRANCE 
AUSTRALIA 
KOREA 
PANAMA 
PHILIPPINES 
ITALY 
OTHER DC 
OTHER LDC 
ALL 
DC 
LOC 
:SUM OF : :: OTHER: : 
:COLUMNS: AGRICULTURAL : MINERAL :CHEMICAL : MECHANICAL: PRODlICTS: SERVICES: 
: 1 to 7 : 
OTHER : EACH : 
INDUSTRIES: COUNTRY'S : 
: SHARE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
% % % % 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
2.77 
48.31 
83.64 
4.42 
3.40 
10.40 
10.02 
11.37 
6.85 
35.55 
67.30 
70.20 
90.54 
28.20 
29.44 
25.01 
23.88 
3.95 
15.54 
13.28 
21.32 
13.05 
14.17 
J6.36 
29.80 
6.73 
8.24 
2.86 
97.23 
25.23 25.05 
15.79 
0.83 0.26 
96.60 
11.56 8.80 
8.92 6.07 
18.29 15.83 
7.91 
16.91 
18.87 
24.03 
5.32 
1.41 
1.22 
0.54 
0.31 
0.23 
0.13 
7.59 
0.25 
100 
========================================================================================================= 
TABLE 3.5 
SECTORS : 
· 
· :COUNTRIES: 
MINERAL OTHER 
INDUSTRIES 
CHEMICAL AGRICULTURAL OTHER : f<lECHAN ICAl: SERVICES 
PRODUCTS: 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
DCs 
· 
· 
: (29.44%) (24.03%) (13.28%) (l0.02%) (8.92%) (8.24%) (6.07%) 100% 
1 6 2 F 3 7 4 
lDCS 
· · 
· · : (25.01%) ( 5.32%) (21.32%) (11. 37%) : (18.29%) (2.86%) (15.83% ) 100% 
:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3 5 4 7 6 
ALL 
· · 
· · 
:(28.20%) (18.87%) (15.54%) (10.4·0% ) : (11. 56%) (6.73%) (8.80%) 100% 
======================================================================================================= 
------------------]------------------]------------------------]-----------------------------SECTOR :::::::::a::::::::: b Total 
.... " ........ " ....... . 
------------------ ------------------ ------------------------ -----------------------------
IAgriculture /-29 .. '· .. • --, . ... ... .... . 83 
IMineral 1'25···,' '-1 -. . ...... - ... - 66 
\Chemical 1:18::::1 50 
IMechanical 1::13:: I 71 
10ther Products 
" 
24' • • .•• 1 
- ... . ........ - 74 
IServices 1:16:::133 
10ther Industries 1: 20 :::::1 54 
-- --T~~;l- -- -------I: -:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::145-:-:-:-:]- ---- --- --- --431- ------ -]--- -- --- ---- -------- -576 -----
...... ,. . . . . .. ..... .. 
------------------------------------- ------------------------ -----------------------------
la:::::1 No. of firms with multiple o\'Jnership 
,b No. of firms with single ownership 
Chart 3.4 
SECTION 3.4: SECTOR-WISE PATTERN 
Considering the developed and the less-developed countries 
together (Table 3.4, last row), we find that the largest 
sector accounting for foreign direct investment in Thailand 
is Mineral products (28.20% of total foreign investment) 
followed by 'Other Industries' (18.77), Chemical sector 
(15.54%), 'Other Products' (11.56%), Agricultural sector 
(10.40%), Services (8.80%). The Mechanical sector accounts 
for only 6.73% of total investments. The fact that foreign 
investment in the mineral sector is relatively high needs 
some explanation. This could be the result of abundant 
availability of minerals in Thailand. Therefore, it is 
likely that countries with scarce indigenous mineral 
resources (like Japan or the Netherlands) will seek an 
external source of raw-materials supply. There are countries 
with an abundant supply of raw-materials, e.g., U.S.A. and 
Australia. Their investments in the mineral sector in 
Thailand could be explained by the hypothesis that their own 
pattern of mineral endowments is different from that of 
Thailand. An additional important consideration is the lower 
cost of mining in Thailand relative to that in the home 
country, even after the cost of transportation etc. has 
been taken into account. Furthermore, countries like the 
U.S.A. may wish to preserve their own mineral resources for 
the future and yet guarantee a smooth flow of output by 
utilising the mineral resources from other countries. 
The 'Other Industries' sector lies second in attracting 
foreign investments. We may note that the nature of the 
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products in this sector (e.g. spinning, weaving, veneer 
industry and wood parquet products etc.) is such that these 
products use natural resources intensively. Moreover, the 
industries which use wood or cotton as primary raw-materials 
are also relatively labour-intensive. The natural resources 
and unskilled labour are available at a relatively lower 
cost in Thailand. Therefore the developed countries with 
relatively higher labour cost and dearer natural resources 
are expected to invest in this sector in Thailand. It is 
interesting to note that 24.03% of the foreign investment 
from the developed countries and only 5.32% of the foreign 
investment from the less-developed countries have gone into 
this sector. 
The third largest sector of foreign investment is Chemical 
products. While it might seem superficially surprising to 
see foreign investment in this sector, nevertheless 
non-economic factors may be regarded as primarily 
responsible. These are related to the nature of the product. 
Thailand may have been used by foreign firms to produce 
toxic and hazardous chemicals because production is more 
strictly regulated and restricted in the home country. (Note 
that this aspect is discussed in detail in Chapter 8). This 
may also be regarded as an economic factor due to the 
increased cost of production resulting from such 
regulations. Furthermore, labour unions in Thailand are weak 
so that unions fail to prevent investors from exposing 
workers to health hazards. The IClean Housel policies of 
investing countries (like Japan) make Thailand an attractive 
ground for their overseas investment (in addition to the low 
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cost of employing Thai skilled labour in this area, e.g. 
laboratory technicians). For the rest of the investment 
sectors, the aim of foreign investors generally may be 
either to take advantage of cheap labour, local 
raw-materials or to exploit land for cultivation. Now we 
proceed to discuss the pattern of investment for each 
country. 
Japan is the biggest investor in Thailand. It is evident 
from Table 3.4 (Column 8) that the Japanese foreign direct 
investments account for 36.36% of the total foreign direct 
investments. Japan concentrates her investments in 'Other 
Industies' sector which accounts for 35.78% of her total 
investments in Thailand. Relatively low-cost and natural 
resources are the main attractions. It ;s generally accepted 
that during the last ten or fifteen years, Japan's textile 
industry has largely lost its competitiveness due to 
relatively high domestic wage costs, so that Thailand 
becomes a useful low cost new location. The Chemical sector 
attracts 16.60% of Japan's direct investments. The 'Clean 
House' policy of Japan probably makes a substantial impact 
on the relatively high investment in this sector. The 
Japanese Government has been strongly criticised by Ozawa 
(1979) in their 'Clean House' policy. This policy 
emphasises a shift from 'pollution-prone' and 
'resource-consuming' industries towards 'clean' and 
'knowledge-intensive' industries, using overseas investment 
in a new role to serve as a device to 'houseclean' the 
economy. 
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U.S.A., the second largest investing country with 12.00% of 
total foreign investment in Thailand, presents a picture 
remarkably different from that of Japan. The U • s . 
investments are concentrated in the Mineral sector with 53% 
of her total Thai investments going into this sector. As a 
highly industrialised country, mineral products form an 
important input for the U.S.A .. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to assume that the U.S.A. will try to procure her input 
supply by investing in countries with an abundant supply of 
) 
mineral resources as in Thailand (despite U.S.A.s own supply 
of minerals as explained earlier). On the other hand, the 
U.S.A. has a smaller level of investments than Japan in the 
'Other Industries', Mechanical sector and the 'Other 
Products' sector. But she has a higher level of investment 
than Japan in the Agricultural sector. Like Japan though, 
its level of investment in the Services sector is less than 
6% of its investment. 
Taiwan, although a developing country, is one of the 
principal investors, accounting for 10.65% of total foreign 
direct investment (the third largest). The pattern of her 
investment resembles that of the U.S.A., in so far as the 
proportions of total investment going to the Agricultural, 
Mechanical, Services and 'Other Products' sectors are 
concerned. These proportions are roughly similar. But 
Taiwan's pattern differs significantly from that of the 
U.S.A. in having a relatively larger proportion of her 
investment in Chemical with 29.52% (her largest sectoral 
investment) and 'Other Products' with 20.61%, and in having 
less investment in the Mineral sector. 
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The U.K. is the fourth largest investor, accounting for 
6.86% of the total foreign direct investment. The U.K. 
pattern of investment differs from those of the U.S.A. and 
Taiwan. Nearly 75% of total investment by the U.K. is 
concentrated in two sectors, viz., 'Other Industries' 
(42.45%) and Services sector (33.53%). It is interesting to 
find that the U.K. investments are not directed towards the 
natural-resource-based industries. Given the historical 
dominance of London in insurance and banking services (in 
many less-developed countries), we are not surprised that a 
large part of the U.K. investments have gone into the 
Services sectors. However, in Thailand, U.K. investments in 
the Services sector are not in Banking and Insurance, but 
are mainly in the hotel, cold storage, silos and Coastal Oil 
Tank business. 
India is the fifth largest investor with 5.97% of total 
foreign direct investment. Her investment being concentrated 
in the Minerals sector (59.20%) and in Chemicals (23.50%). 
It should be noted however, that the data for the Chemical 
sector contain a substantial proportion of shares held by 
other foreign investors. In many cases, the proportion of 
the Indian contribution to owne~ship of the firm is low, 
tending to be below 50%. As for example, a Chromium Sulphate 
firm with joint venture investment, contains 40% of Thai 
ownership, 35% of Indian share, the remaining 25% being 
Canadian share. 
The shares of investment in Thailand by Hong-Kong and 
Singapore ar 3.99% and 2.75% respectively. The biggest area 
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of their investments is the Services sector. Hong-Kong's 
pattern of investment is similar to that of the U.K. except 
for the 'Other Products' and 'Other Industries' sectors. 
While the U.K. investment in the 'Other Products' is only at 
1.24% of investment, Hong-Kong's 
is at 21.27%. The opposite 
investments in this sector-
is that for the 'Other 
Industries' sector where the U.K. investment is as high as 
42.45% and the Hong-Kong investment is as low as 1.33% of 
her total investment in Thailand. As both Hong-Kong and U.K. 
have close economic 
surprising to note 
contact with one another, it is not 
that their pattern of investment in 
Thailand is similar in the Services sector. 
The rest of the developed countries (viz., Netherlands, 
Italy and other Des) concentrate their investment in the 
Mineral sector. Chemicals sector is an important target 
for Australia, Switzerland and Portugal. Switzerland, 
Australia, and Netherlands have a high level of investment 
in the Agricultural products sector. France and Portugal 
concentrate their investment in 'Other Products' sector. 
Among the less-developed countries, Malaysia, Korea and the 
Philippines have a high level of investment in the Mineral 
sector. The 'Other Products' sector attracts investments 
from Korea and 'Other lDCs I. Malaysia and Panama have a 
high level of investment in the Agricultural products 
sector. 
On examining each country's share of foreign direct 
investment in Thailand, in column 8 of Table 3.4, we find 
that Japan occupies the leading position followed by U.S.A., 
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Taiwan, and U.K .. These four countries' share of investment 
accounts for 65.87% of the total foreign direct investment 
in Thailand during the twenty year period (1960-1981). A 
comparison of the pattern of investment 
and OCs + LOCs, is shown in Table 3.5. 
the data for these groups in descending 
between Des, LOCs 
The table presents 
order of sectoral 
proportions. As previously mentioned, the foreign investment 
pattern in Thailand is concentrated in three main sectors, 
viz. Mineral, 'Other Products' and Chemical sector; the 
value of investment in these three sectors accounting for 
65.61%, or about two-thirds of the total foreign direct 
investment. The Services and Mechanical sectors, are the 
least attractive sectors for foreign investors. There are 
differences between the DC and LDC pattern of investment 
except for the Minerals sector, which has the largest share 
of both the DC and LOC investments in Thailand. 
SECTION 3.5: COUNTRY-WISE PATTERN 
In this section we discuss the country-wise sectoral pattern 
of foreign direct investment in Thailand. Consider Table 
3.6; Japan plays a dominant role in the Agricultural 
products sector, since her investments in this sector 
account for 27.45% of the total investment in this sector by 
all countries. Most of her investments are in Canned food, 
Preserving products and Animal food. U.S.A. is second 
highest investor (13.92%) followed by Taiwan (12.63%). Most 
of the U.S. investments are in Tobacco leaves, Canned food 
and wheat products, while Taiwan's investments are Rubber 
and leather products and Canned food (fruit, sea-food and 
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TABLE 3.6 
COUNTRY-WISE SECTORAL PATTERN OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESn~HIT IN THAILAUD 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SECTORS · · . · . OTHER · : OTHER · 
· · 
. 
· 
. 
· · 
· 
AGRICULTURAL 
· 
MINERAL :CHEMICAL · MECHANICAL: PRODUCTS · SERVICES: INDUSTRIES · 
· · · · · 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COUNTRIES % % % % % % % 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JAPAN 27.45 15.54 38.83 69.42 36.65 13.30 69.32 
U.S.A 13.92 22.72 11.15 8.48 2.69 7.66 4.55 
TAIWAN 12.63 7.76 20.23 
co 
5.99 18.99 7.39 4.18 
CD 
U.K. 2.75 2.66 1.80 3.67 0.74 26.10 15.52 
INDIA 0.18 11.27 8.12 4.01 2.37 
HONG-KONG 0.96 0.69 1.32 7.35 29.42 0.28 
SHJGAPORE 7.49 1.90 4.10 2.69 9.63 
NETHERLANDS 4.39 5.82 1.07 1. 98 1.25 
WEST GERMANY 2.67 3.28 c.98 0.95 2.53 1.89 1.08 
PORTUGAL B.91 6.53 
MALAYSIA 7.26 2.12 1. 53 2.56 0.94 
SW ITZERLAND 8.74 0.05 1.78 0.58 0.45 0.06 1.03 
===================================================================================== 
(Cont.) 
ro 
1..0 
TABLE 3.6 (Cont.) 
COU~JTRY-WISE SECTORAL PATTERN OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVES1NENT IN THAILAtlD 
SECTORS 
COUNTRIES 
FRANCE 
AUSTRALIA 
KOREA 
PANAMA 
PHILIPPINES 
ITALY 
OTHER 
OTHER 
TOTAL 
DC 
LDC 
DC 
LDC 
: : : : : OTHER: : OTHER : 
: AGRICULTURAL: MINERAL :CHEMICAL : MECHANICAL: PRODUCTS: SERVICES: INDUSTRIES: 
:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
% % % % % % % 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.37 
5.68 
2.47 
3.23 
0.08 
100 
69.22 
30.78 
0.29 
0.67 
0.54 
0.33 
24.36 
100 
75.05 
24.95 
1.88 
1.93' 
100 
61.43 
38.57 
2.37 
1.13 
0.75 
0.58 
100 
88.03 
11.97 
11.89 
1.17 
0.31 
0.54 
1.93 
100 
55.48 
44.52 
.. 
. 
0.52 
1.52 
0.21 
0.22 
100 100 
49.48 92.02 
50.52 7.98 
===================================================================================== 
meat}. In the Mineral sector, the U.S.A. holds the dominant 
position 
followed 
with 22 .. 72% of total investment in this 
by Japan (15.54%) and India (11.27%). 
interesting to note that the 'Other DCs' group 
share of investment (24.36%) in this sector. 
sector, 
It is 
big has a 
Japanese investments in 'Chemicals' account for 38.83% of 
total foreign direct investment in this sector. This is more 
than three and a half times as large as that of Taiwan 
(20.23%), Portugal (8.91%) and India (8.12%) have the 
similar levels of investment in this sector 
Again Japan has the highest share of 
'Mechanical' sector (69.42%), followed 
after Taiwan. 
investments in 
by the U. S. A. 
(8.48%). Japan also plays the dominant role in the 'Other 
Products' sector with her 36.65% share of investment. 
Taiwan is in the second highest position with 18.99% share. 
This is the sector where France concentrates her investments 
with 97% (see Table 3.4). France is the third highest 
investor (11.89%) followed by Hong-Kong (7.35%) and Portugal 
(6.53%). Hong-Kong and U.K. with 29.42% and 26.10% share of 
investment in this sector, are by far the largest investors 
in the Services sector followed by Singapore (9.63%) Taiwan 
(7.39%) and U.S.A. (7.66%). Lastly, we have the 'Other 
Industries' sector, where Japan is the main investor 
accounting for 69.32% of the total investment in this 
sector. U.K. plays the second role (15.52%) followed by 
Taiwan (4.1%) and U.S.A. (4.55%). An interesting finding is 
that in all sectors of investment, except in the Services 
sector, DCs investors playa dominant role as shown in Table 
3.7. In 'Other Products', the share of the DCs is about 11 
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TABLE 3.7 
============================================================ 
:SECTOR DCs + LOCs 
% 
OCs 
% 
LOCs 
% 
DCs % 
LOCs % 
----------------------------------------------------------
:AGRICULTURAL 
:PRODUCTS 
:MINERAL, ft1ETAL: 
:& CERAMICS 
100 69.22 
100 75.05 
30.78 2.2 
24.95 3 
----------------------------------------------------------
:CHEMICAL 100 61. 43 38.57 1.6 
:MECHANICAL 100 88.03 11. 97 7.3 
----------------------------------------------------------
:OTHER PRODUCTS: 100 55.48 44.52 1.2 
----------------------------------------------------------
:SERVICES 100 49.48 50.52 0.98 
----------------------------------------------------------
:OTHER 
:INDUSTRIES 
100 92.02 7.98 11. 5 
============================================================ 
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times larger than that of the LDCs while in 'Agriculture' 
and 'Chemicals' the share is only about twice larger. It is 
only in the 'Services' sector that LOC and the DC shares are 
roughly equal. 
SECTION 3.6: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND PER CAPITA INCOME 
In this section we examine whether countries with higher per 
capita income invest relatively more in Thailand. We have 
seen in the previous section that the sectoral proportions 
of foreign direct investment differ between the LDC and DC 
countries. Furthermore, in most sectors the Des invest 
relatively more than the LDCs. We assess that the primary 
differences between the LDCs and the DCs are reflected in 
one important variable, i.e., the level of per capita 
income. We have the following hypothesis: the higher the 
per capita income, the higher is the share of foreign direct 
investment in Thailand. 
We have the sectoral proportions of individual countries in 
Table 3.6. We note that these shares are the results of 
cumulative investment from 1961-1981. Therefore, for per 
capita income, we use the following alternative definitions: 
WA i = i 
Avj = i 
th country's weighted average of per 
capita incomes of 1960, 1970, and 1980, 
where the weights are the Thai population 
in 1960, 1970 and 1980 respectively. 
th country's average per capita incomes of 
1960, 1970 and 1980 
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AV i 2 
AV i I 
= 
= 
i th country's average per capita incomes of 
1970 and 1980 
; th country's per capita income of 1980 
The data on per capita income are easily available from the 
IMF Year Book and are expressed in constant 1975 prices. We 
now define the following variables: 
sri = i th country's share of total 
investment. 
sri = i th country's share of totai J 
investment in the Jth sector. 
D = Dummy when 0 = 0 for LDC 
0=1 for DC 
Regressing sr on WA, for a cross-section of 20 
(as in Table 3.6) we get the following: 
sr = 2.87 + 0.01WA 
(t=1.04) (t=1.41) 
+ 0.930 
(t=0.21) 
+ R 
DW 
foreign 
foreign 
countries 
= 0.17 
= 1. 39 
These results do not improve if AV 3, AV 2 or AV 1 are run as 
independent variable. Logarithmic runs also did not improve 
these results. The evidence thus shows that per capita 
income does not explain share of foreign direct investment 
in Thailand. Then the question arises whether per capita 
income explains a country's share in a particular sector. 
Again WA performs relatively better than the other 
independent variables. We have the following results: 
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S I i 
agriculture = 
Si 
mineral 
S~hem;cal 
S; 
mechanical 
= 
= 
= 
3.23 
(t=1.44) 
2.38 
(t=1. 79) 
4.05 
(t=1.21) 
5.65 
(t=0.95) 
+ 0.008HAi 
(t=1.41) 
+ 0.002WA i 
(t=5.10) 
+ 0.1WA; 
(t=1.19) 
0.003AVl 
(t=1.45) 
S i . 
other products = 6.64 + 0.002AV~ 
s~ervices = 
(t=1.66) (t=0.82) 
7.73 
(t=1.87) 
i 0.002AV 3 
(t=0.77) 
Si . 
other industries= 6.90 0.005AV~ 
(t=1.10) (t=1.62) 
+ 1.40 R2 = 0.19 
(t=0.39) DW = 1.89 
2.56D R2 = 0.65 
(t=1.18) ow = 1.62 
0.850 R2 = 0.10 
(t=0.16) ow = 1.59 
32.340 
(t=1.80) 
R2 = 0.19 
0\4 = 2.86 
+ 10.100 R2 = 0.22 
+ 
(t=0.88) OW = 1.60 
7.670 
(t=0.66) 
R2 = 0.72 
OW = 1.53 
+ 36.7D R2 = 0.22 
(t=2.0) DW = 1.60 
It is clear from the above results that per capita income 
does not explain sectoral shares of an investing country in 
Thailand. 
The only reasonably good result is for the 'Mineral' sector 
where WA is significant and R2 = 0.65 although the ~- value 
is very small. For the 'Mechanical', 'Other Products', 
'Services', and 'Other Industries' sectors the results 
presented are AV 1 AV 2, and AV 3 respectively, except for 
'Other Industries' sector is AV 2, as the independent 
variable. All of them (viz., AV 1 , AV 2 , AV 3) are 
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insignificant with the wrong sign. Lastly, we note that 
logarithmic runs did not improve these results. 
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SECTION 3.7: CONCLUSIONS 
There exists a significant trend for the aggregate inflow of 
foreign direct investments to Thailand. The trend is made 
weaker by the large fluctuations between 1974 and 1981. We 
also found a significant trend for the flow of German 
investments to Thailand; although a similar result does not 
hold for the Japanese foreign direct investments in 
Thailand. Further analysis has been carried out by using the 
BOI data which give both the country-wise and sector-wise 
investments. Ninety-two per cent of the firms from the 
less-developed countries are in the 0.1-49% 
foreign-ownership category, 
the firms from the developed 
foreign-ownership category. 
while twenty-five per cent of 
countries are in the 51-100% 
The largest proportion (28%) of 
foreign direct investments has gone to the mineral sector. 
The second largest proportion (19%) has gone to the 'Other 
Industries' sector where industries are mostly 
natural-resource based. Japan, U.S.A. and Taiwan are leading 
investors in Thailand. About 27% of the total investments in 
the agricultural sector, about 39% of the total investments 
in the mineral sector, and about 69% of the total 
investments in the mechanical sector come from Japan. About 
22% and 15% of the total investments in the mineral sector 
come, respectively, from the U.S.A. and Japan. The 
sectoral pattern for foreign direct investment differs 
between the developed and the less-developed countries 
except in the services sector. Lastly, we tested whether a 
country with higher capita income will have a larger share 
of foreign direct investment in Thailand. Our test has 
rejected the hypothesis. 
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SECTION 4.1: INTRODUCTION 
Multinational firms, as we have noticed in Chapter 2, are 
oligopolistic firms with a degree of monopoly power in terms 
of firm-specific factors (e.g., technological superiority) 
and/or product differentiation. It is often argued that such 
firms are 'large' and are engaged in 'high technology' which 
are relatively capital-intensive. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that capital-labour ratio has featured as one of 
the various determinants of foreign direct investment in the 
work of Baldwin (1979), Juhl (1979), Lall (1980) among 
others. Caves (1974) alone has used capital to sales ratio 
to construct a variable which captures 'size' of firms. 1 
Following Hirsch (1976), let Z denote firm specific know-how 
and other intangible assets. Z may be the result of past 
investment in R&D leading to new products and/or processes 
or new managerial know-how. Since Z is intangible, it is 
'neither depleted nor amortized', and, thus, takes the 
characteristics of a public good as pointed out by Johnson 
(1970). Now we note that Z "appears to be particularly 
important in high technology industries which manufacture 
new product-cycle goods" (Hirsch 1976, p.267). The transfer 
of Z by a multinational firm to another country involves a 
1 Caves (1974) defines a variable called KC which 
'indicates the capital cost of constructing a simple 
plant of minimum efficient scale'. It is the size of 
the 'minimum efficient scale' plant multiplied by 
assets to sales ratio. 
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large amount of physical capital or tangible assets. 2 These 
transfers requiring relatively a large quantity of physical 
capital stock may take place from one country to another 
country which is relatively more abundant in capital or 
which provides other combinative factors (such as skilled 
and unskilled labour or raw-materials) cheaply. In these 
cases, the transfer is primarily motivated by the 
country-specific characteristic (e.g., availability of 
capital). However, this transfer may also take place to a 
country which is, say, relatively less endowed with capital, 
when the investing countries supply the required capital. In 
this case, the motive may be to capture the market or the 
'expected' market before a competitor invades that country. 
It is, therefore, clear that capital labour ratio is 
strongly associated with foreign direct investment from one 
country to another. Thus, capital-intensity is a necessary 
condition. The purpose of this chapter is to test this 
capital-intensity hypothesis in the case of Thailand. 
SECTION 4.2: COUNTRY-WISE AND SECTOR-WISE ANALYSIS OF THE 
CAPITAL-LABOUR RATIO 
We begin by investigating the sectoral and country-wise 
capital-labour ratios and later use them to test the 
hypothesis that the foreign firms tend to invest in 
high-technology and capital intensive sectors of the 
2 In the case of licensing this need not be the case. 
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less-developed countries countries lika Thailand. Let K 
stand for capital and L for labour and k = K/L is 
capital-labour ratio. A higher value of k implies that 
relatively more capital is used. In this study, capital is 
operationally defined as fixed assets net of depreciation 
plus current assets (viz. inventories). Lall (1980), for 
example, defines the total net fixed assets as capital. We 
have very little choice in this matter as the data are 
available only in this form. However, these figures are 
taken as a reasonably good estimate of capital in value 
terms. 
The value of capital per worker embodied in foreign direct 
investment in Thailand is discussed with reference to eight 
principal investing countries and two 'groups' of countries 
which are 'small' investors. Four of the countries are 
developed countries (viz., U.S.A., U.K., West Germany, 
Japan) and the other four are developing countries (viz., 
Taiwan, Hong-Kong, India and Singapore). The rest of the 
investing countries are classified into two groups: (a) the 
'Other developed countries' group which consists of 18 
countries, viz., Denmark, Israel, Belgium, Canada, Italy, 
Australia, Netherlands, New-Zea 1 and, Portuga 1 , France, 
Panama, Norway, Switzerland, Luxembourg, 
South-Africa and Austria, and (b) the 
Bermuda, Romania, 
'other developing 
countries' group which contains six countries, viz., Kenya, 
Korea, Philippines, Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia. We are 
using cumulative data from 1961-1981 from the BOI (as we 
have explained earlier in Chapter 3). From the sample data, 
we first take the cumulative figure for each of the eight 
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principal investing countries (as mentioned above) for the 
period of 1961-1981. Because of inflation the BOI data would 
not be appropriate if we were to use the cumulative total of 
capital assets at the current prices. We must, therefore, 
deflate to express the value of capital at constant baht. We 
have done so by taking 1975 as the base year. However, an 
exact deflator of the type we require does not exist. We 
have therefore decided to use the Thai GOP deflator which is 
readily available from the UN publications (1982). 
To determine labour in the most accurate way we should 
consider the number of hours worked or man hours per year. 
However, this is not possible here because of lack of data. 
We have, therefore, used number of employees as labour. We 
should be aware that this accounts for quantity not the 
quality of labour. But this is a more difficult problem, 
and even Leontief (1953) could not take account of quality 
of labour. In practice it is very difficult to account for 
the differences in quality of labour input. We are taking 
number of employees as labour and thereby implicitly 
assuming homogenous labour. 
a first approximation. 
This seems to be acceptable as 
We have computed, in Table 4.1, the country-wise sectoral 
capital-labour ratios of eight principal countries plus two 
groups of developed and developing countries. Then the 
figures for each country are classified into seven sectors, 
namely, Agricultural products, Mineral, Chemical, 
Mechanical, 'Other Products', Services and 'Other 
Industries'. The last row shows the over-all capital-labour 
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TABLE 4.1 
CAP !TAL-LABOUR 
RATIO K/L = k 
:% OF : 
:m~NERSHIP: USA 
(~ 1000 at 1975 prices) 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
UK :~!.GERMANY:JAPAN :OTHER DCs:TAIWAN :HONG-KONG:WDIA :SINGAPORE:OTHER LDCs: 
=======================================================================================================================: 
:51-100% : 694.10 : 336.13:2097.66 :1732.79: 708.23 : 74.39: 14.86: : 350 1. AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS AND 
COMMODITIES 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:01.-49% :295.38 : 261.68: 178.64 : 572.29: 688.82 : 136.72: 173.42 : 126.44: 857.68 : 216.05 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:51-100% :1895.62: : 246.31 :2230.12:7877.08 : 205.89: : 667.79 : 238.14 2. ~lINERAL AND 
t1ETAL, CERAMICS :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49% : 567.81 : 458.99: 609.37 :1288.18: 319.95 : 423.53: 680.27 :1183.42: 461.97 : 507.77 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
3. CHEMICAL AND 
CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 
:51-100% :2000.76: 830.69:1470.17 :5850.11:1158.89 : 503.99: 931.81: 397.07: 
. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:0.1-49% :1746.20: 431.02: :1745.29:6460.69: 825.80: 393.82 : 532.70: 
4. MECHANICAL AND :51-100% : 466.22 : 538.71: 477.18 :1059.88: 209.02 
ELECTRICAL :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
EQUIPMENT :0.1-49%: 679.56 : 721.14: 178.18 : 605.29: 215.98 : 146.50: :3793.97 : 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
5. OTHER PRODUCTS :51-100% : : 340.99: : 330.02:1590.00: : 597.83 : 
TOYS, WATCH, CLOCK :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS:0.1-49% :1013.07: 123.83: 407.13 : 840.33:1117.05 : 278.43: 312.61 : 397.35: 466.97 : 154.84 : 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~--. 
6. SERVICES :51-100% : : 789.81 
:---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:0.1-49% : 448.71 :1199.14: 477.06 : 888.09: : 432.93: 491.89 : : 914.12 : 276.20 
. ----------------------------------------------------------------~------------------------------------------------------. 
7. :51-100% : : 1940. 48: : 279.03: : 120.21 
OTHER INDUSTRIES :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:0.1-49% : 434.06 : 241.24: 281.66 : 938.77: 376.79 : 125.72: 62.51 : 334.25: : 212.75 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
:51-100% : 650.51 : 540.37: 942.17 :1605.87:1852.56 : 273.41: 130.47 : 397.07: 667.79 : 317.89 
OVER-ALL k :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:0.1-49% : 542.69 : 292.39: 371.78 : 9]8.48:1831.79 : 304.66: 392.31 : 608.21: 978.85 : 231.21 
=========================================================~============================================================= 
ratio of each individual investing country. Further, we ha~e 
classified each sector of a country's investment into two 
categories: Primarily foreign-owned firms (with 51-100% 
foreign ownership) and primarily Thai-owned ,firms (with 
o . 1 - 49% for e i g now n e r s hip) . The s h are 0 f 0 w n e r s hip by a 
foreign firm depends largely on the degree of 
internalisation of the country-specific advantages desired 
by the investing firm. This is discussed in detail in the 
Survey Chapter (See Chapter 2, pp.45). 
Table 4.1 presents the country-wise sectoral capital-labour 
ratios. It shows that the k ratios differ greatly between 
sectors and between countries. It also reveals that the 
majority of the k ratios of 'all developed countries' are 
larger than those of 'all developing countries'. Differences 
in k-ratios also exist between the primarily foreign-owned 
firms and the primarily Thai-owned firms. A detailed 
break-down of k-ratios shows that the k-ratios of 'all DCs' 
investors in the primarily Thai-owned firms category are 
relatively lower than those of the primarily foreign-owned 
firms category. This is not surprising. It confirms the 
expected. Since Thailand is relatively less abundant in 
capital, one would expect the primarily Thai-owned firms to 
be relatively less-capital-intensive. However, there are 
exceptions. For example, West Germany in the 'Agricultural' 
sector, the 'Other DCs' group in the Mineral sector. Other 
similar results also appear in the 'Mechanical' sector where 
the k-ratios of U.S.A., U.K. and 'Other DCs' are lower for 
the primarily foreign-owned firms category. A similar low k-
ratio is again unexpected in the 'Other Products' sector for 
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Japan. But in the cases of the 'Services' and 'Other 
Industries' sectors, it seems unjustified to pursue any 
further comparisons because of insufficient observations. 
The k-ratios of the developing countries lie in the opposite 
direction to those of the developed countries. That is, the 
k-ratios for the LOCs are relatively higher than those for 
the OCs in the primarily Thai-owned firms. Comparing the k-
ratios of LOC firms between the categories of ownership, we 
find that, in seven cases out of twelve, the primarily 
Thai-owned firms have relatively lower k-ratios. The high k-
ratios in primarily Thai-owned firms appear in the Mineral 
and 'Other Industries' sectors of the 'Other LOCs' group. It 
is unfortunate that we do not have more observations in our 
analysis in order to draw a more rfgorous conclusion. 
However, the different results of the k-ratios between OC's 
and LDC's will become more apparent if we study over-all 
ratios for each country. 
Nevertheless the results for the LOC 
particularly surprising ~ because within 
developing countries, Thailand, in general 
ratios are not 
the domain of the 
technologically advanced in South-East 
seems to be more 
Asia, with the 
exception of Singapore. Other countries such as Taiwan and 
Hong-Kong concentrate their advantage relatively more in 
the finance and banking areas rather than in the technical 
field. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that some of 
the firms in the primarily Thai-owned category, which have a 
greater element of Thai capital, tend to engage in 
relatively high-technology, capital intensive investment. 
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While at the same time some of the primarily foreign-owned 
firms (from the LDCs) may still prefer to choose the 
traditional labour-intensive methods of production. 
According to the above discussion, if we are to test the 
hypothesis that foreign firms tend to concentrate on 
high-technology and capital intensive investment, the most 
appropriate method would be to compare the results of the 
firms from the DC group with those of firms from the LOC 
group. Thus we pay attention only to the results of the DC's 
sectoral capital-labour ratios in testing this hypothesis; 
and most of our attention will be given to the category of 
the primarily foreign-owned firms. 
The first sector un~er consideration is the Agricultural 
sector, where West Germany has the highest k-ratio 
(2097.66), Japan ;s second with her k-ratio of 1732.79. 
'Other DCs' group 708.23 and U.S.A. 694.10 share the same 
level of k- ratio. The U.K. (336.13) has the lowest ratio 
in all DCs group even lower than the 'Other LDC's ratio 
(350). Taiwan and Hong-Kong have low k-ratios (74.39 and 
14.86 respectively.) 
We find that the k-ratios of DCs are lower in the category 
of the primarily Thai-owned firms than those for the 
category of the primarily foreign-owned firms. But the 
results are in opposite direction for the LDCs except for 
the 'Other LDCs' group. The k-ratio for Singapore is 
surprisingly high (857.68); her ratio being the highest in 
both the DCs and LDCs group. 
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In the Mineral Sector in the category of 51-100% foreign 
ownership firms, the k-ratio for 'Other DCs' is 
exceptionally high with a value of 7847.08 followed by 
2230.12 for Japan and 1895.65 for the U.S.A .. But the k-
ratio for West Germany gives a very low value of only 
246.31 in this sector. There is unfortunately no observation 
for the U.K. in this sample. In the LDC group, Singapore has 
the highest ratio of 655.96. While Taiwan and 'Other LDCs' 
share the similar low level of k-ratio at 205.89 and 238.14 
respectively. The DC k-ratios are relatively lower in the 
category of the primarily Thai-owned firms than those in the 
primarily foreign-owned firms as we would expect according 
to the hypothesis under consideration. However, the k-ratio 
of Japan is still high at 1288.18; and surprisingly the k-
ratio of India is as high as 1183.43. It can be explained by 
the fact that her investments in Thailand are carried out 
jointly with other industrialised countries viz., Canada and 
Britain. 
In the category of the primarily foreign-owned firms the k-
ratios of the DCs for the Chemical sector are relatively 
higher as compared to the k-ratios of the other sectors. 
Japan has the highest ratio (5850.11) followed by the U.S.A. 
with 2000.76, West Germany with 1470.17 and 'Other DCs' with 
1158.89. The U.K. has a low value in this sector (k = 
830.69). Her ratio is even lower than that of Hong-Kong 
(931.81), Taiwan ratio is 503.99. India has the lowest k-
ratio of 397.07 compared to the other k-ratios in this 
sector. It can be seen that the k-ratios in primarily 
Thai-owned firms category in this sector are also high, in 
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particular, the ratio of 'Other DCs' with k = 6460.69 and 
U.S.A. with k-ratio = 1746.2. Taiwan also has a higher 
k-ratio in the Chemical sector relative to the other sectors 
with k = 825.80. Both 'Other DCs' and Taiwan k-ratios are 
much higher than the ratios for the primarily foreign-owned 
firms. This may be explained in terms of 'Other DCs' being a 
large group with various industries in the same sector. With 
a less heterogeneous group of industries and with data from 
more countries, this effect would probably disappear. 
For the Mechanical sector in the category of the primarily 
foreign-owned firms the k-ratios are much lower than the 
k-ratios in the sector discussed so far. Japan has the 
highest k-ratio of 1059.88 followed by West Germany with k = 
477.18. We have no sample observations for the LDC firms in 
this category. For the Des in the category of the primarily 
Thai-owned firms, the k-ratio seems to be higher than for 
the primarily foreign-owned firms. This is true for the 
U.S.A., the U.K. and West Germany. Singapore has the highest 
k-ratio of 3793.97 in this category. 
In the last three investing sectors: 'Other Products', 
Services and 'Other Industries', foreign direct investment 
of DCs and LDCs tend to be concentrated in the category of 
the primarily Thai-owned firms, in particular, in the 
Services sector where only the 'Other DCs' appear to invest 
in the category of the primarily foreign-owned firms. 
In the 'Other Products' sector, there are only four 
countries involved in the primarily foreign-owned firms 
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category. There are 'Other DCs' with a k-ratio of 1590. In 
the primarily Thai-owned firms category, the 'Other DCs' has 
the highest ratio of 1117.05 and the U.S.A. has the second 
highest ratio of 1013.07. 
Taiwan and Japan are the only two countries who invest in 
the 'Other Industries' sector in the primarily foreign-owned 
firms group. For the primarily Thai-owned firms group, Japan 
has the highest ratio of 938.77 in this category. 
We conclude from our analysis that the sectoral 
capital-labour ratios of the four developed countries and 
the 'Other DCs' are consistently higher than the sectoral 
capital-labour ratios of the four less-developed countries 
and the 'Other LDCs' group in both 51-100% and 0.1-49% 
foreign ownership categories. Moreover, as mentioned 
earlier, the DC k-ratios in the category of primarily Thai-
owned firms, in general, are relatively smaller than those 
in the category of the primarily foreign-owned firms. This 
means that a greater capital-intensity of investment is 
observed whenever a relatively larger element of foreign 
ownership is present. Furthermore, the capital-intensity of 
the LDC investments appear to concentrate in the category of 
the primarily Thai-owned firms. The data in the LDCs group 
show greater variability between the 51-100% and 0.1-49% 
foreign ownership category. 
The data provide fairly clear evidence for accepting the 
capital intensivity hypothesis since the over-all k-ratios 
confirm that the k-ratios of DC investors involved in the 
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51-100% foreign-ownership category are larger than the 
k-ratios of those in the 0.1-49% foreign ownership category 
and are also larger that the k-ratfos of the LDCs group. On 
the contrary, the LDC ratios for 0.1-49% foreign-ownership 
category are larger than the ratios in 51-100% 
foreign-ownership category except for the k-ratios of the 
'Other LDCs'. 
SECTION 4.3: A SIMPLE ECONOMETRIC TEST 
Although we have found (in section 4.2) some empirical 
evidence which supports the capital intensity hypothesis in 
the case of Thailand, further empirical analysis is likely 
to provide more rigorous support. This section presents some 
simple econometric results by using the OLS method. 
Testing the capital intensity hypothesis by using 
econometric methods turns out to be tricky. Baldwin (1979), 
Lall (1980) and others have used capital-labour ratio as one 
of the several determinants of foreign direct investment. In 
a multiple regression model, this procedure perhaps is 
acceptable. We test a 'simple' hypothesis which relates 
capital-labour ratio to foreign direct investment. As 
explained in the Survey Chapter (PP.51), it··is ·only a 
necessary condition that a firm investing in a foreign 
country has oligopolistic characteristics with monopolistic 
advantages. It is not a sufficient condition in that an 
oligopolistic firm with firm-specific advantages need not be 
a mUlti-national firm. Now, if capital-labour ratio 
109 
captures these characteristics, then we should find a strong 
correlation between sectoral foreign direct investment and 
sectoral capital-labour ratio. In testing a necessary 
condition, it is not possible to hypothesize which 
'causes'what. In other words, we may say that either 
capital-labour ratio is a function of foreign direct 
investment or vice versa. 
It is important to note that the above argument applies 
directly to horizontal expansion which leads to multi-plant 
economies. But the pattern of foreign direct investment in 
Thailand (Chapter 3) shows that a large percentage goes 
towards producing raw-materials (minerals, rubber etc.). In 
these cases, clearly the oligopolistic firm decides on 
vertical integration. But extractive industries, such as 
mining, require a large amount of capital. So, on both 
accounts (i .e. vertical and horizontal integration), one 
would expect sectoral capital-labour ratio to be directly 
related to sectoral investments. 
Furthermore, there is a broad view regarding capital-labour 
ratio. This view is associated with the relative abundance 
of capital in the developed countries. Thailand being a 
less-developed country and the major investors in Thailand 
being the developed and semi-industrialised countries, one 
would expect a positive relationship between sectoral 
capital-labour ratio and sectoral investments. 
We postulate a simple regression equation of the following 
type: y = ~+ Po x + PIO! + P2 02 + r3 03+ r4 D4+ u where y 
110 
is the dependent variable, x is the independent variable, 
Di , i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the dummies, u is the error term. 
D1 = 1 for all developed countries, D1 = 0 for all 
less-developed countries. This is clear enough. We 
hypothesize that the capital intensity 'requirement' will 
vary from sector to sector. One would expect, in general, 
mechanical and chemical sectors to be more capital 
intensive than, say, the 'Services' sector. The second dummy 
D2 is used to capture this difference. It takes a value of 
unity for the Mineral, Chemical and Mechanical sectors, and 
a value of zero for Agriculture, 'Other Products', Services, 
and 'Other Industries' sectors. We have a group of developed 
countries lumped together as 'Other DCs' and a group of 
less-developed countries lumped together as 'Other LDCs'. 
These countries grouped together are not homogeneous, and it 
is our considered opinion that these two groups may affect 
our empirical results. In order to take account of this, we 
use dummies D3 and D4 when D3, = 1 for 'Other DC's' and D4=1 
for 'Other LDC's', D3 = 0 and D4 = 0 for the rest of the 
countries. 
We have used three 'definitions' of capital-labour ratio 
based on foreign-ownership categories. These are: 
k 1 = capital-labour ratio of 51-100% foreign-ownership 
category 
k2 = capital-labour ratio of 0.1-49% foreign-ownership 
category 
k3 = capital-labour ratio of 0.1-100% foreign-ownership 
category 
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The data for k1and k2 are taken from Table 4.1 and the data 
for k3 (calculated from the original BOI data) is presented 
in Table 4.2. 
For foreign direct investments we have two 
specifications: These are the following: 
II = level of foreign direct investments 
alternative 
12 = over-all share of investment for each country in 
each sector (i.e., sectoral investment as a 
percentage of total foreign direct investments). 
Data for variables II and I2 are presented in Tables 4.3 and 
4.4. These are calculated from the BOI data as discussed in 
Chapter 3. We note that Table 4.1 has 10 'countries' and 7 
sectors. 
Each figure in a cell is taken here as one observation. This 
requires an explanation. Consider the U.S.A. investments in 
the Agricultural sector. There are many American firms (say, 
preferring majority equity share, i.e., 51-100%.) who have 
invested in the Agricultural sector of Thailand. The figure 
694.10 is derived by dividing the aggregate capital stock of 
all those firms by the aggregrate number of employees. The 
corresponding value of aggregrate investment (in % terms or 
levels) is available from Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Furthermore, 
we assume that the decision-making process of the American 
firms investing in the Thai Agricultural sector is 
independent of the same if the American firms invest in the 
Mechanical or Mineral sector. This is assumed to be true for 
all the countries including the 'Other LOCs' and 'Other DCs' 
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TABLE 4.2 (~ 1000 AT 1975 prices) 
===================================================================================================================== 
K/L 0.1-100% USA UK :W.GERMANY: JAPAN :OTHER DCs: TAIWAN :HONG-KOt.JG: INDIA :SHIGAPORE:OTHER LDCs: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
1.AGRICUL TURAL : 490.99 : 276.66: 469.59: 686.95: 695.78: 137.03: 63.25 : 126.45: 857.68: 225.95 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
2. MINERAL : 998.09 : 458.99: 507.91 :1390.40: 6015.04: 422.47: 680.27: 1183.42: 632.04: 498.48 
3. CHEMICAL : 1833.23 : 788.79: 1470.15:1796.84: 5054.38: 819.03: 567.37: 56.88: 
4.MECHANICAL : 477.41 : 576.96: 223.94: 659.12: 211.95: 146.50 : 3793.96: 
5.0THER PRODUCTS : 1013.07 : 141.89: 407.12: 733.86: 1122.78: 278.43: 318.66: 397.35: 466.97: 154.84 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
6. SERVICES : 448.71 : 1199.14: 447.06: 888.99: 789.81: 432.93: 491.89: 914.12: 276.19 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
7. OTHER 
INDUSTRIES 
: 434.06 : 241.24: 281.66: 1102.01: 376.79: 147.15: 62.52 : 334.25 : 211.37 
===================================================================================================================== 
TABLE 4.3 LEVEL OF FOREGN DIRECT INVES~1ENT (~ 1000 AT 1975 prices) 
========================================================================================================================= 
: USA UK :W.GERMANY:JAPAN :OTHER DCs:TAIWAN :HONG-KONG:INDIA :SINGAPORE:OTHER LDCs: TOTAL 
========================================================================================================================: 
1. AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS AND 
COMMODITIES 
· . . 
· . . 
:3686880 :185053 : 857936 
· . . . 
· . . . 
:5798525 : 4161557 : 690841: 
· 
109428 : 22381: 
· 
· 308764 : 917360 : 16738725: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
2. MINERAL AND . ..... 
t4ETAL, CERAMICS ;1707730 :326342 ; 1125024 ;8557940 ; 4589472 -;1292750; 100000: 1394063: 436743: 564782 : 20094846: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
3. CHEMICAL AND : 
CHEMICAL PRODUCTS:2513361 :195620 : 346960 :7153227: 12843191:1985328: 255316: 908683: : 26191686: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
4. MECHANICAL 
AND ELECTRICAL 
EQUIPNENT 
· .... . 
· . 
:3804976 :1144696: 43893 :6445580: 88170: 196455: 527361 : : 12251131: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. · . 
· . OTHER PRODUCTS : 176275 : 295268: 85903 :4245353: 1851469 :1758580: 706145 : 574564 : 133485 491631 : 10418763: 
6. SERVICES · . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . · 
: 367044 :733874: 76000 :1048125: 101096 : 887510: 2120031 : : 419582 : 228413 : 5981675 : 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. ::: · . 
· . 
. . 
. . · . 
· . 
OTHER INDUSTRIES : 1321279:2440167: 172377 :29043603: 655616 : 608752: 34696 : 207571 : 468613 : 34952674: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
TOTAL 
INVESTMENT 
· . 
· . 
:13577545:5321020: 2708093 :62292353:24290571 :7420216:3325616 :3107262 :1925935 : 2670799 :126629410: 
========================================================================================================================== 
--..... 
\Jl 
TABLE 4.4 OVER-ALL SHARE OF INVESTMENT FOR EACH COUNTRY IN EACH SECTOR 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% 
USA 
% 
UK 
% %: % : % : % : % % %: 
:W.GERMANY: JAPAN :OTHER DCs: TAIWAN :HONG-KONG: INDIA :SINGAPORE:OTHER LDCs: 
====================================================================================================================: 
1. AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS AND 
COMMODITIES 
2. MINERAL AND 
METAL, CERAMICS 
3. CHEMICAL AND 
· 
: 2.91 
· 
· : 1.35 
CHEMICAL PRODUCTS : 1.99 
4. MECHANICAL 
AND ELECTRICAL 
EQUIP~1HJT 
: 3.00 
· : 0.15 
· 
· : 0.26 
· 
: 0.15 
: 0.90 
0.68 
0.89 
0.27 
0.03 
. 
: 4.58 
: 6.76 
. 
: 5.65 
: 5.08 
3.29 : 0.55 0.09 : 0.02 0.24 0.72 
· 
3.62 : 1.02 0.08 :1.10 0.35 0.44 
· 
. 
10.14 : 1.57 0.20 : 0.72 
0.07 : 0.16 0.42 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 5. OTHER PRODUCTS 
: 0.14 : 0.23 0.07 : 3.35 1.46 : 1.39 0.56 : 0.45 0.18 0.39 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 6. SERVICES · · · 
: 0.29 : 0.58 0.06 : 0.83 0.08 : 0.70 1.67 0.33 0.18 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 7. OTHER INDUSTRIES: 
: 1.04 : 1.93 0.14 : 22.93 0.52 : 0.48 0.03 : 0.16 0.37 
. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. TOTAL 
: 10.72 : 4.20 2.14 : 49.19 19.18 : 5.87 2.63 : 2.45 1.52 2.10 
===================================================================================================================== 
groups. On this basis, we consider each cell in Table 4.1 as 
an independent observation. 
, 
In the Tables below, we present the results of our basic 
regression equations. In Table 4.5, the first column 
identifies the dependent variable. The second column shows 
the constant term. The next six columns show, mutatis 
mutandis, the estimated coefficients of the independent 
variables. The number in parentheses under the coefficients 
are the t-ratios. Those marked with three asterisks identify 
coefficients that are significantly different from zero at 
the 1% confidence level, while those with two and one 
asterisk are significant at 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Table 4.5 gives the results for capital-labour ratio, k3 
(0.1-100% foreign-ownership category). When we regressed 
Ii' i = 1, 2 on k3' and k3 on Ii' i = 1, 2 without the 
dummies, the results were not statistically significant with 
very low R2s. 
When we entered Oland 02 together in our basic regression 
model the size of the coefficients remained almost the same, 
while the value of R2increased up to 0.22 (as given in 
equation 4) and the ~-values become 
added 03 and 04 as explanatory 
significant. 
variables, 
We then 
and the 
coefficients of Ii' i = 1, 2. (as given by equations 5,6,10, 
and 11 in Table 4.5) were positive and significant. At the 
same time the value of R2 increased to a range of 0.34 and 
0.41. We also note that in equations 5 and 11, both 02 and 
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TABLE 4.5 k ratio of 0.1 -100% foreign-ownership. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant: Ii : 109 Ii : k3 : log k 3 : D1 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
1. : 0.41 :204.77 
: (2.32)**: : (1.86)* : 
:60774 
:(0.29) 
: -0.11 
:(-0.49) 
: n = 63 : 
: R2 = 0.06: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
2. : 0.49 
: (2.46)**: 
:164.21 
: (I. 35) 
:-31379 :-96121 
:(-0.14) :(-0.41) 
: 0.27 
:(0.72) 
: -0.30 : n = 63 : 
• • 2 • 
:(-0.75): R = 0.08~ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
3. : 9.51 
: (7.65) 
: 0.40 : 0.57 
:(1.81)* :(1.45) 
:-0.05 
:(-0.14) 
:-0.15 
;(-0.26) 
: 0.01 : n = 63 : 
• • 2 • 
:(0.02) : R = 0.15: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: 143.68 :0.000311: 
~ (0.69) ~(1.86)* ~ 
: 206.02 :0.000211: 
: (0.95) :(1.35) 
:357.37 :750.19 
!(1.49) !{3.10)**; 
n = 63 
! R2 = 0.22: 
:105.16 :750.19 :1216.6 :-119.15: n = 63 
:(O.43) :(3.28)***:(3.23)***:(-0.27): R2 = 0.34: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
6. : log k3 
: 3.91 
:(4.32)***: 
: 0.141 1 
: (1.81)* : 
: 0.51 :0.64 :0.53 : 0.23 n = 63 
:(2.28)**:(3.24)***:{1.65) • • 2 • ~ ( 0.65 ) ~ R = O. 36 ~ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. (Cont.) 
TABLE 4.5 k ratio of 0.1 -100% foreign-ownership. (Cont. ) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:Constant : I. 1 : 109 Ii 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. 0.72 
; (1. 57) 
:-0.0007 
;(-2.59}**; 
: 0.63 
;(l.13) 
:-0.09 
!(-0.15) 
n = 63 
; R2 = · 0.15 ~ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
8. 0.70 
: (1. 38) 
:0.0009 
:(2.83}***: 
: 0.78 
:0.29) 
:-0.21 
!(-0.35) 
:-1.19 
:(-1.19) 
:-0.13 : n = 63 
:(-0.12): R2 = 0.17: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
9 : -4.83 
:(-4.19)*** 
: 0.73 : - 0.009 : 0.13 
!(3.61)***!(-0.02) !(0.38) 
:-0.14 
:(-0.27) 
:-0.17 : n = 63 
!(-0.31)! R2 = 0.26! 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
10. 143.46 :136.5112: 
(0.72) ;(2.59)**: 
:269.39 :696.56 
!(1.13) !(2.93}***: 
n = 63 
: R2 = 0.26~ 
· ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
11. 171.85 :136.0312: 
(0.B5) :(2.83)**: 
:-16.64 :389.37 :1308.6 :-141.64: n = 63 
:(-0.07) :(3.17}***!(3.17}***:(-0.34): R2 = 0.41: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
12. 5.72 
(33.01) 
: 0.251 2 
. . 
: ( 3.61) ***: 
: 0.51 : 0.51 : 0.47 : 0.24 n = 63 
. . 
:(2.52)* :(2.72)***:(1.58) ~(0.74) ~ R2 = · 0.45: 
====================================================================================================================== 
D3 are significant. The results of the coefficients of k3 
(as given by equations 1, 2, 7 and 8) are significant. 
Among the four dummy variables, D2 gives the best 
performance with some high levels of significance. 
In general, our regression tests using K/L ratio for the 
0.1-100% foreign-ownership category does not give us good 
results. These unsatisfactory results for 0.1-100% 
foreign-ownership category could be explained in terms of 
the data used. The capital-labour ratio for 0.1-100% 
foreign-ownership category ;s simply a combination of two 
sets of data, i. e . , the 
foreign-ownership category 
K/L 
and 
ratio 
K /L 
of 
ratio 
51-100% 
0.1-49% 
foreign-ownership category. Our method of combining these 2 
sets of data could be misleading because the behaviour of 
these two ownership categories may not generally be 
homogeneous. According to our earlier analysis in this 
chapter we found tha t the firms in the 51-100% 
foreign-ownership category (the primarily foreign-owned 
firms) tend to prefer capital-intensive, high-technology 
investment. The firms of the 0.1-49% foreign-ownership 
category (the primarily Thai-owned firms) are expected to be 
involved in relatively less-capital intensive investments. 
If this explanation is valid, then we should expect to find 
better results if we use k1 and worse results it we use k2 
than those given by k3' The regression results arrived at by 
using k2 and k1 are presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 
respectively. Consider Table. 4.6 where we present the 
regression results. Most of the results for the 0.1-49% 
foreign-ownership category are very poor. When we regress 
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o 
TABLE 4.6 k ratio of 0.1 -49% foreign-ownership. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant: Ii : log Ii 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
1. : 0.18 
: (1. 53) . . • 
: 52.20 
: (0.81) : 
: 0.19 : 84955 
: (1.28) : (0.56) 
: n = 61 : 
: R2 = 0.06: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
2. : 0.18 : 46.76 
: (1.41) : (0.70) : 
: 0.15 : 844.70 
: (0.99) : (0.55) 
: O. 14 : 164. 92 
: (0.56) :(-0.06) 
: n = 61 
: R2 = 0.17: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
3. : 9.42 : 0.40 : 0.77 : 0.06 : 0.08 :0.05 : n = 61 
: (7.72) : (1.89)* :(2.13}**: (0.16) ! ( O. 14) ! ( 0.09 ) : R2 = 0.20: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
4. 
5. 
261.06 
(0.98) 
3.85 
:0.00031 1: 
:(0.70) 
:(3.99)***: 
: 0.151 1 
: (l. 89)* 
407.58 736.88 
(1.38) (2.48)**: 
717.55 503.97 :-169.28 290.00 
(0.89) (2.38)**: (0.98) : (-0.30) 
0.25 
(1. 06) 
0.54 0.22 :0.13 
(2.67)**: (0.64) : (0.36 
n = 61 
• 2 • 
: R = 0.16: 
n = 61 
: R2 = 0.17: 
n = 61 
: R2 = 0.25: 
===================================================================================================================== 
(Cont. ) 
TABLE 4.6 k ratio of 0.1 -49% foreign-o\'mership. (Cont.) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant: Ii : log Ii 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
7. 0.70 
; (1. 46) 
: 0.00004: 
; (0.11) ; 
: 1.15 : 0.64 : n :: 61 
! (1.99)*; (1.04) ! R2 = 0.09: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
8. 0.77 
: (1.44) 
:-0.00004: 
: (0.12) : 
: 1.06 : 0.63 : 0.13 :-0.32 : n = 61 
: (1.62) : (1.00) : (0.12) :(-0.31) : R2 = 0.09: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
9 
10. 
11. 
12. 
: -4.12 .. 
:(-3.30) 
324.57 :6.1212 
(1.66) :(0.11) 
239.06 :0.0000612 
(1.14) :(0.87) 
5.80 
(31. 84) 
: 0.201 2 
:(2.74)***: 
:0.59 : 0.20 : 0.27 : -0.004 :-0.08 
:(-0.007):(-0.14) :(2.74)***: (0.53) : (0.77) 
234.14 566.99 
(0.97) (2.36)**: 
178.90 
(0.69) 
0.30 
(1.40) 
545.43 : 825.03 :435.17 
(2.33)**:(2.07)**:(1.07) 
0.46 0.22 :0.14 
(2.30)**: (0.65) :(0.42) 
: n = 61 
; R2 = 0.20: 
n = 61 
; R2 = 0.11: 
n = 61 
: R2 = 0.19: 
n = 61 
: R2 = 0.29: 
===================================================================================================================== 
I\) 
I\) 
TABLE 4.7 k ratio of 51-100% foreign-ownership. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
Dependent 
Variable 
1. 
:Constant : 
:-173.08 
!(-0.43) 
I. 1 
Independent Variables 
: log Ii 
:0.0007 
!(2.56)***! 
:716.32 :439.20 
:(1.76)* :(1.15) 
n = 36 
! R2 = 0.28! 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
2. :0.00002 
!(0.76) 
:285.74 
. ! ( 3. 02) *** : 
:0.00002 :-73276 
:(0.09) :(-0.03) 
:-0.00004:-43972 
:(-1.17) :(-0.10) 
n = 36 
: R2 = 0.29: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
3. :587.15 
:(0.12) 
:0.00091 1 : 
:{3.35)***: 
:0.34 :0.17 n = 36 
:(-0.61) :(1.19) : R2 = 0.25: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
4. 
5. : log k1 
:-60.20 :0.00081 1 : 
:(-0.15) :(3.02)***! 
:5.57 
: (10.38) 
:-0.1511 
:(-1.35) 
:226.54 :466.98 
: (0.15) : (1.30) 
:0.75 :0.59 
:(1.29) !(1.26) 
:1164.8 :-6.94 n = 36 
:(2.30)**: (-0.009): R2 = 0.41: 
:0.45 :-1.61 n = 36 
:(0.71) :(-1.93)*: R2 = 0.42: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
:0.75 
6. ! (O. 90) 
:0.001 
:(2.88)***: 
:0.68 
: (0.74 ) 
:-0.19 : n = 36 
: (-0.23) : R2 = 0.26: 
==============================================================================================================;======= 
(Cont. ) 
TABLE 4.7 k ratio of 51-100% foreign-ownership. (Cont.) 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant: Ii : log Ii 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
7. :0.83 
:(0.87) 
:0.001 :0.86 
! (3.09)***: : (0.83) 
:-0.33 
:(-0.39) 
:-1.49 :-0.26 
~(-1.20) :(-0.16) 
: n = 16 
~ R2 = 0.29: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
8. :-54.69 
:(0.14) 
:202.861 2 : 
:(2.86)***: 
:522.74 :428.76 
:(0.53) :0.15) 
n = 36 
: R2 = 0.31: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
9 :-85.12 :207.501 2 : 
:(-0.21) :(3.09)***: 
:235.77 :474.00 
:(0.53) :0.33) 
:1168.1 :12.46 
:(2.32)**:(0.02) 
n = 36 
: R2 = 0.41: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
10. :0.17 
:(0.55) 
:0.1712 
: O. 00) 
:0.44 :0.66 
: ( 0.80 ) : (J • 35 ) 
:0.47 
:(0.71) 
:-2.19 n = 36 
====================================================================================================================== 
II on k2 and 12 on k2' the estimated coefficients are 
2 
statistically insignificant and the R s are low. When we 
regress and k2 on II' and k2 on 12, as given by equations 4, 
5, 10 and 11 in Table 4.6, the results are again poor. We 
now consider the results which use 
capital-labour ratio in the 51-100% 
kl' i.e., the 
foreign-ownership 
category. It is apparent that our regression results have 
improved considerably. The regression equations of lIon kl 
and 12 on kl (as given by equations 1, 2, 6 and 7) in Table 
4.7, give us the best performance with estimates significant 
at 1% level. The values of R2s are in the range of 0.26 and 
0.28. Regressing kl on II (equations 3, 4 and 5) and on 12 
(equations 8, 9, 10), we find the relevant coefficients are 
significant (except for the logarithmic ru~s). In this 
case, R2s are higher and they range from 0.36 to 0.42. 
The mo s t sat is· f yin g res u 1 t s 0 f 0 U ran a 1 y sis are f 0 U n d by 
using the K/L ratio of the 51-100% foreign-ownership 
category. These results simply reinforce our previous 
analysis of the k-ratios. In this case, finally, the 
hypothesis that foreign firms invest in 'high-technology 
capital-intensive ' sectors comes out reasonably well. 
SECTION 4.4: CONCLUSIONS 
We have established empirically that sectoral capital-labour 
ratios are associated with sectoral foreign direct 
investments in Thailand. This statistical association is 
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stronger for the 51-100% ownership category. No causality is 
implied in our analysis, and the reported association is 
taken as confirmation of a necessary condition i.e., the 
foreign firms (or 'countries', in this case, which is to be 
taken as 'aggregation' of firms) who invest in Thailand are 
oligopolistic with product differentiation and are 
integrating horizontally and vertically as the case may be. 
In 'causal I models of U.S. direct investment, both Lall 
(1980) and Baldwin (1979) did not find capital-labour ratio 
a statistically significant explanatory variable. This is 
not really surprising as these analyses consider total 
outflow of U.S. direct investments and most of these go to 
the developed countries. These studies are rather 
macro-type aggregative. If the U.S. direct investments in 
specific countries were analysed on a sectoral basis, we 
would not be surprised if a close association is established 
between U.S. sectoral investments and sectoral 
capital-labour ratios. 
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SECTION 5.1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the importance of the availability of 
raw materials in a country in inducing inflow of foreign 
direct investment. The role of 'resources' or 
'raw-materials' in explaining foreign direct investment has 
been recognized in the literature. For example, Caves (1971) 
considers production of raw-materials abroad as vertical 
integration. To quote his own words; 
It 
"In the parlance of industrial organisation, 
oligopoly with product differentiation normally 
prevails where corporations make 'horizontal I 
investments to produce abroad the same, lines of 
goods they produce in the home market. Oligopoly, 
not necessarily differentiated, in the home market 
is typical in industries which undertake 'vertical' 
direct investments to produce abroad a raw-material 
or other input to their production process at home" (p.1, 1971). 
is, however, not -necessary that foreign d i rec t 
investments in resource sectors be always vertically 
integrated to the parent company. As Dunning (1979) pointed 
out, such investments can also be horizontally integrated 
to the investing firms. To quote Dunning (1979), 
'Countries may engage in resource based investment 
for two quite different reasons. The first arises 
where there are abundant domestic natural resources, 
which lead either to the exploitation of similar 
activities overseas or of secondary processing, and 
prompted by the need to internalize the markets. The 
second arises where backward integration is 
undertaken to manufacture end-products to which the 
home economy is particularly suited, but for which 
local resources are inadequate' (p. 281-282). 
This, of course, is not surprising. If a giant American firm 
has technological expertise in mining, it is natural for 
127 
that firm, motivated either by profits or by global market 
share, to extend its activities to countries where such 
mining is possible. Earlier, Krainer (1967) established an 
interesting proposition: a country with limited natural 
resources has a higher proportion of its foreign direct 
investment in the 'vertical integration' form. In Chapter 4, 
this hypothesis is empirically confirmed for Japan in 
relationship to her foreign direct investment in Thailand 
since we found a large proportion of Japanese direct 
investment in Thailand is in the 'mining' sector. Kojima 
(1978) also found, by considering total Japanese outflow of 
foreign direct investment, that a major part of Japanese 
direct investments went towards Inatural resources' sectors. 
According to Kojima (1978), this is done in order to 
complement Japan's comparative advantage in the 
manufacturing sectors. Hence, Japanese foreign direct 
investments are termed 'trade oriented ' . Using American 
data, (data of 1191 manufacturing corporations out of which 
576 owned majority interest in Canada), Horst (1972) found 
that Iresource' as an explanatory variable 1 did not perform 
well. However, for the 'Canadian case' it worked fairly 
well. To our knowledge, no sectoral analysis has been 
carried out for any host country. Horst (1972) uses the U.S. 
sectoral 'outflow' data irrespective of the host countries 
except for the sectoral 'outflow' to Canada. 
1 Horst (1972) used a dummy variable to capture 
'resource with a value of unity for five 
industries, viz., wood, paper, petroleum, 
non-metalic mineral products and basic metals. 
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SECTION 5.2: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
We use here the BOI data as discussed in Chapter 3. We are 
fortunate to have data on the use of domestically available 
raw-materials and imported raw-materials for each firm 
registered separately with the BOI. 
Our analysis 
raw-material/labour 
first considers the 
ratio and then the 
domestic 
imported 
raw-material/labour ratio. The three variables, which are 
chiefly used in this study, are: RT which stands for 
domestically procured raw-material, RM which stands for 
imported raw-material and L which stands for labour (as 
defined in Chapter 4). Furthermore, r = RT/L is local 
raw-material/laoour ratio and TT = RM/L ;s imported 
raw-material/labour ratio. A higher value of r relative to 
TT implies that relatively more local raw material is used. 
This procedure will enable us to examine empirically whether 
the investors are investing in Thailand for the purposes of 
using raw materials - which are abundantly available in 
Thailand. But where TT is relatively higher, investors are 
using relatively more of imported raw-materials in their 
production. This procedure then gives us an indirect way of 
examining the same hypothesis empirically. 
The two Tables which appear in this chapter are concerned 
with local raw-material/labour ratios and imported 
raw-material/labour ratios. Tables 1 and 2 show country-wise 
sectoral rand TT respectively for the eight principal 
investing countries plus 'Other DCs' group and 'Other LOCs' 
group. It also contains the relevant ratios for 'All DCs' 
129 
and 'All LOCs I. We have seven sectors as listed in the 
earlier chapter. In both the Tables, the ratios for each 
sector are calculated for two categories of firms, viz., 
primarily foreign-owned firms (with 51-100% 
foreign-ownership) and primarily domestically-owned firms 
(with 0.1-49% foreign ownership). The rand TT ratios of the 
primarily foreign-owned firms are then compared with the r 
and TT ratios of the primarily domestically-owned firms in 
all countries and sectors. 
Both rand Ti are calculated from the BOI cumulative data 
(1961-1981). We are using the same techniques and methods as 
discussed in Chapter 3 by deflating the raw-material data at 
constant prices and by using the same definition of labour. 
It should be mentioned here that there are firms who use 
only domestically available raw-materials. There are a 
small number of firms who use only imported raw-materials. 
But the vast number of firms (about 75%) use both imported 
and domestic raw-materials. In this study, for reasons to be 
explained later, we calculate domestic and imported 
raw-material figures separately. 
Table~l shows domestic raw-material/labour ratios. In terms 
of r, the results for 'All sectors l show that the primarily 
foreign-owned group of firms from West Germany has the 
highest ratio (1561.78), being nearly three times the 
Japanese ratio (541.78). However, on examining the data, it 
can be seen that r is exceptionally high for Germany in the 
Agriculturai sector (6063.33) while in all other sectors in 
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the same category (51-100% ownership) the Germany ratio is 
relatively much lower and certainly lower than that of 
Japan. Given that the Agricultural ratio is calculated from 
data involving a relatively small number of German firms, 
such a ratio might therefore be taken as an exception rather 
than the rule. In this case, Japan emerges as having the 
highest ratio with 'Other DCs' and Singapore having ratios 
of 258.08 and 244.12 respectivily. The U.S.A. ratio is 
lower than that of any other developed country accounting 
for only 67.47. 
In the primarily domestically-owned firms category, 
Singapore (658.28) emerges as having the highest ratio in 
'All sectors', followed by 'Other DCs' (298.28), 'Other 
LDCs' (189.99) and Hong-Kong (172.67). The ratios of Japan, 
U.K., U.S.A. and West Germany are relatively lower in this 
category. These results lead us to conclude that, for the 
primarily foreign-owned (i.e., 51-100% foreign-ownership) 
firms, developed countries tend to employ more local 
raw-material in their production while the less-developed 
countries employ less local raw-material in the same 
category. For the primarily domestically-owned (0.1-49% 
foreign-ownership) firms, developed countries use relatively 
less domestic raw-materials than the less-developed 
countries do in the same category. 
Examining each country's ratio in each sector of investment 
in Table5.1, we find that the relative value of some 
countries is surprisingly much higher, even though in our 
hypothesis we would expect the r ratios to be high. Very 
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TABLE 5.1: 
SECTOR :% OF 
: OWNER-
:SHIP 
DOMESTIC RAW-MATERIALS-LABOUR RATIO. (RAW MATERIALS IN ~ 1000 AT 1975 PRICES) 
USA: U.K. :GERMANY: JAPAN :OTHER DCs:ALL DCs:TAIWAN :HONG-KONG:INDIA :SINGAPORE:OTHER LDCS:ALL LDCs: 
========:==============================================================================================================: 
1. :51-100%:160.99:328.29:6063.33: 302.79: 443.86 :1134.76: 650.32: 0.15 132.28 54.51: 
AGRIC- :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: ULTURAL :0.1-49%: 49.14:299.76: 200.36: 220.86: 520.85 : 249.86: 181.36: 207.64 :28.25: 2308.20: 289.31 : 299.09 : 
========-==============================================================================================================. . 
2. :51-100%: 38.43: 82.74:1161.83: 48.24 : 362.59:: 244.12 : : 244.12 : 
MINERAL :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49%: 6.20: 7.29: 68.69: 290.29: 35.94 : 188.09: 131.69:2053.06 :192.18: 256.04: 356.57 : 241.05 : 
=======================================================================================================================: 
3. :51-100%:162.16:347.07: 353.03: : 103.16 : 172.24: 107.39: 492.14 : 73.80: : : 229.99 : 
CHEMICAL:--------------.--------------------~---------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49%:308.82:102.61: : 163.55: 178.65 : 188.22: 125.62: 41.02 : 71.17: 99.55 : 
=======================================================================================================================: 
4. :51-100%: 18.97: 43.43: 23.79: 505.04: 41.83 69.34: : : : : : : 
MECHIN- :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: ICAL :0.1-49%: 51.40:317.39: 46.98: 174.60: 98.46 : 171.89: 85.25: 85.25 : 
=======================================================================================================================: 
5. :51-100%: :290.56: : 175.64: 919.50 84.43: 75.60 75.60 : 
OTHER --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PRODUCTS:0.1-49%: 55.80: 63.03: 7.87: 47.63: 56.98 51.95: 91.42: 10.93 : 42.70: 30.45 99.67 71.35 : 
=======================================================================================================================: 
6. :51-100%: 
SERVICES:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49%: :486.43: : 144.25: : 150.12: 763.49: 217.88 : 747.48 : 146.04 : 388.19 : 
=======================================================================================================================: 
7. OTHER:51-100%: : 610.87: : 610.87: 86.47: 87.49 81.71 : 
INDUST- :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: RIES :0.1-49%:100.18: 57.04: 488.76: 124.35: 210.82 : 107.06: 105.59: 6.29 :240.17: 78.98 : 101.37 : 
=======================================================================================================================: 
:51-100%: 67.47:100.10:1561.78: 541.78: 285.08 : 190.88: 142.37: 43.67 : 73.80: 244.12 : 115.27 69.77 : 
ALL :--------------------~-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SECTORS :0.1-49%: 79.89: 86.89: 34.47: 159.97: 298.28 : 151.18: 140.55: 172.67 :111.14: 658.28 : 189.99 : 193.87 : 
======================================================================================================================= 
high r ratios are found for both the primarily foreign-owned 
firms and the primarily Thai-owned firms. Both country-wise 
and sector-wise, in the 51-100% foreign-ownership category, 
Germany has a high r ratio of 6063.33 in the Agricultural 
sector. Japan has a high r ratio of 1163.83 in the Mineral 
sector. Again the Japanese r ratio (505.04) for the 
primarily foreign-owned firms, is relatively high in the 
Mechanical sector. The 'Other DCs' has an r ratio of 919.50 
in the 'Other Products' sector. And again Japan has a 
relatively high ratio (610.87) in 'Other Industries' sector. 
In the 0.1-49% ownership category, most of the countries 
with relatively high r ratios are found to be less-developed 
countries. For example, in the Agricultural sector, 
Singapore has an r ratio of 2308.20. Hong-Kong's ratio is 
2053.06 in the Mineral sector. Relatively high r ratios of 
Taiwan (763.39) and Singapore (747.48) are found in the 
Services sector. Let us now consider each sector separately. 
First consider the Agricultural sector. 
In the Agricultural sector, the r ratios of DCs are higher 
for the primarily foreign-owned firms than those for the 
primarily Thai-owned firms with the exception of the 'Other 
DCs'. But in case of LOCs, the r ratios for the primarily 
Thai-owned firms are relatively higher than those for the 
primarily foreign-owned firms with the exception of Taiwan. 
Both DCs and LDCs investors have a similar level of r ratios 
for the primarily Thai-owned firms, but for the primarily 
foreign-owned firms the r ratios for the LDCs are much lower 
in comparison to those for the DCs. 
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Now we move to discuss the Mineral sector. We have mentioned 
earlier that Japan has a very high ratio in this sector. The 
reason for the high Japanese ratio can be explained in 
terms of paucity of Japan's domestic supply. Japan is 
relatively less endowed with mineral and natural resources. 
Therefore, Japan has to find her own mineral supply by 
investing in countries like Thailand with relatively high 
endowments of natural and mineral resources. The r ratios in 
the primarily foreign-owned firms from the DCs are 
relatively lower than the r ratios of those from the LDCs. 
In the category of the primarily Thai-owned firms, Hong-Kong 
has a very large r ratio of 2053.06 and generally the 
investors from the LDCs have relatively higher r ratios than 
those from the DCs, with the exception of the Japanese 
ratio. 
For the Chemical sector there are unfortunately no 
observations in our sample for Japan in the 51-100% 
foreign-ownership group and for Germany in 0.1-49% 
foreign-ownership group. Hong-Kong has the highest ratio of 
492.40 in 51-100% ownership group followed by the German 
ratio (353.03) and the U.K. ratio (347.07). The results of r 
ratio in the 01-49% foreign-ownership group show that the DC 
ratios in general are higher than the LDC ratios. 
In the Mechanical sector, Japan by far has the largest ratio 
(505.04) for the primarily foreign-owned firms. There are no 
observations for 'All LOCs' in our sample. It should be 
noted that all the r ratios in the 0.1-49% ownership group 
of firms from the DCs are higher than those in the 51-100% 
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foreign-ownership group except for the Japanese ratio. 
In the Services sector there are no observations in our 
sample for either the OCs or the LOCs in the group of 
primarily foreign-owned firms. We have poor observations 
also in the 0.1-49% foreign-ownership group for the DCs. It 
is noticeable that r ratios of Taiwan (763.49) and Singapore 
(747.48) are relatively high. 
Again the observations in the 10ther Industries l sector 
appear to be poor in the 51-100% foreign-ownership category. 
There are only three results available and they are from 
Japan, Taiwan and 10ther LOCs l • Nevertheless, the Japanese 
ratio is fairly high with an r value of 610.87. 
Given the limited size of our sample, it is perhaps 
advisable to take the results for IAll sectors' of specific 
countries and for IAll sectors' of IAll LDCs' and 'All DCs' 
as strong. The sectoral analysis according to countries does 
throw some light on the question but the exceptional results 
noted should be taken as weak results. We find. that the 
firms from the developed countries (51-100% ownership) do 
use relatively more of local raw-materials. We also find 
that the firms (51-100% foreign-ownership) from the LDCs use 
less raw-materials per unit of labour relative to the firms 
(in the same category) from the developed countries. This is 
not surprising as the LDCs are usually more endowed with 
natural and mineral resources (relative to domestic demand 
and relative to the developed countries). Furthermore, we 
find that for IAll sectors l of all countries (developed + 
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less developed), the r ratio is 179.01 for the primarily 
foreign-owned firms and 165.99 for the primarily 
domestically-owned firms. We therefore conclude on the basis 
of this evidence that foreign firms invest in Thailand in 
order to make use of the abundant natural and mineral 
resources. 
Table 5.2 gives the sector-wise and country-wise imported 
raw-material labour ratios. The pattern of IT ratios are 
remarkably similar to that of r ratios. We need not discuss 
these in detail. Suffice to note that, for 'All sectors' of 
the developed countries, the rr ratio (524.90) for the 
primarily foreign-owned firms (51-100% foreign-ownership) is 
higher than that (245.26) for the primarily 
domestically-owned firms (01-49% foreign-ownership). This 
result is also true for the less-developed countries with rI 
= 82.86 and n = 61.32 respectively for the primarily 
foreign-owned and the 
Furthermore, we also 
countries (developed 
primarily domestically-owned firms. 
find that for all sectors of all 
+ less-developed) the n ratio is 
481.57 for the primarily foreign-owned firms and 196.89 for 
the primarily domestically-owned firms. We note that both of 
these n ratios are higher than the respective r ratios. 
These results appear prima facie to be unexpected if we 
hypothesise that foreign firms invest in Thailand to make 
use of her abundantly available raw-materials. Why should 
foreign firms import raw-materials if these are abundantly 
available in Thailand? 
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TABLE 5.2: 
"SECTOR :% OF 
:OWNER-
:SHIP 
IMPORTED RAW-MATERIAL/LABOUR RATIO. (RAW-MATERIALS IN ~ 1000 at 1975 prices) 
USA U.K.:GERMANY: JAPAN :OTHER DCs:AlL DCs:TAIWAN :HONG-KONG:INDIA :SINGAPORE:OTHER lDCS:ALL LDCs: 
=========================================================================================================================: 
1. :51-100%:245.68: 70.76: 83.33: 820.10: 291.46 : 308.99: 0.71 4·.58 0.93 
AGRICUl-:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
TURAL :0.1-49%:132.52: 52.68: 0.28: 170.24: 333.09 : 179.08: 29.00: 102.31 7.99 43.04 39.01 
=========================================================================================================================: 
2. :51-100%:814.85 : : 107.21: 925.72: 6.17 : 471.88: 84.86 84.86 
MINERAL :-----------------------------------------~----------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49%:232.76 :160.28: 24.57: 949.62: 14.32 : 616.71: 60.65: 12.24 : 76.38: 29.82 66.66 67.28 
=========================================================================================================================: 
3. :51-100%:1016.42:348.81: 659.03:2199.24: 496.84 : 684.88: : 281.92 :802.29: : 380.09 
CHEMICAL:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49%:465.51 :206.79: : 851.54: 365.43 : 657.54: 237.73: 87.69 : 22.41: : 141.5 
~ =========================================================================================================================: 
4. :51-100%:773.44 :226.46: 226.37: 672.51: 184.77 : 603.78: 
MECHAN- :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
ICAl :0.1-49%: 68.86 :105.80: 17.26: 341.66: 44.12 : 309.19: 56.87: 56.87 
=========================================================================================================================: 
5. OTHER: 51-100%: 22.42: 8.14:: 250.31 : 250.3 
PRODUCTS:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49%:157.72 :149.76: 36.61: 347.33: 254.21 : 272.87: 119.02: 100.89 :128.21: 40.97 98.13 
=========================================================================================================================: 
6. :51-100%: 
SERVICES:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49%: : 198.90: 57.76: 21.88: 4.48 97.71 8.39 
=========================================================================================================================: 
7. OTHER:51-100%: :1054.98: :1054.98: : 201.27 11.09 
INDUST- :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
RIES :0.1-49%: 64.35 :110.25: 5.08: 113.09: 10.55 : 101.87: 44.04: : 49.9 : 16.67 32.96 
=========================================================================================================================: 
ALL :51-100%:623.82 :196.64: 161.74: 817.08: 266.51 : 524.90: 38.37 :802.2: 84.86 21.55 82.86 
SECTORS :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49%:140.39 :111.18: 26.87: 318.80: 254.64 : 245.26: 80 28: 34.29 : 68.5: 31.49 36.34 61.32 
========================================================================================================================= 
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to look at 
some specific firms which import raw-materials. It is clear 
that, if the foreign investors import raw-materials from 
their countries of origin, then raw-materials ' availability 
does not explain foreign investment in Thailand. But is this 
the case? One Japanese firm (registered in June 1978) 
produces dried algae. The raw-material is sea weed which is 
available in Thailand and it does not import any 
raw-material. This is a clear case. Another Japanese firm 
(registered in January 1969) produces 'Tyres, flaps and 
Tubes ' . This firm uses rubber as raw-materials but the 
proportion of domestic raw-material to imported raw-material 
;s 1: 26. Now, clearly Japan does not export rubber to 
Thailand. Thailand produces rubber but her neighbour 
Malaysia also produces rubber (and relatively more rubber). 
It is not surprising that the Japanese investor imports 
rubber from Malaysia (because of the high quality rubber 
available there) to Thailand. It appears that the Japanese 
firm is clearly motivated by rubber availability in the 
'region ' , although it is not clear why the Japanese investor 
came to Thailand instead of going to Malaysia. This does 
not, of course, imply that the raw-material availability 
hypothesis is not acceptable. It does, however, raise some 
concomitant questions about relative merits and demerits of 
Thailand and Malaysia in terms of tax benefits, availability 
of skilled labour, etc .. It is not possible here to come to 
any firm conclusions regarding this aspect of relative 
advantages of similar countries in the same region. We can 
take many other similar telling examples from the U.S.A., 
Germany, and the U.K .. But, the central issues are the 
same. 
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Keeping this in mind we argue that the high rI ratios do not 
reject the raw-material availability hypothesis. Thus from 
the analysis of the r ratios, it is fairly clear that there 
is empirical evidence to accept the hypothesis that foreign 
firms are attracted to Thailand because of abundant 
availability of raw-materials. 
SECTION 5.3: A SIMPLE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
The preceding section presented a fair degree of 
empirical corroboration of the raw-material availability 
hypothesis. This section attempts to test the hypothesis 
more rigorously by using simple econometric methods. We 
hypothesise that foreign direct investment (I) is a function 
of raw-material availability (R) so that we estimate a 
regression equation of the following form: 
I = a + bo R + bIO I + b2 O2 + b3 D3 + b4 04 + u. 
The dummies Di , i = 1,2,3,4, have the same definitions as 
in Chapter 4. For direct investment we use two definitions, 
viz, II which is the level of sectoral investment of a 
country, and 12 which is the sectoral investment of a 
country as a percentage of the total foreign direct 
investment. These figures are presented in Chapter 4. For 
raw-material (R) we have the following definitions: 
RTI = Domestic raw-materials/labour ratio for the 51-100% 
foreign ownership category 
RTLI = Level of domestic raw-materials for the 51-100% 
foreign ownership category 
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RT2 = Domestic raw-materials/labour ratio for the 0.1-49% 
foreign ownership category 
RTL2 = Level of domestic raw-rna te ri a 1 s for the 0.1-49% 
foreign ownership category 
RT3 = Domestic raw-materials/labour ratio for the 
0.1-100% foreign ownership category 
RTL3 = Level of domestic raw-materials for the 0.1-100% 
foreign ownership category 
RM1 = Imported raw-materials/labour ratio for the 51-100% 
foreign ownership category 
RML1 = Level of imported raw-materials for the 51-100% 
foreign ownership category 
RM2 = Imported raw-materials/labour ratio for the 0.1-49% 
RML2 
RM3 
RML3 
RR 
foreign ownership category 
= Level of imported raw-materials for the 0.1-49% 
foreign ownership category 
Imported raw-materials/labour ratio for the 
0.1-100% foreign ownership category 
= Level of imported raw-materi al s for the 0.1-100% 
foreign ownership category 
= Total raw-materials/labour ratio, i.e. domestic 
plus imported raw-materials divided by the 
appropriate figure for labour (in the 0.1-100% 
foreign ownership category) 
RRL = Level of total raw-materials, i.e., domestic plus 
imported raw-materials (in the 0.1-100% foreign 
ownership category) 
The calculations of RT1 ,RT2 RM 1 , RM 2are based on the 
data from Tables~l and[2 of this chapter. The RTL1 ' RTL2 ' 
RMLI ' RML2 ' RTL 3 , RML3 ,RRL and the RM3 ' RT3 and RR 
ratios are presented in Tables 5.3 - 5.10. 
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TABLE 5.3: 
SECTOR :% OF 
: OWNER-
:SHIP 
lEVEL OF DOMESTIC RAW-MATERIALS (~1000 at 1975 prices) 
USA U.K. : GERMANY JAPAN :OTHER DCs:TAIWAN :HONG-KONG: INDIA :SINGAPORE:OTHER LDCs: 
===============================================================================================================: 
1. :51-100% :593116 :43990 :1679542 :252523 : 953856 : 45523 183 : 105000 
AGRICUl-:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
TURAl :0.1-49% :187964 : 160372 : 310550 : 1680100: 1995904 : 909539 : 109636 5106: 830953 : 108781 
===============================================================================================================: 
2. :51-100% :23126 : 51213 : 776102: 27737 :: 139393: : 
MINERAL :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49% : 7167 : 5187 : 82764 :1592849: 6757 : 400999 : 301800 : 226398: 16899 : 399932 
===============================================================================================================: 
3. :51-100% : 64866 : 47549 : 83315 : 69527 : 5477 : 71852 : 15130 : : 
CHEMICAl:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49% :299864: 2668 :642905 : 333544 : 298099: 12469 : 110526 : 
===============================================================================================================: 
4. :51-100% :143264 : 68100 714 :584838 : 10080 :: :: 
MECHAN- :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
ICAl :0.1-49%: 21486 : 132035: 7798 :1505246: 17231 : 114325 : 
===============================================================================================================: 
5. :51-10OX : : 50267 : 211993 : 18390 3553 
OTHER ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PRODUCTS:0.1-49% : 9883 : 120268: 493 : 218061 : 92827 :577429 : 23697 : 61740 : 15225 : 316451 
===============================================================================================================: 
6. :51-10OX : 
SERVICES:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
:0.1-49% : : 247106 : : 170101 : :1565158 : 939059 : 343093 : 120775 
===============================================================================================================: 
7. OTHER:51-100% : :2623671 : 48942 : 3967 
INDUST- :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
RIES :0.1-49% :304958 : 576976 : 30303 : 274314 : 366833 : 378656: 3492 : 149147 : : 172485 
===============================================================================================================: 
ALL :51-100% :822572 : 209906 :1814784 :4449127 :1079590 : 99942 : 75568 :1465721: 139393 : 108967 
SECTORS :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49% :831321 :1244612 : 142528 :8552370 :2813096 :3334695: 1390153 : 15130 : 1206170 : 1118424 
================================================================================================================ 
TABLE 5.4: 
SECTOR :% OF 
:owt~ER­
:SHIP 
LEVEL OF IMPORTED RAW-MATERIALS (~1000 at 1975 prices) 
USA 
' . 
. 
U.K. :GERMANY: JAPAN :OTHER DCs:TAI1~AN :HONG-KONG: INDIA :SINGAPORE:OTHER LDCs: 
===============================================================================================================: 
1. :51-100% :905087 : 9481 1500: 644602: 626342: 85 1373 
AGRICUL-:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
TURAL :0.1-49% :506894 : 28153 436 :1295020: 1276406 : 145449: 54019 2879 161833 
=====================================================================================~=========================: 
2. :51-100% :452240 : : 66360 : 618378: 3545 48457 
MINERAL :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49% :269072 : 113960 : 39217 :5210568: 2692 : 209025: 1800 : 89977 1968: 72923 
===============================================================================================================: 
3. :51-100% :406568 : 47787 :155532 :109962 : 3348'68 41161 : 164469 : 
CHEMICAL:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49% :432923 : 2668 :3347411 :682262 :564142 : 26659 : 34797 
===============================================================================================================: 
4. :51-100% : : 355084 : 7991 : 778768 : 44529 
MECHAN- :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
ICAL :0.1-49% :27443 : 44012 : 2865 :2945469: 7721 : 76258 
===============================================================================================================: 
5. :51-100% ::' : 27065 : 11765 
OTHER ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PRODUCTS:0.1-49% : : 285735 : 2380 :1590057: 414102 : 751746 : 218835 : 185392 : : 130080 
===============================================================================================================: 
6. :51-100% : 
SERVICES:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49% : : 160511 : : 19307 : 44850 
===============================================================================================================: 
7. OTHER:51-100% : :4531128 : : 6642 
INDUST- :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: RIES :0.1-49% :195874 :1115200: 3109 :2494911: 18355 : 157992 : : 31043 : 36403 
===============================================================================================================: 
ALL :51-100% :7604939:412352 : 231383 :6709903 : 1009284 : 53011 : 164469 : 48457 : 8015 
SECTORS :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.1-49% :1460991:1992600 : 48007 :17043947: 3418022 :1904612 : 320620 : 341208 : 49697 : 401239 
================================================================================================================ 
TABLE 5.5: lEVEL OF DOMESTIC RAW-MATERIALS FOR THE 0.1-100% FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RTl3 (~ 1000 at 1975 prices) 
SECTOR :% OF 
:OWNER-
:SHIP USA U.K. : GERMANY JAPAN :OTHER DCs:TAIWAN :HONG-KONG: INDIA :SINGAPORE:OTHER LDCS: 
===============================================================================================================: 
1. 
AGRICUL-:0.1-100%:781080 : 204362 :1990093 :1932624 :2949760 :955062 : 110838 : 5106 
TURAl 
: 830953 : 213781 
===============================================================================================================: 
2. 
MINERAL :0.1-100%: 28493: 5187 :133977 : 236895 : 34494 : 400999 : 301800 : 226398 : 156291 : 399932 
===============================================================================================================: 
3. 
CHEMICAL:0.1-100%:364730 : 50217 : 83315 :642903 : 403071 : 303576: 84321 : 125656 : 
===============================================================================================================: 
4. 
MECHAN- :0.1-100%:164750 :200135 : 8512 
ICAl 
: 2090084: 27311 : 114325 : 
===============================================================================================================: 
5. 
OTHER :0.1-100%: 9883 :170535 
PRODUCTS: 
493 : 430855 : 111217 : 577429 : 27251 : 61740 : 15225 : 316451 
===============================================================================================================: 
6. 
SERVICES:0.1-100%: : 247106 : : 170071 : :1565158 : 939059 : 343093 : 120775 
===============================================================================================================: 
7. OTHER: 
INDUST- :0.1-100%:304958 :576976 : 30303 :2897985: 366833 :427598 : 3492 
RIES 
: 149147 : : 176451 
================================================================================================================ 
TABLE 5.6: lEVEL OF J~PCRTtO RAW-MATERIALS FOR THE 0.1-100% FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RMl3 (~ 1000 at 1975 prices) 
SECTOR :% OF 
: OWNER-
:SHIP USA U.K. : GERMANY JAPAN :OTHER DCs:TAIWAN :HONG-KONG: INDIA :SINGAPORE:OTHER lDCs: 
===============================================================================================================: 
1. 
AGRICUl-:0.1-100%:1411981: 37635 : 1936 
TURAl 
:193962 :1902747 :145449 : 54104 2879 : 163206 
=================================================================================================;=============:-
2. 
MINERAL :0.1-100%:721312 :113960 : 105577 :5828946 : 6238 : 209025 : 1800 : 89977 : 50425 72923 
===============================================================================================================: 
3. 
CHEMICAl:0.1-100%:839490 : 50455 :155532 :3457373: 1017130 : 564142 : 67820 : 199266 : 
===============================================================================================================: 
4. 
f<IECHAN- :0.1-100%:5869829:399097 : 10856 :3724237: 52251 
ICAl 
: 76258 
===============================================================================================================: 
5. 
OTHER :0.1-100%: 27443 :285735 : 2380 
PRODUCTS: 
: 1617121: 414102 : 751746 : 230600 : 185391 : : 130080 
===============================================================================================================: 
6. 
SERVICES:0.1-100%: : 160511 : : 19307 44850 
===============================================================================================================: 
7. OTHER: 
INDUST- :0.1-10~h:7800813:1115200 : 3109 
RIES 
:7026038 : 18355 : 157992 : : 31043 43044 
================================================================================================================ 
TABLE 5.7: LEVEL OF RAW-MATERIALS FOR THE 0.1-100% FOREIGN OWNERSHIP (DOMESTIC & IMPORTED) RRL (~ 1000 at 1975 prices) 
SECTOR :% OF 
: OWNER-
:SHIP USA U.K. : GERMANY JAPAN :OTHER DCs: TAH~AN :HONG-KONG: INDIA :SINGAPORE :OTHER LDCs: 
====================================================================================~==========================: 
1. 
AGRICUL-:0.1-100%:2193061:241997 :1992029 :2126586 :4852507 : 1100511: 164943 
TURAL 
5106 : 833832 376988 
===============================================================================================================: 
2. 
MINERAL :0.1-100%:749804 : 119147 :239554 : 6065841: 40732 : 610023 : 303600 : 316375 : 206716 472855 
===============================================================================================================: 
3. 
CHEMICAL:0.I-100%:1204220: 100671 :238847 :4100277 :1420201 : 867717 : 152141 : 324922 : 
===============================================================================================================: 
4. 
MECHAN- :0.1-100%:6034579:599231 : 19368 : 5814321: 79561 : 190583 : 
ICAL 
===============================================================================================================: 
5. 
OTHER :0.1-100%:37326 :456270 
PRODUCTS: 
2873 :2047976: 525319 :1329175: 257850 : 247132 : 15225 : 446531 
===============================================================================================================: 
6. 
SERVICES:0.1-100%: : 247106 : 330582 : :1565158 : 958366 : 387943 : 120775 
===============================================================================================================: 
7. OTHER: 
INDUST- :0.1-100%:8105770:1692176 : 33412 : 9924023: 385187 : 585590: 3492 
RIES 
: 180189 : : 219496 
================================================================================================================ 
TABLE 5.8: DOMESTIC RAW-MATERIALS/LABOUR RATIO FOR THE 0.1-100% FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RT3 (~ 1000 at 1975 prices) 
SECTOR :% OF 
: OWNER-
:SHIP USA U.K. : GERMANY JAPAN :OTHER DCs:TAIWAN :HONG-KONG: INDIA :SINGAPORE:OTHER lDCs: 
===============================================================================================================: 
1. 
AGRICUL-:0.1-100%:104.02 : 305.47 :1087.27 : 228.96 : 493.19 : 187.82 : 155.89 : 28.25 : 2308.20: 52.66 
TURAl 
===============================================================================================================: 
2. 
MINERAL :0.1-100%: 16.65: 7.29 : 60.49 : 384.88 : 45.21 : 131.69 :2053.06 : 192.19 : 226.18 : 365.57 
===============================================================================================================: 
3. 
CHEMICAl:0.1-100%:266.03 : 202.49 : 353.03 : 163.55 : 158.63 : 125.24 : 187.38 : 71.48 
===============================================================================================================: 
4. 
MECHAN- :0.1-100%:206.67 : 100.87 : 43.43 : 213.73 : 65.65 
ICAl 
: 85.25 
==============================================~================================================================: 
5. 
OTHER :0.1-100%: 56.80 : 81.95 : 7.87 
PRODUCTS: 
74.34 : 67.45 91.42: 12.30 : 42.70 30.45 99.67 
================================================================================================================ 
6. 
SERVICES:0.1-100%: :403.77 : 144.25 : : 763.49 : 217.88 : 747.48 : 146.04 
===============================================================================================================: 
7. OTHER: 
INDUST- :0.1-100%:100.18 : 57.04 : 488.76 : 109.96 : 210.82 : 102.99 : 6.29 : 240.17 : 79.59 
RIES 
================================================================================================================ 
TABLE 5.9: IMPORTED RAW-MATERIALS/lABOUR RATIO FOR THE 0.1-100% FOREIGN OWNERSHIP (RM3) (~ 1000 at 1975 prices) 
SECTOR :% OF 
: OWNER-
:SHIP USA U.K. : GERMANY JAPAN :OTHER DCs:TAIWAN :HONG-KONG: ItJDIA :SINGAPORE:OTHER lDCs: 
===============================================================================================================: 
1. 
AGRICUl-:0.1-100%:188.04 : 56.26 
URAL 
:229.79 : 318.13 : 29.00 31.27 9.60 : 40.20 
===============================================================================================================: 
2. 
MINERAL :0.1-100%:421.57 : 160.28 : 47.66 :947.03 8.18 : 68.65 12.24 : 76.38 : 72.97 : 66.66 
===============================================================================================================: 
3. 
~ CHEMICAl:0.1-100%:612.32 : 203.45 :659.03 :868.47 : 400.29 :237.73 : 150.71 :113.35 
......J 
===============================================================================================================: 
4. 
MECHAN- :0.1-100%:736.49 : 201.16 : 55.39 :380.84 : 125.60 : 56.87 
ICAl 
===============================================================================================================: 
5. 
OTHER :0.1-100%:112.62: 149.76 : 36.61 :279.54 : 254.21 :119.02 : 104.06 :128.21 
PRODUCTS: 
40.97 
===============================================================================================================: 
6. 
SERVICES:0.1-100%: :198.90 : 21. 88 4.48 97.71 
===============================================================================================================: 
7.0THER 
INDUST- :0.1-100%: 64.35 : 110.25: 5.08 :266.59 
RIES 
10.55 : 44.06 : 49.99 19.42 
======================================================================================~========================= 
TABLE 5.10: RAW-MATERIALS/lABOUR RATIO FOR THE 0.1-100% FOREIGN OWNERSHIP (DOMESTIC & IMPORTED) RR (~ 1000 at 1975 prices) 
SECTOR :% OF 
: OWNER-
:SHIP USA U.K. : GERMANY JAPAN :OTHER DCs:TAIWAN :HONG-KONG: INDIA :SINGAPORE:OTHER lDCs: 
===============================================================================================================: 
1. 
AGRICUl-:0.I-100%:292.06 : 361.73 :1090.33 : 251.94 : 811.32 : 216.42: 95.34 : 28.85 :2316.20 
TURAl 
92.85 
===============================================================================================================-
- . 
2. 
MINERAL :0.1-100%:438.23 : 167.58 : 108.15 : 985.51: 53.38 : 200.34 :2065.31 :268.57 : 299.16 : 432.23 
===============================================================================================================: 
3. 
~ CHEMICAl:0.1-100%:878.35 : 405.93 :1012.06 :1043.06 : 558.91 : 357.97 : 338.09 :184.82 
en 
===============================================================================================================: 
4. 
MECHAN- :0.1-100%:757.16 : 302.03: 98.81: 594.57 : 191.25 : 142.12 : 
ICAl 
===============================================================================================================: 
5. 
OTHER :0.1-100%:214.52: 219.25: 13.62: 354.01 : 318.57 : 210.45 : 116.36 :170.91 
PRODUCTS: 
30.45 : 140.64 
================================================================================================================ 
6. 
SERVICES:0.1-100%: : 403.77 : : 280.39 : : 763.49 : 222.36 : 845.19 : 146.04 
===============================================================================================================: 
7. OTHER: 
INDUST- :0.1-100%:535.56 : 167.29: 54.59: 376.55 : 221.37 : 141.04 : 6.29 :290.16 99.01 
RIES 
==============================================================================================================:= 
We first regressed II and 12 both o~ RR and RRL without 
distinguishing (a) between imported raw-materials and 
domestically available raw-materials, and (b) between the 
primarily foreign-owned firms (51-100% foreign-ownership). 
These results are presented in Table 5.11. In equations (1) 
and (3) we note that RR~$insignificant. However, for the 
logarithmic runs, RR is significant in equations (2) and 
( 4 ) . 
The R2s remain low although they are relatively better for 
the logarithmic runs. RRL in equations (5) and (6) are 
significant. The logarithmic run, viz., equation (7), also 
yields RRL as a significant variable. In this case, it is 
clear that RRL performs relatively better than RR as an 
explanatory variable. The dummy variables are not 
significant in any of the runs. 
We then introduce the distinction between imported 
raw-materials and domestically available raw-materials but 
without distinguishing 
domstically-owned firms 
between 
and 
the 
the 
foreign-owned firms. That is, we regressed II 
on RT3 ' RM3 ,RTL3 ' and RML3 . 
primarily 
primarily 
and 12 
These results are presented in Table 5.12. The 
(RT3 ) domestically available raw-materials/labour ratio 
performs very poorly as is evident from (1),(2),(3) and (4) 
in Table 5.12. Imported raw-materials/labour ratio (RM 3) as 
an explanatory variable performs relatively better; and RM3 
is significant both in (6) and (8). Again RML3 (level of 
imported raw-materials) performs relatively well in (11) and 
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o 
Tab 1 e 5.11: 
Independent Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant: RR RRL : 1 og RR : log RRL 
==================================================================================================================: 
(1) 
0.21 
: (1.36) 
(2) : 9.53 
: 20.71 
: (0.11) 
log II : (11.12) : 
(3) 
: 0.87 
:(1.41) 
: -2.84 
: 0.00006 : 
(0.08) : 
(4) log 12 : (-3.31) : 
0.44 
: (2.86) 
0.4 
: (2.79) 
0.29 
: (1.70) 
0.34 
: (0.9!) 
1.10 
: (1.63) 
: 96034 
: (0.60) 
: 45484 
: (0.17) 
: -0.06 0.34 
: (-0.18) : (0.59) 
0.42 
: (0.67 
: 0.17 
: (0.17) 
: -0.30 -0.04: 0.33 
: (-0.82) : (-0.11) : (0.58) 
: -38889 :n = 59 
• • 2 • 
: (-0.13) :R = 0.08 : 
0.23 
: (0.37) 
:n = 59 
:R2 = 0.18 : 
: -0.19 :n = 59 
• • 2 • 
: (-0.16) :R = 0.08 : 
0.20 
: (0.32) 
:n = 59 
:R2 = 0.17 : 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
(5) 
( 6) 
: 0.26 
II : (1. 95) 
:0.000001 : 
: (1.19) 
0.10 
: (2.69) 
0.16 
: (4.86) 
: 0.11 
: (0.63) 
: 13544 
: (0.09) 
: -60956 : 18671 
: (-0.41) : (0.08) 
: -75809 :n = 59 
• • 2 • 
: (-0.28) :R = 0.17 : 
:0.000002 :0.0000002: -58470 :n = 59 
. . • • 2 . 
: (1.21) : (0.81) : (-0.22) :R = 0.36 : 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
: 7.08 0.38 0.15 : 0.31 0.23 : -0.10 :n = 59 
(7) log II . 
: (7.51) 
. 
: (5.16) 
. 
: (0.47) : (1. 05) 
. 
: (0.45) • • 2 • : (-0.17) :R = 0.36 : 
=================================================================================================================== 
Table 5.12: 
Dependent 
Variable 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Independent Variables 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant : RT3 
====================================================================================================================: 
: 0.27 
(1) 
: (1. 70) 
: -127.32 : 
: (-0.67 
0.03 
: (1.57) 
: 92722 
: (0.59) 
: 40236 
: (0.15) 
: -7198 
: (-0.24) : 
n = 59 
R2 = 0.09: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: (2) : 11.18 : 0.13 
log II : (14.32) : : (0.91) 
: 0.53 
: (1. 36) 
0.12 
: (0.32) 
0.25 
: (0.41) 
0.16 
: (0.24) 
n = 59 
R2 = 0.06: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: 1.09 
(3) 
: (1.75) 
: -0.0005 : 
: (-0.70) : 
: 1.01 
: (1. 50) 
0040 
: (0.65) 
0.15 
: (0.15) 
: -0.32 
: (-0. 27) : 
n = 59 
R2 = 0.09: 
~ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
(4) log 12 
(5 ) 
(6) 
: -1.20 
: (1. 54) 
: 0.25 
: (1. 62) 
: 10.85 
: (17.17) : 
: 785.39 
: (1.66) 
0.12 
: (0.86) 
0.36 
: (2.35) 
: 0.49 
: (1. 26) 
: 0.11 
: (0.55) 
0.13 
: (0.38) 
0.25 
: (0.41) 
: -34330 0.11 
: (-0.19) : (0.39) 
: -0.23 : -0.12 0.51 
: (-0.57) : (-0.35) : (0.91) 
0.13 
: (0.19) 
: -53404 
: (-0.16) : 
n = 59 
R2 = 0.06: 
n = 53 
R2 = 0.12: 
: 0.002 n = 53 
: (0.003): R2 = 0.12: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
(7) log 12 
(8) 109 12 
0.99 
: (1.62) 
: -1. 61 
: (-2.54) : 
0.003 
: (1.66) 
0.36 
: (2.36) 
0.45 
: (0.55) 
-0.13 0.43 
. . 
: (-0.19) : (0.39) 
: -0.23 : -0.13 0.51 
: (-0.57) : (-0.37) : (0.92) 
-0.21 
. . 
: (-0.16) : 
: 0.007 
: (0.01) 
n = 53 
R2 = 0.12: 
n = 53 
R2 = 0.12: 
===================================================================================================================== 
(cant. ) 
Table 5.12: (cont.) 
Dependent 
Variable :Constant : RT3 
Independent Variables 
====================================================================================================================: 
0.13 0.48 
(9 ) 
: (0.82) : (1. 50) 
: 12.06 
(10) 109 II : (30.54) : 
: 0.24 
: (1. 67) 
0.16 
: (3.53) 
: -0.13 
: (-0.71) : 
0.29 
: (1. 70) 
0.32 
: (0.82) 
: 22335 
: (0.12) 
: -6709.1: 0.14 
: (-0.04) : (0.52) 
: -0.11 0.35 
: (-0.29) : (0.58) 
: 83002 
: (0.54) 
0.21 
: (0.82) 
-62368 
: (-0.22) : 
0.11 
: (0.16) 
: -51539 
: (-0.17) : 
n = 59 
R2 = 0.10: 
n = 59 
R2 = 0.05: 
n = 59 
R2 = 0.26: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: 9.12 
(12) 109 11 : (10.43) : 
0.28 
: (3.65) 
: -0.27 0.10 
: (-0.71) ; (0.31) 
0.49 
: (0.95) 
: -0.17 
: (-0.28) ; 
===================================================================================================================== 
(12) with t-values exceeding 3.5 and R2 of about 0.25. Dummy 
variables again are insignificant. 
We then introduced the distinction between the primarily 
foreign-owned firms (51-100% foreign ownership) and the 
primarily domestically-owned firms (0.1-49% 
foreign-ownership) as in the previous chapter, by using a 
dummy variable. The results for the primarily 
domestically-owned firms are presented in Table 5.13. Once 
again, we find that imported raw-materials viz., RM2 and 
RML 2, perform relatively better as seen from equations (5), 
(6), (7), (8), (11) and (12). The regression of level of 
investment on level of imported raw-materials gives us the 
relatively better result with a R2 = 0.34. From (12), it is 
clear that, although RML2 is significant, the elasticity of 
foreign investment with respect to imported raw-materials is 
only 0.29 so far as the primarily domestically owned firms 
are concerned. Furthermore, RTL2 in equation (10) is not 
significant at the 5% level and the elasticity of the level 
of investment to domestically available raw-materials is 
only 0.16 so far as the primarily domestically-owned firms 
are concerned. 
The results for the primarily foreign-owned firms are 
presented in Table 5.14. We have regressed II and 12 on RT 1, 
RM 1, RTL1 and RML 1. Both in terms of R
2s and the t-values, 
the results are somewhat better than those for the primarily 
domestically-owned firms. Once again, it is clear that 
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Table 5.13: 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
:Constant : RT 2 
====================================================================================================================: 
(1) 
(2) 10 9 II 
(3) 
(4) 109 12 
: 0.40 
: (2.83) 
: 10.49 
: -138.34 : 
: (-0.68) : 
: (13.03) : 
: 0.89 :-0.0002 
: (1. 44) : (-0.30) : 
: -1. 83 
: (-2.18) : 
: 0.25 
: (1.61) 
: 0.19 
: (1.88) 
: 702.68 
: (0.01) 
0.54 
: (1.39) 
1.14 
: (1.65) 
0.15 
: (1. 27) 
: 0.14 
: (0.84) 
0.16 
: (0.61) 
: 0.33 0.53 
(0.91) : (0.82) 
: 0.06 
: (0.96) 
: 0.62 
: (1. 64) 
: 0.05 
: (0.05) 
: 0.52 
: (0.78) 
: -0.20 : n = 57 
: (-0.69): R2 = 0.04: 
0.15 
: (0.22) 
: n = 57 
R2 = 0.13: 
: -0.19 : n = 57 
: (-0.16): R2 = 0.10: 
: 0.26 
: (0.38) 
: n = 57 
R2 = 0.14: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
: 0.22 
(5 ) 
: (1. 43) 
: 931. 74 
: (1. 86) 
0.13 
: (0.65) 
: 22520 
: (0.13) 
: 81815 
: (0.30) 
: -45629 : n = 53 
: (-0.14): R2 = 0.13: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
: 11.24 
(6) 109 II : (18.90) : 
: 0.27 
: (1. 96) 
: -0.21 : -0.11 : 0.58 
: (-0.49) : (-0.29 : (0.86) 
: -0.05 : n = 53 
• • 2 • 
: (-0.07): R = 0.09: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
: 0.81 
: (1. 33) 
: 0.004 
. 
: (2.01) 
: 0.57 
: (0.75) 
: 0.16 
. 
: (0.24) 
0.25 
: (0.24) 
: -0.13 : n = 53 
: (-0.10): R2 = 0.15: 
. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
: -1. 55 
(8 log 12 : (-2.93) : 
0.31 
: (2.66) 
: 0.0009 : 0.05 
: (0.02) : (0.24) 
: 0.33 
: (0.61) 
: 0.05 
: (0.08) 
: n = 53 
R2 = 0.16: 
===================================================================================================================== 
VI 
\Jl 
Table 5.13: (cont.) 
Dependent 
Variable :Constant : RTL2 
Independent Variables 
====================================================================================================================: 
0.11 
( 9) : (0.87) 
0.14 
: (1. 83) 
0.29 
: (1. 96) 
0.17 
: (1. 20) 
0.13 
: (0.54) 
152254 
: (0.06) 
n = 57 
R2 = 0.18: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------_._-----------------------------------------: 
9.76 
(10) 109 II : (9.22) 
0.16 
: (1.90) 
0.57 
: (1. 50) 
0.39 
: (1.11) 
0.45 
: (0.71) 
0.12 
: (0.18) 
n = 57 
R2 = 0.15: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
0.26 
: (1. 76) 
0.35 
: (4.50) 
3748 
: (0.02) 
39105 
: (0.27) 
0.20 
: (0.83) 
-60208 
: (-0.21) : 
n = 53 
R2 = 0.34: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
: 9.09 
(12) 109 II : (10.85) : 
0.29 
: (3.99) 
: -0.33 0.10 
: (-0.87) : (0.30) 
0.59 
: (1. 07) 
: -0.30 
: (-0.44) : 
n = 53 
R2 = 0.26: 
===================================================~================================================================= 
Table 5.14: 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant : RT1 
=====================================================================================================================: 
(1) 
0.56 
: (1.35) 
: -114.69 : 
: (-0.67) : 
0.54 
: (1.31) 
-0.50 -71323: -0.39 n = 31 
: (-1.34) : (-0.13) : (-0.50) : R2 = 0.14: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
11.27 
(2) 109 II : (12.00) : 
0.15 
: (0.96) 
0.53 
: (0.81) 
: -0.37 1.66 -0.30 n = 31 
: (-0.65) : (1.24) : (-0.24) : R2 = 0.14: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
(3) 
0.92 
: (0.98) 
: -0.0002 : 
: (-0.58) : 
1.12 
: (1. 20) 
0.13 
: (0.16) 
0.43 
: (0.35) 
-0.27 
: (-0.15) : 
n = 31 : 
R2 = 0.10: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
(4) 109 12 
(5) 
: -1. 77 
: (2.22) 
0.10 
: (0.28) 
: 903.13 
: (2.79) 
0.22 
: (1. 63) 
0.42 
: (0.75) 
0.25 
: (0.66) 
0.13 
: (0.28) 
1.31 
: (1.16) 
: -0.36 0.48 
: (-1.12) : (1.17) 
: -0.01 
: (-0.01) : 
: -37112 
: (0.06) 
n = 31 : 
R2 = 0.20: 
n = 28 : 
R2 = 0.34: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: 10.75 
(6) 109 11 : (10.66) : 
0.22 
: (1.22) 
0.75 
: (0.94) 
: -0.29 0.72 
: (-0.44) : (0.84) 
0.18 
: (0.14) 
n = 28 
R2 = 0.18: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
0.39 
(7) . 
: (0.29) 
0.004 
: (2.80) 
0.97 
: (0.66) 
-1. 35 1.89 -0.14 n = 28 
. . 
: (-1.13) : (1.16) 
. . 
: (-0.06) : R2 = 0.34: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
-1.88 
(8) 109 12 : (-1. 98) : 
0.26 
: (1. 53) 
0.76 
: (1. 02) 
: -0.28 0.58 
: (-0.46) : (0.72) 
0.23 
: (0.19) 
n = 28 
R2 = 0.22: 
====================================================================================================================== 
(Cont. ) 
Table 5.14: (cant.) 
Independent Variables . . . 
Dependent 
Variable 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant : RTL1 
====================================================================================================================: 
(9 ) 
(IO) log II 
(11 ) 
(12) log II 
: 0.19 -0.36 
:{0.000002j (-1.90) : 
-2.19 
: (-1.25) : 
: 0.25 
: (0.000003j 
: 9.84 
: (7.08) 
-0.0008 
0.67 
: (3.99) 
: (-0.28) : 
0.18 
: (1.47) 
-0.12 17096 -1495.7 : -44342 
: (-1.26) : (0.20) : (-0.007): (-0.25) : 
0.25 
: (0.38) 
18277 
: (0.18) 
0.61 
: (0.77) 
-0.22 -2.20 0.95 
: (-0.40) : (-1.59) : (0.80) 
-0.16 94962 
: (-1.99) : (0.88) 
0.03 0.56 
: (-O.05) : (0.69) 
-88283 
: (-0.53) : 
0.38 
: (0.30) 
n = 31 
R2 = 0.16: 
n = 31 
R2 = 0.46: 
n = 28 
R2 = 0.18: 
n = 28 
R2 = 0.20: 
===================================================================================================================== 
imported raw-materials (irrespective of whether RM1 or RML1 
is used) does better. The elasticity of the level of 
investment with respect to domestically available 
raw-materials is 0.67 as seen from equation (10) and with 
respect to imported raw-materials is 0.18 as seen from 
equation (12) so far as the primarily foreign owned firms 
are concerned. Both of these values are higher than those 
for the primarily domestically-owned firms (which are 0.29 
and 0.16 respectively). 
SECTION 5.4: IMPORTED RAW-MATERIALS 
From our studies in Sections 2 and 3, it is clear that 
imported raw-material is relatively a more important 
explanatory variable than the domestically available 
raw-material. It makes nonsense of the raw-material 
availability hypothesis if the major investing countries 
like Japan and U.S.A. export raw-materials to Thailand. In 
Table 5.15, we present 1970 and 1980 figures of exports from 
and imports to Thailand. We have chosen 1970 and 1980 
figures because the data used in our analysis is cumulative 
data from 1961 to 1981. So 1970 and 1980 figures should 
indicate the actual state of affairs. It is clear from Table 
5.15 that about 86% of Thai exports to Japan ; s 
raw-materials and only 
Japan is raw-materials. 
about 22% of the Thai imports from 
The 1970 and 1980 figures for the 
vary but conclusions similar to U.S.A and U.K. somewhat 
that for Japan still hold. However, for Malaysia things are 
different since about 70% of Thai imports from Malaysia are 
raw-materials (72% in 1970 and 68% in 1980). This was our 
suggestion in Section 5.2. That is, multi-national firms 
158-
TABLE 5.15 
EXPORTS OF RAW- EXPORTS OF RAW-
MATERIALS FROM MATERIALS TO 
THAILAND THAILAND 
:YEAR % :YEAR % 
· · 
· 
:1970 - 82% :1970 - 39% 
U.S.A · · 
· · :1980 - 58% :1970 - 16% 
· · 
· · :1970 - 86.5% :1970 - 23% 
JAPAN · · 
· · :1980 - 86% :1980 - 22% 
· · 
· · :1970 - 91% :1970 - 22% 
U . K . : · 
· :1980 - 44% :1980 - 5,4% 
· · 
· :1970 - 41% :1970 - 72% 
MALAYASIA · · 
· · :1980 - 65% :1980 - 68% 
: · 
· :1970 - 83% :1970 - 53% 
INDONESIA · · 
· · : 1980 - 89% :1980 - 92% 
159 
from Japan, U.S.A. or U.K. do invest in Thailand because of 
raw-material availability. Nevertheless, the reason why 
imported raw-material becomes significant is the fact that 
the neighbouring countries of Thailand export raw-materials 
to Thailand. The multi-national firms do invest in the 
'region' because of raw-material availability. Thus, it is 
not immediately clear why, for example, a firm investing in 
Thailand imports raw-materials from Malaysia while the firm 
is free to invest in Malaysia. MUlti-national firms may 
invest in Thailand rather than in Malaysia because of 
government incentives, availability of skilled labour, or 
availability of channels for easy contact etc .. This aspect 
is beyond the scope of our present study. 
SECTION 5.5: CONCLUSIONS 
From Sections 5.2 and 5.3, and keeping in mind the points 
raised in Section 5.4, we conclude that availability of 
raw-materials does playa crucial role in explaining foreign 
direct investment in Thailand. Our study confirms Kojima's 
(1971) findings and also reinforces Krainer's (1967) 
hypothesis so far as Japan is concerned. 
Horst's (1972) work so far as Horst's 
'resource' as a significant explanatory 
'Canadian case'. 
160 
It also confirms 
finding confirms 
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SECTION 6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The idea that firms may invest in a foreign country in order 
to escape high tariffs imposed by the foreign country is not 
new. For example, Johnson (1970) mentioned this possibility. 
The tariff-jumping hypothesis is considered to be relatively 
more relevant in the context of the flow of foreign direct 
investment from the developed countries to the 
less-developed countries. (See, for example, Lall & Streeten 
(p.30, 1977). It is for the following reasons: most of the 
newly independent less-developed countries during the last 
two or three decades attempted to generate growth in their 
planned economies by using a strategy of import-substitution 
industrialisation. In many cases, the rates of tariffs 
imposed by the less-developed countries are prohibitive. 
Thus, there exists a situation when the multinational firms 
find it profitable to build a plant in the protected economy 
and capture the market there. 
Horst (1971) has carried out an interesting study of the 
effect of tariffs on foreign direct investment. 
Multinational firms may find exporting less profitable 
because of higher domestic prices in the protected market or 
they may find it more profitable if price discrimination can 
be practised provided that the price elasticity of demand is 
low. However, there exist critical levels of tariffs when it 
becomes more profitable to produce the goods in the 
protected market. Earlier, Eastman & Stykolt (1967) carried 
out a study regarding the effects of tariffs on foreign 
investments in Canada. Caves (1971) used Canadian effective 
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rate of protection as one of the 
variables (to explain U.S. foreign 
Canada). The p-coefficient of the 
several explanatory 
direct investments in 
effective rate of 
protection is 0.003 and it is statistically insignificant. 
It should be pointed out that, in the context of tariffs and 
foreign direct investments, Juhl (1979) has put forward an 
entirely different proposition. If an industry in a 
developed country is highly protected against the exports 
from the LOCs, then the propensity of that industry to 
locate production in a LOC is low. However, Juhl·s test on 
West Germany data rejected this hypothesis. 
The objective of this chapter is to test the hypothesis that 
foreign firms invest in Thailand in order to jump the high 
tariff wall of Thailand. To the best of our knowledge, such 
studies have not been carried out for any LOC. 
SECTION 6.2 A SIMPLE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
The tariff rates used here are taken from the Custom Tariff 
1980 tariff schedule of the Government of Thailand. The 
rates used here are nominal tariffs rates although we are 
aware of the fact that effective tariff rates are more 
appropriate. It is virtually impossible to compute effective 
rates of protection as the value-added figures at the level 
of the firm are not available. Indeed, the investment 
figures used here are taken for 147 firms who invested 
during 1975-1981. Table 6.1 presents these figures. The 
investment figures are at constant prices (1975 = 100). 
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TABLE 6.1 
DATE OF :INVESTING :INVEST-:TARIFF 
REGIST- :COUNTRY :MENT :RATES 
ERED :/if 1000 : 
: (1975 . % . 
: =100) : 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1 :1975:INDIA :CALCIUM CARBIDE 20000 30 
· · · 
· · · 2 :1975:HONG-KONG :ALLUMINIUM HYDROXIDE 21000 30 
· · · 
· · 3 :1980:HONG-KONG :SORBITAL MANITOL 21000 30 
· · · 
· · · 4 :1980:TAIWAN : LI QU ID OXYGEN 25017 30 
· · : 
. 
· · 
. 
5 :1975:TAIWAN :SYNTHETIC RESIN FOR SURFACE COATING: 10000 60 
· : · 
· · 6 :1975:INDIA :CHEMICAL PRODUCTS, FATTY ACID 12000 30 
· · · 
· · · 7 :HONG-KONG : SnlTHETIC COAL 20000 40 
· · · 
· · · 8 :1976:INDIA :BASIC CHROMIUM SULPHATE 10000 30 
· · · 
· · · 9 :1975:INDIA :REACTIVE DYES 20000 30 
· · · 
· · · 10 :1975:INDIA :DYESTUFF, VEGETABLE DYES 40000 10 
· · · 
· · · 11 :1981:KOREA :DIESEL ENGINE . : 19375 80 
· · · 
· · · 12 :1975:TAIWAN :MACHINERY FOR MINING & INDUSTRY 16000 30 
· · : 
· · 13 :1980:TAIWAN :ELECTRICAL BULBS FOR CHRISTMAS 6949 30 
· · · 
· · · 14 :1977:TAIWAN :WASHING MACHINE, MOTOR FOR VARIOUS 12000 60 
:TYPES 
· · · 
· · 15 :1975:TAIWAN :CARD BOARD 15000 30 
· · · 
· · 16 :1979:TAIWAN : TRANSFORMER 10000 30 
· : : 
· 17 :1975:TAIWAN :COOLING TOWER 16000 30 
· · · 
· · 18 : 1981 :TAH/AN :PARTS OF MACHINERY 10533 80 
· · · 
· · 19 :1975:TAIWAN :STANDARD DRAWING DYES 5000 25 
· · · 
· · · 20 :1975:TAIWAN :FLASHLIGHT BULBS 2000 30 
· · · 
· · 21 :1975:TAIWAN :PISTON OF VEHICLE & MACHINERY 5000 80 
· · · 
· · 22 :1977:TAIWAN :CRYSTAL OSCILLATOR 1716 30 
· · · 
· · 23 :1978:HONG-KONG :WATCH BOARD 1559 40 
· · · 
· · · 24 :1976:CAMBODIA :BALL-POINT PEN 12878 30 
· · : 
· 25 :1975:TAIWAN :BLEACH COLOURS & DRAWING PENCIL 10000 30 
: · · 
· · 26 :1976:PHILIPPINES:STAINLESS STEEL MEDICAL EQUIPMENT 9200 30 
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TABLE 6.1 (Cont.) 
DATE OF :INVESTING : INVEST -: TARIFF 
REGIST- :COUNTRY :MENT :RATES 
ERED :~ 1000 : 
: (1975 . % . 
: =100) : 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
27 :1979:HONG-KONG :MEDICAL & NON-MEDICAL PLASTER 2205 : 30 
· · · 
· · 28 :1975:TAIWAN :TENNIS BALL 2200 50 
· · · 
· · · 29 :1975:TAIWAN :SOLUTION INFUSION SET 4000 30 
· · · 
· · 30 :1978:TAIWAN :SHOES FROM EVA 6235 60 
· · · 
· · · 31 :1978:SINGAPORE :REEL TAPES, CASSETTES TAPE 15588 50 
· · 
: 
· 32 :1979:HONG-KONG :FLEXIBLE DRINKING STRAW 1470 10 
: · · 
· · 33 :1975:TAIWAN :PLASTIC WOVEN SHEET 10000 60 
· · · 
· · 34 :1981:TAIWAN :FLEXIBLE FLOORTILE, TENT MATERIAL 13562 30 
· · · 
· · · 35 :1975:TAIWAN :PLASTIC WOVEN SHEET 10000 60 
: · · 
· · 36 :1975:TAIWAN :LAMINATED SHEET 1000 60 
· · · 
· · 37 :1977:TAn!AN :SHOE FROM VINYLE 5000 60 
· : · 
· · 38 : 1977: TAIWAN :SHOE FROM EVA 10000 60 
· · · 
· · · 39 :1975:TAIWAN :ARTIFICIAL LEATHER 12500 50 
· · · 
· · · 40 :1979:HONG-KONG :ARTIFICIAL PRODUCTS FOR DECORATING 5000 30 
:CHRISTMAS TREE 
· · 
: 
· · 41 :1978:TAIWAN :RUBBER TREE PRODUCTS 5000 30 
· · 
: 
· 42 :1975:TAIWAN :PARAWOOD PRODUCTS 5000 30 
· · : : 
· · 43 :1976:HONG-KONG :NYLON FILAMENT YARN 183976: 20 
· · · 
· · 44 :1976:INDIA :VISCOSE RAYON, SODIUM SUPHATE 90148 20 
· · · 
· · · 45 : 1975 : TAIWAN :STRETCHED YARN 15000 20 
· · · 
· · · 46 :1981:TAIWAN :GLASS FIBRE MAT 6458 40 
· · · 
· · 47 :1980:TAIWAN :FIBRE LEATHER BOARD 6949 30 
· · · 
· · 48 : 1975: TAIWAtJ : PLAIN VELVET 20000 80 
· · · 
. 
· · · 
. 
49 :1975:TAHJAN :NYLON TIRECORD FABRIC :200000 20 
· · : 
· 50 :1981:KOREA :KILOWATT METER 13562 30 
· · · · · · 51 :1975:TAIWAN :HAND-SAW, HACK-SAW BLADE 4287 15 
· · · 
· · · 52 :1977:TAIWAN :LEATHER AND COTTON GLOVES 4290 60 
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TABLE 6.1 (Cont.) 
DATE OF :INVESTING 
REGIST- :COUNTRY 
ERED 
: INVEST -: TARIFF 
:MENT :RATES 
:~ 1000 : 
: (1975 : % 
: =100) : 
· . 
· . 53 :1978:INDIA · · :COTTON INDUSTRIAL GLOVES 
... . 
. 
3118 60 
54 :1975:HONG-KONG :ARTIFICIAL FLOWER FROM POLYETHYLENE: 5000 30 
.. . 
. 
55 :1979:HONG-KONG :ARTIFICIAL FLOWER FABRIC 
· . 
· · . 56 :1975:LAOS :ARTIFICIAL FLOWER & TREE FROM 
:POLYETHELENE 
· . · . 
· . · . 
1470 
4000 
57 :1975:TAIWAN :ARTIFICIAL FLOWER FROM POLYETHYLENE: 4000 
· . 
· . 58 : 1979: KOREA 
· . 
· . 59 :1975:KOREA 
· . 
· . 60 :1975:KOREA 
· 
· :MENS SOCKS 
· 
: SOCKS 
· 
· : SOCKS 
.. . 
2940 
8000 
10000 
6949 
12000 
12000 
9199 
. 
61 :1980:SINGAPORE :CARPET FROM KENAF 
.. . 
. 
62 :1975:HONG-KONG : GARMENT 
· . 
· · . 63 :1975:TAIWAN : VENEER 
· . 
· · . 64 : 1976: TAIWAN :WOOD PARQUET FLOORING 
.. . 
. 
65 :1979:HONG-KONG :ELASTIC BAND 6436 
21000 
8000 
· . 
· . 66 :1975:TAIWAN 
· . 
· . 67 :1977:JAPAN 
· . 
· . 68 :1975: II 
· . 
· . 69 :1975: " 
· . 
· . 70 :1980: " 
· . 
· . 71 :1981: " 
· . 
· . 72 :1975: II 
· . 
· . 73 :1975: II 
· . 
· . 74 :1975: II 
· . 
· . 75 :1980: II 
. 
76 :1980: " 
· 
: HAND TOOLS, SAI~ FLI ES 
· 
:CHEMICAL FOR TEXTILE 
· 
· :WARP SIGNING AGENTS, SYNTHETIC 14718 
:SIZER 
· 
:CALCIUM CITRATE 29397 
· 
· :CHEMICAL PRODUCT FOR METAL SURFACE 4864 
: TREATMENT 
· 
· :LIQUID OXYGEN 19375 
· 
· :POLYURETHENE RESINS 30000 
· 
:AlKYD RESIN, TEXTILE FINISHING 30000 
:RESIN 
· 
· :UREA FORMAL DE HYDE 7500 
· 
· :PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT 12916 
:DIESEL ENGINE 34746 
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30 
30 
30 
60 
60 
60 
100 
60 
30 
30 
30 
15 
30 
30 
30 
10 
30 
10 
10 
30 
30 
80 
TABLE 6.1 (Cant.) 
DATE OF :INVESTING :INVEST-:TARIFF 
REGIST- :COUNTRY :t4ENT :RATES 
ERED :~ 1000 : 
: (1975 · % 
· : =100) : 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
· · · · 
· · · · 77 : 1980: II :DIESEL ENGINE : 69493 80 
· · · 
· · 78 :1975: " : FLUORESCENT LA~'PS 18398 80 
· · · 
· · 79 :1980: " :ELECTRIC RICE COOKER 27797 30 
· · · · 
· · · 80 :1981: II :ELECTRIC RICE COOKER 3229 : 30 
· · · · · 
· · · · · 81 :1975: " :DIESEL ENGINE :100000 : 80 
· · · 
· · · 82 :1975: II :ELECTROLYTIC CONDENSER 20000 30 
· · · 
· · · 83 :1975: " :ENGINE VALVE 15000 80 
· · · 
· · · 84 :1979: II :PISTON RING 15000 80 
· · · · 
· · · · 85 :1978: II :CYLINDER HEAD GADGET 4000 : 80 
: · · · 
· · · 86 :1978: " :BICYCLE & COMPONENTS OR BIKE 3000 : 30 
· · · · 
· · · 87 :1075: " :PISTON RING 10000 : 80 
· : · · 
· · 88 :1975: II :PISTON RING 10000 : 80 
· · · 
· · · 89 :1978: " :CAB PARTS & CAR BODY PARTS 38971 80 
· · · 
· 90 :1980: " :COMPONENTS PART OF VEHICLES 6949 80 
· · · · 
· · 
, 
91 :1980:JAPAN :COMPONENTS PART FOR VEHICLES, : 69493 80 
: BRAKE DRUM 
· : · · 
· · · 92 :1975: " :COMBINATION SWITCH SET, IGNITION 10000 : 80 
:COIL 
· · · · 
· · · 93 :1975: II :HYDRAULIC GEAR, DRIVE SHAFT, PUMP 5000 : 80 
· · · 
· · · 94 :1975: II :FARM GENERATOR FUES, IGNITION COIL 18750 30 
· · · 
· · · 95 :1975: " :ELECTRICAL BULBS, LIGHTING 10000 30 
:EQUIPMENT 
· · · 
· · · 96 :1979: /I :CAB PART & FRONT BODY PARTS 1837 80 
· · · 
· · · 97 :1980: /I :GROUNDING WIRE, MOTORCYCLE MOTOR 17373 30 
· · · · 
· · · 98 :1975: /I :TV TRANSFORMER & COIL 30000 : 40 
· · · 
· · 99 :1978: /I :CHAIR ~!OOD & PINEWOOD PRODUCTS 9353 30 
· 
· 100:1975: II :OPTHALMIC LENS 5357 30 
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TABLE 6.1 (Cont.) 
DATE OF : INVESTING : INVEST-:TARIFF 
REGIST- :COUNTRY :MENT :RATES 
ERED :~ 1000 : 
: (1975 · % 
· : =100) . 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
· · · · 
· · · 126:1975:SWITZERLAND:INTEGRATEO CIRCUITS 10000 : 30 
· · · · 
· · · 127:1975:SWITZERLAND:WATCH CASE 5380 : 40 
· · · 
· · · 128:1978:FRANCE :JEWELLRY RING BRACELET 7794 50 
· · · · 
· · · · 129:1977:FRANCE :POLYESTER STAPLE FIBRE :343230 20 
· · · 
· · · 130:1975:BELGUIM :BIAXIALLY ORIENTED POLYSTYRENE 16000 30 
:SHEETS 
: · · 
· · 131:1980: UK :MODULE OF ELECTRONIC DIGITAL WATCH 3475 10 
· · · 
· · · 132:1980: UK :BALL PEN 7644 30 
· · · · 
· · · · 133:1975: UK :SANDAL MADE OF PLASTIC 5000 : 100 
· · · 
· · · 134:1980: UK :INDUSTRIAL WORKS GLOVES 2780 60 
· · · 
· · · 135:1978: UK :ARTIFICIAL FLOWER & TREE 7794 30 
: · · 
· · 136:1975: UK : GARMENT 4000 60 
· · · 
· · 137:1977: UK : AMPOULE , VIAL, GLASS TUBE 3432 20 
· · · 
· · · 138:1976: UK :SHAPE SECTION METAL WINDOW 6899 5 
· · · 
· · · 139:1975: UK :TERMINATOR INTEGRATED CIRCUITS 2142 30 
· · : · 
· · 140:1975: UK :ALLUMINIUM Fall : 120000 30 
: · · 
· · 141:1976: USA :ALlUMINIUM TUBE 47037 15 
· · · 
· · · 142:1978: USA :POlYESTERINE FOR GENERAL PURPOSE 49883 30 
: HIGH IMPACT 
· · · · 
· · · · 143:1975: USA :SEEDlAC COLOUR PIGMENT : 49883 30 
· · · 
· · · 144:1977: USA :CITIZEN BAND TRANSCIEVER 4290 40 
· · · 
· · · 145:1980: USA :INTEGRATED CIRCUITS 3789 30 
: · · · 
· · 146:1975: USA :FIBRE GLASS 6000 : 40 
· · · · 
· · · · 147:1979: USA : POLYESTER 73492 : 20 
:===================================================================== 
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We here test the following hypothesis: 1 
I~ 
1 
= 0<:. + ~T i + 0'0 1 
where Ii is the jth country's investment in the ith sector, 
Ti is the nominal rate of tariff in the ith sector, and 01 
is the dummy when 0 = 0 for the LOCs and 0 = 1 for the 
developed countries. The first results are presented in 
Table 6.2. Regression equation (1) shows that the 
coefficient of T has the wrong sign and it;s significant 
although the R2 is poor. The dummy variable is 
insignificant. The logarithmic run in equation (2) does not 
improve these findings. Results (not reported here) with 
dummies for four countries (viz. U.K., U.S.A., Germany and 
Japan) are not better than the above. We ran the same 
regression equation for the LDCs and the DCs. Equation (3) 
shows the logarithmic results for the DCs. The hypothesis ;s 
rejected. A similar run (not reported here) for the LDCs 
also yielded poor results. Last we included a dummy variable 
to take account of 'time ' e.g. 02 = 1 for 1975, 02 = 2 for 
197~ and so on. These results are given by equations 4, 5, 6 
and 7. Once again, the coefficient of T is insignificant. 
We then considered that matters might improve if the 
regression is run for various sectors separately because of 
the apparent differences in industry characteristics. These 
1 We are aware of the fact that a more complete test 
would require some independent variable (such as, 
sales) to capture profitability. This could not be 
done because of lack of appropriate data. 
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TABLE 6.2 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variable :----------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant : . : n, T. 1 . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
1. 29413 
(3.78) 
-32601 : 
(-2.13)! 
8231.1 
{1. 28} 
n = 147 
! R2 = 0.04; 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
2. 
; 1 09 I~ 
• 1 
8.65 
(37.19) 
-0.34 
{-1. 91} 
0.36 
{I. 92} 
n = 147 
! R2 = 0.05! 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
3. ..: 8.95 
4. 
5. 
• all DCs . 
! 109 Ii! (29.99) 
I~ 
1 
i 109 1,1 
• 1 
32522 
(3.72) 
10.26 
(17.23) 
-305.09: 
(-2.0l)! 
-0.40 
{-1. 58} 
-0.27 
n = 81 
! R2 = 0.03! 
8021.3 -1423.7 n = 141 
. 
• • • 2 • ! (1.24) ! (-0.93) ! R = 0.04! 
0.35 -0.10 n = 141 
• • • • 2 I 
! (-1.66) ! {1.95} ! (-2.33) ! R = 0.08! 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
-0.17 -255.59: : 0.17 :-746.18 n = 81 
. 
6. I~ll DCs 
1 ! (-1.30) ! (-1.16)! • • • 2 I ~(1.00) ~ (-O.32) ~ R = 0.02~ 
7. -0.17 
i log I~ll DCs ; 
• 1 • (-1.0I) 
-0.21 0.17 
(-O.21) !{1.00} 
-0.97 n = 81 
• • 2 • ! {-I.59} ! R = 0.04! 
---------------------------------------------~----------------------------------
results are presented in Table 6.3. Equations (1) and (2) 
give the results for the chemical sector and, clearly, the 
hypothesis is rejected. The same is the case for the 
Mechanical sector (equations (3) and (4)) and the 'Other 
Products' sector (equations (5) and (6)). No regression is 
run separately for 'Other Industries' sector as we have only 
two observations for this sector. 
We thought that the above results are poor because we have 
used 1980 tariff rates while investment figures are for the 
years 1975-1981 as if the tariff rates have been constant 
during 1975-1981. This was forced upon us because of the 
problems of data non-availability. So we considered only the 
1980 and 1981 investments as listed in Table 6.4. The 
regression results (not reported here) are found to be 
equally poor. 
SECTION 6.3 CONCLUSION 
Clearly, our study rejects the tariff-jumping hypothesis for 
Thailand. In accepting this result, one must remember that 
our independent variable is 'nominal' tariff rates. If 
I 
similar regressions 
protection, there 
results. However, 
are run with effective 
is a chance of obtaining 
we note that Caves (1971), 
rates of 
different 
using a 
multiple regression model, and using Canadian effective rate 
of protection, found tariff to be an insignificant variable 
in explaining U.S. foreign direct investment in Canada. 
Thus, the over-all weight of empirical evidence seems to 
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TABLE 6.3 
Dependent 
Variable 
1. 
. 
" 
Independent Variables 
:Constant: Ti : 109 T i : D 
28522 :-334.81 :-2735.8 n = 25 
; I~ (CHEMICAL) 
• 1 ! (2.78) 
. . 
!(-1.12) ! !(-0.49) ! R2 = 0.06! 
2. 10.87 -0.37 :-0.33 n = 25 
. 
: 1 09 I{ (CHEMICAL) : (7.25) : (-0.85) !(-0.96) ; R2 = 0.06; 
3. 26994 :-434.68 
i. IJI (r,1ECHANICAL) . • • ! (0.53) !(-0.60)! 
8.67 
:30567 
! (0.68) 
-0.04 :0.50 
4. !log I{ MECHANICAL)! (8.89) . . ! (-0.16) !(1.22) 
n = 51 
. 
• 2 • ! R = 0.02! 
n = 51 
! R2 = 0.03! 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
5. (OTHER PRODUCTS) 
48495 :-706.2] 
! (2.69) !(-1.97)! 
:26591 
!(1.74·) 
n = 69 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
10.78 -0.52 :0.82 n = 69 
6. :log I~ (OTHER • 
: 1 PRODllCTS): (9.62) 
. . 
: (-1.69) :(2.71) ~ R2 = 0.15~ 
========================================================================== 
TABLE 6.4 
:YEAR:INVESTMENT:TARIFF: COUNTRY PRODUCTS 
: ~ 1000 :RATES INVEST 
:in 1975 = : 
: 100 pri ces: 
1 :1980: 21000 
· . 
· . 
2 :1980: 25017 
· . 
· . 
3 : 1981: 10533 
· . 
· . 
4 : 1981: 19375 
· . 
· . 
5 : 1981: 13562 
· . 
· . 
6 : 1981: 6458 
· . 
· . 
7 :1981: 6949 
· . 
· . 
8 :1981: 13562 
· . 
· . 
9 :1980: 6949 
· . 
· . 
10:1980: 4864 
· . 
· . 
11:1980: 12916 
· . 
· . 
12:1980: 34746 
· . 
· . 
13:1980: 69493 
· . 
· . 
14:1980: 27797 
· . 
· . 
15: 1981: 3229 
· . 
· . 
16:1980: 17373 
· . 
· . 
17: 1980: 19375 
· . 
· . 
18:1980: 69493 
· . 
· . 
19:1980: 6949 
· . 
· . 
20:1980: 6949 
· . 
· . 
21: 1980: 7644 
· . 
· . 
22:1980: 3475 
· . 
· . 
23: 1980: 2780 
· . 
· . 
24:1980: 62543 
· . 
· . 
25:1980: 2085 
· . 
· . 
26: 1980: 2780 
30 :HONG-KONG :SORBITAL MANITOL 
· 
· 30 : TAIWAN 
· 
80 : TAIWAN 
· 
80 :KOREA 
· 
· 30 :TAIWAN 
· 
· 40 :TAIWAN 
· 
30 : TAIWAN 
· 
· 30 : TAIWAN 
· 
30 : TAIW.A.N 
· 
10 :JAPAN 
· 
30 :JAPAN 
· 
· 80 :JAPAN 
· 
· 80 :JAPAN 
· 
· 30 :JAPAN 
· 
30 :JAPAN 
· 
30 :JAPAN 
· 
· 80 :JAPAN 
· 
· 80 :JAPAN 
· 
· : LIQUID OXYGEN 
· 
· :SPARE PARTS OF MACHINERY 
· 
· :DIESEL ENGINE 
· 
:KILOWATT METER 
· 
· :GLASS FIBRE MAT 
· 
: ELECTRICAL BULBS FOR CHRISTMAS 
:TREES 
· 
· :FLEXIBLE FLOORTILE, TENT MATERIAL 
· 
:FIBRE LEATHER BOARD 
· 
· :CHEMICAL PRODUCTS FOR METAL 
:SURFACE TREATME~IT 
· 
:PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 
· 
:DIESEL ENGINE 
· 
:DIESEL ENGINE 
· 
· :ELECTRIC RICE COOKER 
· 
· :ELECTRIC RICE COOKER 
· 
· :GROUNDING WIRE, MOTORCYCLE MOTOR 
· 
· :LIQUID OXYGEN 
· 
· :COMPONENT PART FOR VEHICLES, 
:BRAKE DRUM 
· . 
· . 
100 :SINGAPORE :CARPET FROM KENAF 
· 
· 80 :JAPAN 
· 
· 30 : UK 
10 UK 
60 UK 
· 
:COMPONENT PART OF VEHICLES 
· 
· :BALL PEN 
· 
:MODULE OF ELECTRONIC DIGITAL 
:WATCH 
· 
· :INDUSTRIAL WORKS GLOVES 
· . 
· . 
30 :SWITZERLAND:CARBON BLACK 
60 : GERMANY :ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS 
· 
30 USA : INTEGRATED CIRCUITS 
======================================================================= 
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reject the importance of high tariffs in explaining foreign 
direct investments. 
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SECTION 7.1: INTRODUCTION 
We have tested the capital-intensity hypothesis, the 
raw-material availability hypothesis and the tariff-jumping 
hypothesis respectively in chapters 4, 5 and 6. The 
objective of this chapter ;s to run a multiple regression 
equation where all the three independent variables appear at 
the same time. At first, we run capital-labour ratio and 
raw-material-labour ratio together as independent variables. 
This is done for the various ownership categories 
separately, and for domestic and raw-materials separately. 
Then, nominal tariff rates are used as the third independent 
variable although the latter runs are limited to 26 
observations i.e., 26 firms registered with the BOI during 
1980 and 1981, so that the 1981 nominal tariff rates could 
be used. 
SECTION 7.2: CAPITAL-LABOUR RATIO AND RAW-MATERIAL-LABOUR 
RATIO AS EXPLANATORY VARIABLES. 
This section presents some simple econometric results for 
the joint hypothesis with capital-labour ratio and 
raw-material-labour ratio as the explanatory variables. It 
is done in the hope that the results will throw some light 
on the relative merits of these variables. Let us first 
recapitulate the definition of the variables (scattered in 
various chapters). These are: 
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II 
I2 
= 
= 
level of sectoral investment 
investment of a country sectoral 
percentage 
investment 
of the total foreign 
as a 
dit'ect 
kl = capital-labour ratio for the 0.1-100% foreign 
ownership category 
k2 = capital-labour ratio for the 51-100% foreign 
ownership category 
k 3 = capital-labour ratio for the 0.1-49% foreign 
ownership category 
RTI = domestic raw-material-labour ratio for the 
51-100% foreign ownership 
RT2 = domestic raw-material-labour ratio for the 
0.1-49% foreign ownership 
RT3 = domestic raw-material-1abour ratio for the 
0.1-100% foreign ownership category 
RM1 = imported raw-material-labour ratio fo r the 
51-100% foreign ownership category 
RM2 = imported raw-material-labour ratio for tile 
0.1-49% foreign ownership category 
RM3 = imported raw-material-labour ratio for the 
0.1-100% foreign ownership category 
RR = total (domestic + imported) raw-material-
labour ratio for 
0.1-100% 
the ownership category 
The data which we have used here are to be found in Chapters 
3, 4 and 5. The data II and I2 appear in Chapter 3, the data 
for kl' k2 and k3 appear in chapter 4 and the data for RT 1, 
RT , RT , RM , RM , RM and RR appear in Chapter 5. 2 3 1 2 3 
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We have tested the joint hypothesis by considering all the 
firms without distinguishing between the degrees of foreign 
ownership. Following the work of earlier chapters, we have 
two specifications of the dependent variables, viz., II and 
12 · We again use dummy variables Di i = 1,2,3,4, and the 
definitions remain the same as in the earlier chapters. 
Table 7.1 presents the results for the firms within the 
foreign ownership category ranging from 0.1-100%. We do 
distinguish he re between the domestically available 
raw-materials and the imported raw-materials. Equations (1) 
- (4) in Table 7.1 present the results for the domestically 
available raw-material. Regressing II and 12 (in equations 1 
and 3) on RT3 and k3 along with the dummies, we find that k3 
is significant and RT3 insignificant in both the runs. None 
of the dummies is significant. The logarithmic runs 
(equation 2 and 4) somewhat improves the results. Once 
a ga in, k3 ; s significant and RT3 (domestic 
raw-material-labour ratio) is insignificant. The elasticity 
of the sectoral level of investment with respect to 
capital-labour ratio is close to unity (0.93). The 
elasticity of the share of investment with respect to 
capital-labour ratio is also close to unity (0.89). 
Equations (5) - (8) in Table 7.1 present the results for the 
imported raw-material-labour ratio. In equation (5), both k3 
and RM3 are insignificant while k3 is significant and RM3 is 
significant in equation (7). Once again we find that the 
logarithmic runs do better. Furthermore, both RM3 and k3 are 
significant with a relatively high R2 in equation (6). 
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TABLE 7.1 
Dependent: Independent Variables : 
Variable --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant: RT3 :10g RT3:RM3 :log RM3: k3 : log k3: 01 : 02 : 03 °4 : R2, n : 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.54 
: (2. 86) 
:-121.64 : 
:(-0.53) : 
:287.87 : 
: (2. 50) : 
: 0.15 :-99535 :-0.29 :-0.41 : n = 59 
:(-0.71) :(-0.49):(-0.88) :(-1.22): R2 = 0.13: 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
2. :7.07 
109 II : ( 5.32) 
:0.10 
:(-0.09): 
:0.93 :-0.49 :-0.42 :0.10 
:(3.89) :(-1.20) :(-1.10):(0.17) 
:-0.26 : n = 59 
:(-0.42): R2 = 0.26: 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
3. :1.98 :-0.0004 
I 
2 :(2.70) :(-0.46): 
4. :-5.49 
1 og I 2 : ( 4. 19) 
:31678 
:(0.52) 
:0.04 
:(0.30) : 
:78.24 
:(0.42) 
:0.001 :-0.45 :-0.25 :-1.22 :-1.49 : n = 59 
: 2 : 
: (2.59) : :(-0.55) :(-0.31):(-0.97) :(-1.16): R = 0.14. 
:0.89 :-0.41 :-0.21 :0.50 
:(3.77) :(-1.03) :(-0.56):(0.09) 
:-9.68 : 
:(-0.24): 
:-0.14 :-49074 :93007 
:(-1.78) :(-0.67):(0.75) 
:-0.23 : n = 59 
:(-0.38): R2 = 0.27: 
:-81632 : n = 59 
:(-0.34): R2 = 0.08: 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:-3.06 
6.10g II :(-2.53) : 
:0.35 
: (2.58) : 
:0.63 :-0.38 :-0.81 :0.09 
:(3.05) :(-1.07) :(-2.49):(0.18) 
:0.05 : n = 59 
• 2 • 
:(0.09) : R = 0.36: 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
:0.74 
: (1. 30) 
:0.002 
:(1.26) 
:0.001 
: (3.04) : 
:0.40 :-0.70 :-1.36 :-0.09 : n = 59 
: (0.52) • 2 • :(-1.03):(-1.16) :(-0.07): R = 0.27: 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
8. :-5.99: :0.25 :0.83 :-0.43 :-0.56 :-0.08 :0.29 : n = 59 : 
log 12 :(-4.96) : : (1. 89) : • 2 • :(4.07) :(-1.22) :(-1.73):(-0.15) :(0.51) : R = 0.36: 
================================================================================================================== 
(Cont.) 
TABLE 7.1 (cont.) 
Dependent: Independent Variables 
Variable :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant: RR : log RR: : k3 :log k3 : 01 : O2 03 04 : n, R2 : 
10. 
log I 
:0.50 
:(2.81) 
:6.80 
:(5.24) 
:14.73 : 
:(0.16): 
:0.20 
:(1.21) : 
:282.90: 
:(2.46): 
:-0.13 :-93075 :-0.29 :-0.39 : n = 59 
:(-0.64) :(-0.45):(-0.85) :(-1.18): R2 = 0.13: 
:0.79 :-0.49 :-0.41 :0.08 :-0.28: n = 59 
2 : :(3.15) :(-1.23) :(-1.12):(-0.14) :(-0.47): R = 0.28. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
:1.81 
:(2.65) 
:0.0009: 
:(0.25): 
:0.001 : 
:(2.56): 
:-0.40 :-0.23 :-1.27 :-1.44 : n = 59 
2 . 
:(-0.49) :(-0.29):(-0.97) :(-1.12): R = 0.14: 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
12. :-5.74 
log 12 :(-4.53) : 
:0.27 
:(1.67) : 
:0.73 :-0.44 :-0.22 :0.02 
:(2.98) :(-1.14) :(-0.61):(0.03) 
:-0.25 : n = 59 
:(-0.43) : ~ = 0.43: 
================================================================================================================= 
However, in (8), only k3 is significant and RM3 is 
insignificant, although the R2 is relatively high. The 
elasticity of the level of investment with respect to k3 is 
0.63 while with respect to imported raw-material-labour 
ratios is 0.35. 
Equations (9)-(12) in Table 7.1 give the results for the 
total raw-material-labour ratio (RR). These results are 
poorer than the results (1)-(8) although we note that k3 is 
significant and RR is insignificant in all the runs. The 
elasticity of the level of investment with respect to k3 
when run with RR) is 0.79, a figure which lies in between 
0.93 (when run with RT 3 ) and 0.63 (when run with RM 3 ). The 
over-all impression is that capital-labour ratio performs 
relatively better. 
Next we decided to examine whether the relative performance 
of the independent variables remains the same if we 
distinguish between the primarily foreign-owned firms 
(51-100% foreign ownership) and primarily domestically-owned 
firms (0.1-49% foreign ownership). Table 7.2 presents the 
results for the primarily domestically-owned firms. 
Regressing 11 and 12 on R~2 and k2 (respectively in equation 
(1) and (3) in Table 7.2), along with the dummies, we find 
both the capital-labour ratio and the domestic 
raw-material-labour ratio are insignificant with low R2s. 
The logarithmic runs (viz., equations (2) and (4) in Table 
7.2) improve matters considerably. Capital-labour ratio is 
significant in both the runs while the domestic 
raw-material-labour ratio is significant in (2) and 
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TABLE 7.2 
Dependent: Independent Variables : 
Variable :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant: RT2 : log RT2 : RM2 : log RM2 : k2 : log k2: Dl : D2 : 03 D4 : R2, n : 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: 0.19 : -56.22 : 
: (1.28) : (-0.32): 
:39.62 
:(0.43) 
: 0.24 : 0.19 :0.11 
: (1.48) : (1.22):{0.39) 
: -39589 : n = 56 : 
: (-0.15) : R2 = 0.13: 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
2. : 7.07 : : 0.30 
log II : (4.24) : : (1. 96) 
: O. 86 : - O. 0004 : 
: (1.23) : (-0.44): 
4. : -5.67 : : 0.24 
log 12 : (-3.28): : (1. 56) 
:0.54 : 0.29 : 0.53 :0.11 
:(2.32) : (0.76) : (1.47):(0.18) 
:0.0002 : 
:(0.51.) 
: 0.87 : 0.81 :0.22 
: (1.18) : (1.18):{0.17) 
:0.61 : 0.24 : 0.84 :0.06 
:(2.51) : (0.60) : (2.27):(0.09) 
: 0.10 : n = 56 
: (0.16) : R2 = 0.22: 
: -0.29 : n = 56 
2 : (-0.23) : R = 0.10: 
: 0.21 : n = 56 
: (0.32) : R2 = 0.24: 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: 0.31 
: (0.52) : 
:-38.25 : 
:(-0.18): 
:25.62 
: (0.59) 
: -0.15 : -63931:69274 
: (-1.99):(-0.96):{0.62) 
: 080377 : n = 56 
2 : (-0.64) : R = 0.11: 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
: 0.87 
: (1.41) : 
:0.004 : 
: (2. 06) : 
:-0.0003 : 
:(-0.59) : 
: 0.54 : 0.22 :0.50 
: (0.70) :(0.33) :(0.44) 
: 0.16 
: (0.12) 
: n = 56 : 
: R2 = 0.15: 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
7. : -4.03 : 
log 12 : (-2.94): 
: 0.21 
: {I. 67) 
:0.49 : -0.06 : -0.09 :0.16 
:(1.95) : (-0.15):(-0.25):(0.29) 
: 0.24 : n = 56 
: (0.38) : R2 = 0.22: 
======================================================================================================================== 
insignificant in (4). The elasticity of the level of 
investment with respect to capital-labour ratio is 0.54 in 
this case. Equations (5), (6) and (7) give the results with 
imported raw-material-labour ratio. These results show that, 
for the primarily domestically-owned firms, both the 
imported raw-material-labour ratio and the capital-labour 
ratio are insignificant when the dependent variable is 11, 
(level of investment). For 12 (share) as the dependent 
variable, RM2 (imported raw-material-labour ratio) is a 
significant variable while k2 is insignificant. On the 
logarithmic run (equation 7 in Table7.2), k2 is very close 
to being significant while RM2 is insignificant. The 
over-all impression is that, imported raw-material-labour 
ratio and capital-labour r~tio do not perform well for the 
primarily domestically-owned firms. This, of course, is not 
a surprising result. Our hypothesis expects these variables 
to perform well for the primarily foreign-owned firms (which 
satisfy the definition of a 'foreign investor' more 
appropriately) . 
Table 7.3 presents the results for the 51-100% 
foreign-ownership category. Capital-labour ratio run with 
domestic raw-material-labour ratio (equation (1) and (2) in 
Table 7.3) is not significant. However, capital-labour ratio 
run with imported raw-material-labour ratio (equations (5) 
and (6)) is significant. The R2s are high for cross-section 
regression. The elasticity of the sectoral share of 
investment with respect to capital-labour ratio is 0.76. 
From these results, the conclusion appears to be that 
capital-labour ratio is a more important and significant 
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TABLE 7.3 
Dependent: Independent Variables : 
Variable :-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
2. 
I 
2 
:Constant: RTI :10g RTl : RMI :log RMl : kl :log kl : Dl : D2 : D3 D4 : R2, n : 
: 0.22 : -19.75 : 
: (1.88) : (-0.47): 
0.06 -0.0003: 
: (0.06) : (-0.81): 
:i4.30 
:(0.44) 
:0.0004 
:(1.42) 
: -59631 : -21866 :0.10 
: (-0.58): (-0.23) :(0.48) 
: -72969 : n = 31 : 
: (-0.37) : R2 = 0.05: 
1.47 0.36 :1.79 0.28 n = 31 
2 
: (1.58) : (0.43) :(0.93) : (0.16) : R = 0.18: 
3. : -4.37 : : 0.24 : 
: (1.87): 
:0.39 : 0.12 : 0.42 
:(1.89): (0.21) : (0.88) 
:1.36 
:(1.26) 
: -0.]0 : n = 31 
log 12 : (-2.78): : (-0.11) : R2 = 0.30: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:0.23423 : 
: (0.25) : 
:124.79 : 
:(1.36) 
:-38.75 : 
:(-1.56) : 
: 5214.4 : -0.16 :0.19 : -80342 : n = 28 
: (0.05) : (-2.08) :(1.65) : (-0.50) : R2 = 0.27: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: 0.30 
: (0.24) : 
:0.002 
:(1.78) 
:0.0009 : 
:(2.62) 
: 0.88 : -1.28 :0.07 : -0.10 : n = 28 
: (0.69) : (-1.23) :(0.05) : (-0.49) : R2 = 0.51: 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
6. : -5.22 : 
log 12 : (-4.09): 
: 0.07 : 
: (0.45): 
:0.76 : 0.13 : -0.48 :0.32 
:(3.32): (0.20) : (-0.95) :(0.48) 
: 0.20 : n = 28 
: (0.20) : R2 = 0.49: 
==~=================================================================================================================== 
explanatory variable than the raw-material-labour ratio 
(whatever definition of the latter is taken). 
SECTION 7.3: TARIFF-RATES, CAPITAL-lABOUR 
RAW-MATERIAL-lABOUR RATIOS: 
RATIOS, AND 
This section attempts to test the joint hypothesis by 
putting capital-labour ratio, raw-material-labour ratio and 
the tariff rates jointly as explanatory variables. To do 
this, we have taken the actual investments (at the firms' 
level) registered with the BOI during the years 1980 and 
1981. This gives us the opportunity to use 1981 tariff 
rates. These data are presented in Table 7.4. We have only 
level of investment (I) for this set of data. The test 
involves regressing I on k (capital-labour ratio), RR (total 
raw-material-1abour ratio) or RT domestic raw-material-
labour ratio) or R~ (imported raw-material-labour ratio), 
and T (nominal percentage rates of tariff). There is only 
one dummy 0 which takes the value of zero or unity according 
to whether the investing firm comes from a less-developed or 
developed country. 
Table 7.5 presents the results and Table 7.6 presents the 
logarithmic runs. It is clear from Table 7.5 that various 
combinations of the independent variables are run. For 
example, equation (1) runs k and T jointly; equation (2) 
runs k and RR jointly, equation (3) runs k, RR and T 
jointly. These results show that none of the explanatory 
variables are significant with low r 2s. We suspected that 
the additive functional forms have given poor results. So 
we assumed multiplication functional forms and ran log 
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TABLE 7.4 
.---------------------------------------------------------. 
:INVESTMENT: K /L RR RT RM T.A.RIFF 
:S 1000 RATES 
:(at 1975 
=100) % 
----------------------------------------------------------: 
1 21000 121. 6 121. 2 121. 2 0 30 
2 25017 500.3 180.7 0 180.7 30 
3 10533 104.3 317.2 262.8 54.4 80 
4 19375 186.3 142.7 997.1 429.7 80 
5 13562 102.8 338.0 143.4 194.6 30 
6 6458 190.0 184.9 86.2 98.8 40 
7 6949 40.4 268.6 161.1 107.5 30 
8 13562 366.5 420.7 188.6 232.1 30 
9 6949 182.9 187.4 187.4 0 100 
· 
· 10: 4869 202.7 163.2 103.5 59.7 10 
· 
· 11: 12916 60.6 127.2 26.1 101.1 30 
· 
· 12: 34746 327.8 1786.0 301. 8 1485.0 30 
· 
· 13: 69493 253.6 484.6 106.1 378.5 30 
· 
· 14: 27797 617.7 686.2 586.2 100.0 30 
· 
· 15: 3229 44.2 533.0 337.3 195.8 30 
: 
16: 17373 59.7 130.7 67.4 63.3 30 
· 
· 17: 19375 186.3 1662.4 997.1 665.3 80 
· 
· 18: 69493 207.4 426.5 93.4 333.1 80 
· 
· 19: 6949 204.4 322.0 5.4 326.6 30 
· 
· 20: 6949 17.7 145.3 84.5 60.9 30 
· 
· 21: 7644 72.8 137.7 61. 4 76.3 80 
· 
· 22: 3475 7.7 316.0 3.4 312.7 30 
· 
23: 2780 9.1 363.8 73.7 290.1 10 
· 
· 24: 62543 306.6 182.8 1.7 181. 1 60 
: 
25: 2085 69.5 290.2 23.8 266.4 30 
· 
· 26: 2780 905.4 87.2 0.8 86.4 60 
=========================================================== 
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TABLE 7.5 
Dependent Independent Variables 
Variable :-------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
1. 
I 
2. 
I 
3. 
I 
:Constant: k RR 
:3537.8 
:(0.33) 
:7139.0 
: (0.86) 
:9049.7 
: (1. 06) 
: 22.83 
: 0.16) : 
: 18.58 7.49 
: (0.96) : (0.86) 
: 19.65 
: (1. 00) : 
: RT R~1 
. : 3.11 
: (0.20) : 
T 
: 14450 :6762.0: n = 26 : 
: (0.83) :(0.82): R2 = 0.10: 
:6374.7: n = 26 : 
2 :(0.77): R = 0.10: 
:7169.6: n = 26 : 
2 :(0.85): R = 0.08: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
4. I 
: 7661. 2 
: (0.98) 
: 18.30 
: (0.96) : 
: 16.65 
: (1.21) 
:4487.2: n = 26 
:(0.53): R2 = 0.13: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:3404.9 : 21.01 5.56 
5. I :(0.31) : (1.04) : (0.58) 
:10252 
: (0.54) 
:6388.9: n = 26 
2 :(0.76): R =0.12: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
6. I 
:3505.2 
:(0.32) 
: 23.48 
: (1.15) : 
: -3.40 : 
:(-0.20) : 
: 16289 
: (0.81) 
:6498.8: n = 26 : 
2 :(0.76): R = 0.10: 
====================================================================================== 
(Cont.) 
(Xl 
\.0 
TABLE 7.5 (cont.) 
Oependent Independent Variables 
Variable :-------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant: k : RR : RT R~1 T o : R2 
• , n 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
7. 
I 
8. 
I 
9 
I 
10. 
I 
: 20.73 :3027.0 
:(0.28) : (1. 05) : 
:8729.0 
:(0.90) 
:9515.9 : 
:(0.97) 
:8343.1 
: (0. 88) 
7.09 
: (0.75) 
15.11 : 11240 
(1. 06) : (0.64 ) 
: -0.20 : 
: (-0.01): 
: 16.60 
: (1.17) 
:5829.2 
: (0.31) 
: 10911 
:(0.55) 
: 7651. 4 
: (0.44) 
:4568.4: n = 26 
2 :(0.54): R = 0.15: 
:6518.4: n = 26 : 
:(0.45): R2 = 0.07: 
:7005.7: n = 26 : 
2 :(0.81): R = 0.05: 
:4584.9: n = 26 : 
2 :(0.54): R = 0.10: 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I.D 
o 
TABLE 7.6 
Dependent Independent Variables 
Variable :-------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Constant: log k : log RR : log RT : log RM : log T D 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
1. 
log I 
0.17 0.41 
: (0.70) : (2.66) : 
0.17 : 0.05 : n = 26 : 
2 : (1.00) :(0.13): R = 0.24: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
2. 
log I 
5.69 0.39 0.31 
: (3.98) : (2.51) : (1.39) 
:0.02 : n = 26 
2 
:(0.05): R = 0.30: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
3. 0.17 : 0.41 
log I : (0.70) : (2.66) : 
0.17 
: (1. OO) : 
:0.05 : n = 26 
:(0.13): R2 = 0.24: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
4. 0.17 : 0.41 
log I : (0.70) : (2.66) : 
5. 0.17 : 0.41 0.31 
log I : (0.71) : (2.51) : (1.39) 
6. 0.17 : 0.41 
log I : (0.68) : (2.66) : 
0.17 
0.17 
: (1.00) 
: (1. 00) : 
:0.05 : n = 26 : 
2 :(0.13): R = 0.24: 
: 0.17 :0.17 : n = 26 
: (1.00) :(0.05): R2 = 0.30: 
: 0.17 :0.05 : n = 26 
: (1.00) :(0.13): R2 = 0.24: 
====================================================================================== 
(Cont. ) 
TABLE 7.6 (cant.) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables 
:Constant: log k : log RR : log RT : log RM : log T D 2 R , n 
7. 
log I 
8. 
log I 
9. 
log I 
0.17 0.41 
: (0.68) : (2.66) : 
0.17 
: (0.64) : 
0.17 
: (0.61) : 
0.39 
: (1. 57) 
. 
0.17 
0.17 
: (1.00) 
: (1.00) : 
0.17 :0.05 : n = 26 
2 : (1.00) :(0.13): R = 0.24: 
0.17 :-0.15: n = 26 
2 : (1.00) :(-0.36: R = 0.10: 
0.17 :-0.12: n = 26 
2 : (1.00) :(-0.28: R = 0.01: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
10. 0.17 
log I : (0.61) : 
0.17 
: (1.00) 
0.17 :-0.12: n = 26 
: (1.00) :(-0.28: R2 = 0.01: 
====================================================================================== 
linear regressions. These results are presented in Table 
7.6. It is clear that the results are vastly improved. The 
R2s have gone up for all the runs. In all the logarithmic 
runs, raw-material-labour ratio (for each definition) and 
the nominal rates of tariff come out insignificant. And for 
all the runs, capital-labour ratio comes out to be strongly 
significant. Furthermore, for all runs the elasticity of the 
level of investment with respect to capital-labour ratio is 
found to be 0.41 in equation (2) and 0.39 in equation (5). 
SECTION 7.4: CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusion that clearly emerges from our analysis is 
that capital-labour ratio, if used as an explanatory 
variable, performs much better than either (total, domestic 
or imported) raw-material-labour ratio or nominal rates of 
tariff. 
192 
-I 
:x: 
J'T1 
:;0 
J'T1 
r 
):a 
-I 
t-f ("") 
I.D < :x: ~ J'T1 ):a 
I 
" ::e: -I 
):a IT1 
G) :;0 
J'T1 
en 
:x: 
-< 
" 0 
-I 
:x: 
J'T1 
(/) 
t-f 
(/) 
SECTION 8.1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter attempts to test the relative-wage hypothesis 
in the case of Thailand. Relatively low-cost labour in the 
less-developed countries (generally characterised by excess 
supply of labour) has long been recognised as a source of 
their comparative advangage. However, as Agarwal (1980) 
points out, low-cost wage has only recently been recognised 
as a possible determinant of foreign direct investments. 
Existing literature reveals that the empirical significance 
of low-cost wage in explaining flow of foreign direct 
investments is inconclusive. Forsyth (1972) in the case of 
U. S. 
(1977) 
investments in Scotland, Kebschull (1972) and Halbach 
in the case of German investments in the 
less-developed countries, have found low-cost wage to be 
insignificant while Riedel (1975) in a case study of Taiwan, 
Donge (1976) in the case of Spain, and Agarwal (1978) in the 
case of the German investments in six selected LDCs (viz. 
Brazil, India, Iran, Israel, Mexico and Nigeria) have found 
it to be significant. In this chapter we attempt to carry 
out a similar empirical study of the Thai case. This is done 
by regressing the flow of foreign direct investment from the 
ith country to Thailand on the relative wage-rate (; .e., the 
ratio of Thai real wage to the ith country's real wage). 
SECTION 8.2: DATA 
As discussed in Chapter 3, time-series data on the flow of 
foreign direct investments to Thailand for more than 15 
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years exist only for Japan and Germany. These figures are 
presented in Table 4.2 of Chapter 4. The data for real 
wage-rates are presented in Table 8.1. The wage-rate is 
calculated in U.S. dollars by using the average annua 1 
exchange rate (published in the United Nations Statistical 
Year Book). These are weekly wage-rates in the manufacturing 
sector on 40-hour-a-week basis. There is a problem with the 
Thai wage-rate data. From 1966 to 1971 we have obtained 
average real wage-rates from the United Nations sources. 
Such data do not seem to be available from 1972 for Thailand 
and the only proxy we have managed to find is minimum real 
wage-rates from 1972 onwards. These mimimum wage-rates are 
obtained from the Labour Department of the Government of 
Thailand. This is not easy to justify, but we expect·any 
government to take into account average wage-rates in fixing 
minimum wage-rates. We will use a dummy variable to take 
account of this. 
SECTION 8.3: A SIMPLE ECONOMETRIC TEST 
Our test constitutes in regressing ith country's flow of 
foreign direct ~r.vestment on the relative wage-rate, viz., 
the ratio of Thai wage-rate to the ith country's wage-rate. 
. Thailand 
We run the following regression: I~ = Po + P1!'-------
w 
+ 
f2 D1 + P3 02 + u. In the above we have two dummies, D1 and 
02' used respectively to take account of the oil crisis and 
the discrepancy in Thai wage-rates series. 01 takes the 
value of 1 for the period 1973-81 and 0 for 1966-1972. D2 
takes the value of 1 for the period 1972-1981 and D2 = 0 for 
the rest of the years. 
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TABLE 8.1: REAL WAGE RATES (at 1975 prices = 100) 
JAPAN W. GERMANY THAILAND 
$ $ $ 
(Weekly) O~eekly) (Heekly) 
-----------------------------------------------------------. 
1966 28.13 44.22 11. 49 
1967 31. 64 46.16 11.12 
1968 36.60 4·7.99 10.70 
1969 42.89 53.81 10.27 
1970 49.62 65.38 9.49 
1971 57.98 76.51 11. 07 
1972 77.21 90.82 3.54 
· · 
· · 1973 :106.98 :120.18 3.33 
· · 
· · 1974 :125.36 :138.19 6.57 
· · · · 1975 :137.92 :157.54 6.13 
· · 
· · 1976 :154.74 :164.42· 5.64 
· · 
· · 1977 :186.91 :191.89 7.36 
· · 
· · 1978 :254.91 :233.59 6.69 
· : 
· 1979 :259.83 :269.74 8.10 
· : 
· 1980 :269.66 :290.04 9.10 
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The expected sign of f1 is negative, that is, a fall 
in the Thai wage-rate relative to the ith country's wage 
rate will increase 11. The econometric results are presented 
~ 
in Table 8.2. The coefficient of the relative wage-rate has 
the correct sign for Germany (equations 1 and 2 of Table 
8.2); but it has got the wrong sign for Japan (equations 3 
and 4 of Table 8.2). Furthermore, in all cases the relevant 
coefficient is insignificant. The dummy variables are also 
insignificant. The statistical insignificance of D1 
indicates that the proxy used for Thai wage-rates from 1972 
to 1980 is not unreasonable. The R2s are low for time-series 
runs. There is no clear evidence of the absence of 
autocorrelation. We therefore conclude that our test rejects 
the relative wage hypothesis for Thailand so far as the 
German and Japanese foreign direct investments are 
concerned. 
SECTION 8.4:CONCLUS10NS 
The relative-wage hypothesis, although enormously plausible, 
does not appear to stand up to statistical test. As 
discussed in Section 8.1, most econometric work has found 
little or no evidence for the importance of relative-wage 
hypothesis as an explanation of the flow of foreign direct 
investment. The only significant exception is the work of 
Agarwal (1978). However, Agarwal (1978) considers 'relative 
wage cost' which is operationally defined as 'share of wages 
and salaries in value added per employee' of the investing 
country divided by the same of the host country. Strictly 
speaking, this definition is different from the concept of 
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TABLE 8.2 
Dependent Independent Variables 
Variable :-------------------------------------------------.------------------------: 
: : THAI 
;Constant;w.---
. :w 1 
: wTHAI 
·log .---
I 1 
W 
1. 
IGermany 
t 
3.36 -19.96: 
(1.05) (-0.81): 
2. -2.84 
log IGermany 
t (-1.13): 
3. 
IJapan 
t 
34.04 
(2.84) 
16.57 
(0.62) 
-1.15 
(-0.95) 
2 
ri, R 
0.38 -1.36 n = 16 
(0.33) : (-0.51) : R2 = 0.18: 
0.12 -0.82 n = 16 
2 (0.13) : (-0.43) : R = 0.22: 
-8.96 0.89 n = 16 
(-0.38): (0.04) : R2 = 0.08: 
DWS. 
1.47 
0.90 
1.40 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
4. 3.57 0.17 -0.21 0.42 n = 16 1.44 
log I~apan 
: (8.16) : : (0.92) {-O.33}: (0.64) : R2 = 0.10: 
======================================================================================= 
relative wage-rate. One wonders if Agarwal (1978) has in 
fact tested the relative-wage hypothesis, as Johnson (1968) 
pointed out that value-added per head picks up effects of 
productivity, economies of scale etc ... lastly, our finding 
is not as surprising as it appears to be. Foreign firms 
invest in Thailand in the kind of industries which may use 
relatively more skilled labour, or foreign firms investing 
in Thailand may choose modern technologies which inevitably 
require skilled labour. If this is the case, then one can 
put forward a plausible argument that skilled labour is a 
scarce factor in the less-developed countries so that 
skilled labour may not be significantly cheaper. 
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SECTION 9.1: INTRODUCTION 
Studies on the welfare effects (be it social, political or 
economic) of foreign direct investment, have blossomed in 
recent years. The earlier studies were somewhat more 
preoccupied with the 'determinants' of foreign direct 
investments. Studies on the welfare effects are concerned 
mostly with the role of multinational firms in the LDCs. 
This is the arena where the pro- and anti-foreign investment 
economists fight their battles. It perhaps needs an 
explanation. While U.S. foreign direct investment e.g., in 
the U.K., does not raise serious questions about welfare 
effects regarding the associated transfer of 'appropriate 
technology' to the U.K., (because of the similarity of 
factor endowments, technology and tastes), the same in, say, 
Thailand does raise serious questions not only about 
'appropriate technology' but also about a host of other 
things including 'employment and income distribution', 
'political influence' etc .. This Chapter attempts to analyse 
the welfare effects of foreign direct investment in 
Thailand. In the process, it becomes necessary first to 
present a brief survey of the relevant literature; and then 
to try to apply some of the standard arguments to the Thai 
experience. We would consider specifically the Thai economic 
effects which will include (i) the environmental effects, 
(ii) a comparative study of the desired pattern of 
investment as envisaged by the Five Year Plans and the 
pattern of investment as given by the cumulative foreign 
direct investments for each five-year planning period, and 
(iii) a simple time-series study of the effects of total 
foreign direct investments on macroeconomic variables. 
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SECTION 9.2: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
IN THE LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
There are various approaches surrounding the controversy 
regarding the desirability of foreign direct investments in 
the LDCs. Each approach emphasises different aspects of 
economic reality, and embodies, implicitly or explicitly, 
different social and economic values. These observations led 
Lall (1974) to the following conclusion, best summarised in 
his own words: 
"Even given the basic premise that everyone wants to 
promote the well-being of LDCs and some measure of 
agreement on the hard data (investment flows, value 
of output, employment, growth rates, and the like), 
there is bound to remain a fundamental divergence in 
views about the desirability and contribution of 
foreign investment to LDCs" (p.45). 
The above will be revealed to be the state of affairs once 
the neo-classical approach to the problem;s discussed and 
the criticisms arising therefrom, and the criticisms based 
on alternative approaches are presented. What Lall (1974) 
calls the 'traditional economic approach' ts actually the 
neo-classical approach. The theoretical framework is the 
standard 'trade and welfare' framework. We first summarise 
the main arguments. 
(a) The pioneering work of MacDougall (1960) presented a 
'theoretical' cost-benefit analysis where the costs and 
benefits were measured by 'areas' under the margina1-product 
(of capital) curve. The inflow of foreign direct investment 
is treated as addition to the capital stock of the host 
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country. (See, for example, Johnson (1970), Jones, (1967), 
Reuber et. al. (1973). It therefore follows from the simple 
neo-classical growth models that foreign direct investment 
would raise the rate of economic growth of the host country, 
and hence the welfare of the host economy. This conclusion 
is, of course, based on a restrictive set of assumptions 
including perfect competition in product and factor markets, 
full-employment, and absence of externalities. 
(b) foreign direct investments by the multinational firms of 
the developed countries in the host economies of the 
less-developed countries 'integrates' the latter to the 
world economy. This, it is assumed, leads to a larger volume 
of free-trade; and, hence, it leads to higher global 
welfare. In this connection, we should note the following. 
As shown by Jones (1967), if capital in-flow affects the 
terms of trade adversely, then it becomes necessary to 
impose an 'optimum' tax on capital imports, so that possible 
immiserizing growth' could be avoided. 
(c) Furthermore, as argued by Johnson (1972) and Vernon 
(1966) foreign direct investment brings with it new 
technology to the host country, and 'technology' is defi ned 
broadly to include both the nature of the product produced 
in the host country and the method of p~ocess of production. 
The new technology, it is argued, will also raise the host 
co u n try I s we 1 far e, (s e eRe u b e r e t. iLl. (1 973 ) ), ins 0 far as 
the domestic consumers have easy access to new or improved 
goods in and so far as the economy has acquired advanced 
processes of production. The introduction of new technology 
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via foreign 
technological 
effects. 
investment is assumed to lead to further 
improvements via technological spill-over 
(d) In addition to 'new technology', as pointed out by 
Reuber (1973), Lall (1975), and others, multinational firms 
bring with them 'managerial ability'. The superiority of 
entrepreneurial skills, arising from better training and 
higher standards of recruitment, consists in ability to seek 
out investment opportunities, to develop new technologies to 
suit particular conditions, and to organise a stream-lined 
operation (production, distribution and sales). This is, it 
is argued, beneficial to the host country not only because 
the host country has direct benefits from superior 
entrepreneurship, but also because the indigenous firms 
learn from the multinational operations, which is a kind of 
'demonstration effect' in production. Closely related to 
these arguments in favour of entrepreneurial skills are the 
arguments arising from 'marketing skills' of the 
mUltinational firms which often are mentioned separately 
(see, for example, Lall and Streeten, (1977)). The benefits 
to the (LDC) host country, which may accrue from the 
marketing skills of the multinational firms, may be in the 
form of internal marketing or external marketing. Internal 
marketing skills lead to various improvements, e.g., better 
storage, better loading and transport arrangements, better 
information to consumers about products, provision of a 
wider range of products etc. The multinational firms are 
familiar with global operations, and therefore the external 
marketing skills iead to higher exports not only because of 
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marketing outlets but also often because of brand names. 
This argument applies mainly to the manufacturing products. 
(e) This leads to discussion of the effects of foreign 
direct investment on the host country's balance of payments. 
{See, for example, Reddaway (1967), Hufbauer and Adler 
(1968), and Streeten (1969)). If an LOC country follows the 
lSI strategy whereby prohibitive tariffs are imposed on 
certain commodities which are then produced domestically 
with the help of multinational firms, it will have some 
ameliorating effects on the balance of payments to the 
extent that imports decrease and exports (because of the 
marketing skills of the multinationals) increase. 
Furthermore, it is argued that foreign direct investments 
bring in capital in hard currency which temporarily will 
yield favourable effects. However, over a period of time, 
one needs to consider the net effect by taking into account 
the initial capital inflow, the outflow of dividends, 
interests and repatriation of profits to the parent company. 
Lastly, the balance of payments impact can be analysed by 
using a macro-economic approach as done by Lall (1978). To 
quote La11 's own words: 
" ....... from the absorption approach to the balance 
of payments, it is well known that the change in the 
balance of payments following foreign investment, 
which leads to a rise in the host country's real 
income, will depend upon the extent to which 
expenditure rises (or is allowed to rise by the 
government) following the real income increase. If 
expenditure remains unchanged at the pre-POI level, 
the whole of the real income rise associated with 
the foreign investment will appear as a balance of 
payments surplus. On the other hand, if expenditure 
is allowed to rise, by the full amount of (more 
than) the real income rise, there will be no change 
(a worsening) in the balance of payments following 
the foreign investment." (p.31). 
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(f) In almost all the non-OPEC developing countries, 
availability of foreign-exchange remains a serious 
constraint hindering development efforts. To the extent that 
the balance of payments effects are beneficial, foreign 
direct investments help to relieve the foreign exchange 
bottlenecks in the LOCs. 
(g) Another important issue related to balance of payments 
is that of transfer pricing. Transfer prices (sometimes 
called accounting prices) are prices at which transfers of 
sales take place between various branch firms (or units or 
affiliates) of the same mUltinational corporation. The 
transfer prices, charged for intra-corporation transactions, 
can be, and often are, different from market prices obtained 
for larm's length transactions'. If the objective of the 
multinational is to maximise global net after-tax profits, 
then by choosing appropriate transfer prices, the 
mUltinational corporation can show lower profits in the 
country with high tax rates and higher profits in the 
country with low tax rates. Robbins and Stobaugh (1973) 
have discussed the above argument about profit maximisation 
and transfer prices by using an elaborate model. Lall (1973) 
has added further reasons for manipulating transfer prices. 
These include: hedging against depreciation of a weak 
currency, restriction on repatriation of profits, 
and pre-empting high wage claims by local workers because 
of 'high' profits. 
(h) Related somewhat indirectly to the effects of foreign 
direct investments on balance of payments is the view, 
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propounded by Agmon and Hirsch (1979), that the 
miltinational corporation is 
intermediate services" (p.336). 
a "provider of financial 
Multinational enterprises, by virtue of their large size and 
other oligopolistic and monopolistic characteristics, have 
relatively easier access to enormous financial resources for 
investment. The funds may be available from internal sources 
or from external capital market amd financial institutions. 
By providing capital from various sources, mUltinational 
firms may bridge a resource gap in the host (LDC) country 
between the desired level of investment and the domestic 
savings generated, and they can act as financial 
intermediaries to mobilize rocal savings (which otherwise 
would have remained idle) by offering attractive in~estment 
opportunities in the domestic capital market. This is seen 
from the following quotation from Agmon and Hirsch (1979); 
"The multinational corporation may be looked upon as 
an instrument capable of internalising the benefits 
of a linkage to a fully developed capital market 
while responding efficiently to the non-market 
signals· emitted by governments. MNCs both raise 
funds and are being evaluated in fully developed and 
efficient capital markets (most often the US capital 
market). Competing among MNCs makes them use the 
proper price of risk (on a world-wide basis) in 
project evaluation and in financing decisions. The 
involvement of the MNCs in the local market and the 
transfer of real returns of economic activities into 
internationally traded real equities (MNC stocks) 
will contribute towards a more efficient allocation 
of resources in the LDCs". (p.342). 
(i) Since foreign direct investment is treated in the 
traditional models as net addition to the host country's 
capital stock, it is necessary to consider the impact of the 
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multinational investment on employment and income 
distribution. The net addition to capital ;s expected to 
lead to increase in employment (including the employment 
which might be generated through the multiplier effect). The 
multinational firms pay normally relatively higher wages in 
order to secure high quality dependable workers than the 
local firms in the host country. (See for example, Lal 
(1978)). From a simple general equilibrium point of view, 
the distributive effects of foreign direct investment is 
best put in the words of Reuber et.al (1973): 
"The broad distributive effects of private foreign 
investment seem reasonably clear assuming government 
policy to be the same after foreign investment 
occurs as before. In the long run, after all general 
equilibrium effects have worked themselves out, one 
may expect capital 1nflows to lower tre real incomes 
of local capitalists and to raise the real income of 
labour and other complementary factors" (p.218). 
The above argument is based on the marginalist doctrine. If 
labour has more capital to work with, then the marginal 
product of labour must rise. Under perfect competition, this 
will result in higher wage-rates. These inferences are very 
broad, and they should be taken rather tentatively in the 
absence of a full-scale general equilibrium model with a 
less-developed host country characterised by dual economy. 
(j) MacDougal (1960) and Streeten (1971) have pointed out 
the external economic effects of foreign direct investment 
which include the impact of economies of scale and 
intangible externalities. Internal and external economies 
of scale will lead to lower prices, higher sales, and 
exports. Externalities arising from the external economies 
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of scale, which in turn arise from the multinational 
operations, may encourage indigenous entrepreneurship. 
Other externalities may be related to the Hirschman-type 
'forward ' and 'backward ' linkages. 
SECTION 9.3: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
FAVOURABLE TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
The preceding section presented the main arguments, arising 
primarily from the neo-classical analyses, which support the 
beneficial economic effects of foreign direct investment. 
This present section attempts to appraise those arguments 
critically and also to present the alternative views on the 
matter. 
Referring tG the beneficial effects on economic growth 
caused by foreign capital and new technology, Lall (1974) 
says the following: 
"This presumes a host of specific conditions and 
values which underlie welfare economies, mainly that 
the market is the best determinant of economic and 
social welfare - thus, the distribution of income 
reflected in the market is desirable, or, more 
subtly, not the concern of economists at all, and 
that the preferences revealed are independently 
formed and true indicators of 'wel fare I. In the 
particular case of foreign investment in LDCs, the 
implications are that the products introduces and 
marketed, the tastes created, and the needs met, all 
benefit the countries, as long as ventures earn 
profits" (p.44). 
Foreign direct investment brings with it new technology 
which, as Stewart (1978) points out, must be understood in a 
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broad sense to include not only the capital intensive 
processes of production but also the nature of the product 
itself and the use of raw materials. This leads to the 
concept of 'appropriate technology'. What kind of product 
is produced by the multinationals is important. That is, it 
is important to know whether the product is produced to 
satisfy the needs of a tiny minority of rich people (e.g., 
producing videos in an LOC) or whether the product will 
satisfy the needs of the masses (people, e.g., producing 
anti-biotic drugs). Secondly, what kind of resources are 
used in the production is also crucial. That is, one needs 
to know whether the process of production will use the 
abundant factors of production (say, labour and other 
natural and mineral raw materials) or whether a product is 
~roduced in an LOC by importing raw materials. 
Barnet and Muller (1974) accused mUltinational corporations 
of 'diffusing' the consumption patterns of the rich nations 
in the LDCs and also for creating a 'global shopping centre' 
for an 'international elite'. The consumers of the 
upper-income bracket in the LDCs demand 
products of the Western capitalist economies. 
the '1 uxury' 
Thus, foreign 
direct investment per se may not always increase 'desired 
welfare' of an LOC. Furthermore, the choice of product is 
also related to choice of (process) techniques. As Sutc1iffe 
(1971) points out, by surveying US data, that a choice of 
technology exists in some manufacturing sectors while the 
choice is very limited in other manufacturing sectors. (See 
Sutcliffe, p.147-148). Helleiner (1975) and Bhalla (1975, 
p.309) take the view that there always exist possibilities 
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of sUbstitution between capital and labour. Technological 
fixity cannot, thus, be taken as an explanation for 
capital-intensive methods often used by the multinationals. 
Helleiner (1975) also points out that 'appropriate ' products 
are not necessarily always (technologically) produced by 
appropriate labour-intensive methods of production by the 
multinational firms. However, Johnson (1970) thought that 
foreign investment tended to flow into the more 
capital-intensive sectors of the economy. 
It is therefore clear that a particular foreign direct 
investment will affect the pattern of growth and consumption 
(product choice) and will also a ffec t the income 
distrubution situation (choice of process techniques). The 
critics, who point out that the free market mechanism does 
not necessarily lead to optiwal growth - optimal in the 
sense of desired growth which takes into account certain 
social goals and economic objectives, are on fairly strong 
ground. This sort of thinking led Lall (1974) to say: 
"The new schools of technology and management-
oriented analysts, whose roots lie partly in 
business schools, assume essentially that the free 
enterprise system as it operates in the leading 
capitalist countries, represents the best form of 
economic and social organisation, and that its 
wholesale extension, including the forms of 
technology produced, the differentation of products, 
the methods of advertising and selling, and the 
philosophy of corporate operation, to the LDCs is 
per se desirable" (p.44). 
The neo-classical welfare economics within a general 
equilibrium framework is founded on a perfectly competitive 
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market structure with a large number of profit-maximizing 
producers and utility-maximizing consumers. The fact that 
the multinational firms are oligopolistic with monopolistic 
advantages makes it difficult to see the direct relevance of 
the neo-classical paradigm, particularly in the context of 
the LDCs with a structure of dual economy and a perennial 
problem of unemployment (semi or disguised unemployment). 
A case study carried out by Langdon (1975) on Kenya's soap 
industry is a good illustrative example. This study includes 
both the local and multinational firms (subsidiaries). The 
main conclusions are: (a) The multinationals generate 
relatively less employment and use relatively more capital 
intensive technology as compared to the indigenous firms, 
(b) the mUltinationals use relatively more of imported 
inputs thus exerting adverse effects on the balance of 
payments, (c) the indigenous firms succeed in developing far 
more linkages with the Kenyan economy and (d) multinationals 
involve waste in the sense of under-utilisation of capacity 
and a large advertising campaign. UNCTAD (1976) gives 
recommendations regarding how the LDCs can improve the 
regulations of forcing investments and technology transfer. 
Also we note that Griffin (1974) puts forward the 
proposition that international transmission of technology 
leads to greater inequality between nations. 
The investments by the multinational firms mainly in the 
sectors which are new to the host LDC economy will lead to 
an increase in employment. However, the contribution will 
be marginal as Morawetz (1974) found that the contribution 
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of the industrial sector to employment growth was 
disappointing. During the sixties, Morawetz (1974) reports, 
the gross value-added in manufacturing generally increased 
at a higher annual rate than employment. For example, in 
B raz il during 1960-69, the gross value-added in 
manufacturing increased at an annual rate of 6.5% and 
employment in manufacturing increased at an annual rate of 
1.1%. For India, the equivalent figures are 5.9% and 3.8% 
and for Nigeria 14.1% and 5.7%. 
Related to the question of adverse income distribution is 
the fact that multinationals, in general, pay relatively 
higher wages to their employees than the local firms. But 
this is considered a benefit and is defended by Lal (1978) 
as can be seen from the following passage: 
"........ one of the important indirect taxes on 
POI, and hence benefits to the host country, is 
given by the differences between the social 
opportunity costs of the factors employed and the 
actual wages paid to them by the foreign firms. From 
this viewpoint the higher wages paid by POI are a 
benefit to the host country. Clearly, the way out 
would be to let the foreign company pay the higher 
wages, but the recipients should be taxed at higher 
rates in the interests of a better income 
distribution" (p.33). 
An important argument in the discussion of the welfare 
effects of foreign direct investment is the ability, or 
rather lack of it, of the mUltinational firms to establish 
investment-goods or capital-goods industries in the LDCs. 
There are some reasons directly related to the nature of a 
less-developed country. For example, the domestic market for 
investment goods is small or the indigenous producers fear 
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low quality and unreliability of investment goods (machines 
to produce consumption goods) if produced domestically. 
Arrighi (1970) has pointed out that the oligopolistic 
structure of the multinational firms leads to a 'sectoral 
pattern of foreign investment biased against capital-goods 
industry' (p.287). The multinationals arrive with new 
technology which necessitates the use of specialised 
machinery; and often the specialised equipment is imported. 
This does not lead to the expansion of the domestic 
capital-goods sector. Morawetz (1974) and Stewart (1976) 
argue that establishing the domestic capital goods sector is 
a pre-condition for an LOC to be ab1e to adopt 
'inappropriate technology' to suit the local requirements 
(i.e. to narrow the 'suitability gap'). 
Now we consider transfer pricing. Tu~gendhat (1973) has 
argued that multinational firms can frustrate policies with 
respect to capital flows (balance of payments) even in a 
developed country by transfer of funds. Lall (1973) has 
studied the intra-firm exports and imports of the US 
mUltinationals and estimated that about 35% of the total US 
exports ;s intra-firm exports and about 22% of the total US 
imports is intra-firm imports in 1970. These figures show 
how potent a weapon transfer pricing is in the arsenal of 
the multinational. The LOCs have more rigorous controls in 
the shape of foreign-exchange regulations, profit-
repatriation regulations etc ... A multinational firm sti11 
can by-pass the strict regulations by using transfer 
pricing. Although, because of the LOC government agencies, 
mUltinationals cannot use transfer pricing as a means of 
214 
transferring funds quite so openly. (See Tungendhat (1973)). 
This leads Vaitsos (1976) and Streeten (1969) to recommend 
training of the LDC civil servants appropriately in the 
relevant area. Some of the beneficial effects on balance of 
payments are no longer so clear cut if transfer pricing is 
widely used by the multinationals for the purpose of 
'revenue shifting'. Lall (1974) argues that the loss arising 
from 'revenue shifting' is borne by the host country. The 
work of Vaitsos (1970) and La" (1973) show evidence that 
the LDCs as a whole incur loss through transfer pricing. 
Related to the effects on balance of payments is the 
question of export restrictions. Although Safarian (1969) 
and Reuber et. al (1973) do not find such restrictions by 
the multinationals, several UNCTAD studies (e.g., UNCTAD 
(1971), (1972) ) or Levitt (1970) do provide evidence of 
export restrictions so that the favourable impact or foreign 
direct investment on balance of payments is diluted. 
Regarding the argument that the multinationals bring with 
them the much needed financial capital in hard currencies, 
it is pointed out (e.g., see Vernon (1974)) that the inflow 
of capital via foreign direct investment is often fairly 
small and most of the required financial capital comes from 
local borrowing, local savings and reinvested profits. Lall 
and Mayhew (1973) provide evidence for India (21 firms) and 
for Iran (9 firms) that foreign long-term borrowing by the 
guest investors comprised only 21% and 12% respectively. 
This point becomes less significant if foreign firms help to 
mobilize local savings which otherwise would have remained 
idle or would have been used in less productive activities. 
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On the other hand, it ;s equally possible that, by borrowing 
locally, multinational firms divert savings from other more 
productive uses. 
We conclude this section by observing that there are certain 
advantages deriving from foreign direct investment but some 
of these advantages have secondary effects which may be 
disadvantageous to the LDCs. The objective of the 
multinational firms is to grow and to generate surplus; it 
cannot be an objective for a corporation to 'develop' a 
poor nation. As Johnson (1971) concludes: "the main 
contribution of direct foreign investment will be highly 
specific and very uneven in its incidence" (p.246) after 
observing that it is not in the interest of a multinational 
firm to diffuse new technology (to the potential indigenous 
firms) and that it is not the objective of a mUltinational 
firm to exploit human potentialities for rlevelopment. 
Streeten (1971) points out that, in order to squeeze out 
beneficial effects from foreign direct investment, the LDC 
government must have the political power, will and ability 
to control the multinational operations. 
SECTION 9.4: A BROAD-BRUSH ANALYSIS OF THE THAI CASE 
This section 
presented in 
attempts 
Sections 
to apply some of the 
9.2 and 9.3 to certain 
arguments 
facts of 
Thailand, as for example, revealed pattern of foreign direct 
investment (Chapter 3), sectoral capital-intensity (Chapter 
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4), and use 
suggest some 
of raw-materials (Chapter 5), in order to 
possible welfare effects of foreign direct 
investment in Thailand. 
A large proportion of foreign direct investment has gone 
into the mining sector (see Chapter 3). The product of the 
mining sector is the raw-material of the manufacturing 
sector. This reveals that multinational manufacturing firms 
investing in the mining sector of Thailand have preferred 
vertical integration for well-known reasons. It may also be 
the case that large mining companies of industrialised 
countries have invested in the mining sector of Thailand in 
the shape of horizontal integration in order to be able to 
have some control on the world market for some mineral 
products. It is also clear from Chapter 3 that Japan is the 
largest investor in the mining sector. From Chapter 5, we 
see that 80% of exports from Thailand to Japan is 
raw-materials. The ameliorating effects of foreign direct 
investment on balance of payments is fairly clear. What, 
however, is not clear is the extent to which transfer 
pricing is used by the multinational firms to transfer 
funds; and the extent to which it is done ;s a measure of 
welfare loss for Thailand in terms of loss of tax revenue, 
low dividends for the local shareholders in the case of 
joint-ventures, etc .. 
Earlier in Chapter 4, capital-labour ratio is found to be a 
significant factor. The close 
foreign direct investments and 
shows that the larger the 
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association between sectoral 
sectoral capital-intensity 
amount of foreign direct 
investment, the larger is the value of the capital equipment 
relative to labour. This indicates that foreign direct 
investments in Thailand are capital-intensive. This does not 
necessarily mean that it has unfavourable effects on 
employment. The mining sector, where foreign direct 
investment plays a prominent role, employs a large 
proportion of workers. Furthermore, higher 
capital-intensity in the manufacturing sector is indicative 
of 'new technology'. A close examination of the firms 
registered with the BOr does not seem to reveal that, in 
Thailand, the often asserted proposition that the 
multinationals introduce 'inappropriate' products holds. 
This proposition probably holds in a country where a large 
proportion of foreign direct investment is devoted to the 
manufacturing sector; and, secondly, where a fairly 
developed industrial base or infrastructure base does not 
exist. It is not unreasonable to think that Thailand's 
mining sector is gaining from 'new technology' brought in by 
the multinational firms. 
The above discussion leads us to the old Singer hypothesis: 
"....... the specialisation of underdeveloped 
countries on export of food and raw-materials to 
industrialised countries, largely as a result of 
investment by the latter, has been unfortunate for 
the underdeveloped countries for two reasons: (a) 
because it removed most of the secondary and 
cumulative effects of investment from the country in 
which the investment took place to the investing 
country; and (b) because it diverted the 
underdeveloped countries into types of activity 
offering less scope for technical progress ..... " 
(p.475, 1950). 
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In a sense, Singer's reason (a) in the above quotation still 
applies in the sense that the raw-materials exported from 
Thailand to, for example, Japan keeps the Japanese economy's 
dynamism going to that extent. However, it is not clear that 
Thailand is losing out on 'dynamism' altogether. It is 
because (i) the mining sector is benefitting from new 
investment and technology brought in by the multinationals, 
and without foreign direct investment probably the mining 
sector in Thailand would not have been as advanced as it is 
today; (ii) it has created jobs (not only jobs in the mining 
sector but also via the multiplier effect jobs elsewhere in 
the economy); (iii) it contributes towards Thai exports and 
thus brings in foreign exchange which helps. towards 
relieving a major bottleneck. Singer (1950) then relates 
his hypothesis to the adverse terms of trade which is caused 
by a situation where technical progress shows a fall in the 
price of primary products while technical progres~ in 
manufacturing industries shows a rise in income. This terms 
of trade argument probably applies to the Thai situation as 
it is not clear how this could be stopped without taxing 
exports of raw-materials. 
SECTION 9.5: ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 
DIRECT 
Various theories have been advanced to explain the present 
trend of business firms towards mUltinational 
There is, however, an emerging pattern 
investment which has been very much neglected. 
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operations. 
of overseas 
The movement 
of some foreign investments from the developed countries to 
the less-developed countries is primarily the result of 
pushing out 'pollutant ' industries in order to solve the 
pollution problem at home. The point has been expressed in 
the work of Vernon (1977), Hood and Young (1979), Dunning 
(1978), Kojima (1977) and Ozawa (1977, 1979). However, the 
work which has been done by Kojima (1977) and Ozawa (1977, 
1979) emphasises the pattern of Japanese foreign direct 
investment and criticises the policy of the Japanese 
government to restructure Japan's industry. To quote Ozawa 
(1979): 
"As the small island nation (Japan) soon depleted 
her available industrial space, the costs of 
pollution and ecological destruction - social costs 
of economic development aggravated by 
industrialisation centered in the heavy .and chemical 
industries - had reached intolerable levels ..... 
With these developments as a backdrop, the Japanese 
government adopted an epoch-making policy to 
restructure Japan's industry - a proposal made by 
the Industrial Structure Council, the MITI's 
consultative organ. The policy emphasised a shift 
from 'pollution-prone ' and resource-consuming heavy 
and chemical indu~tries towards ('Clean' and 
'Knowledge-intensive ' industries, and assigned 
overseas investment a new role - that of a catalyst 
to ('house clean ' the economy" (p.18-19). 
Also Kojima (1977) says: 
"Recent theories advocating the movement of Japanese 
equipment industries abroad, an idea of what would 
be a desirable industrial structure of Japan look 
too much as though they are simply pushing out 
'pollutant' industries and looking for ways of 
importing such products into Japan from plant 
located abroad" (p.141). 
Both Ozawa (1979) and Kojima (1977) strongly criticise their 
government on the 'House Clean' policy. They argue that 
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such policy seems to be 'a very insensitive' policy lacking 
a sense of cooperation with the host country in its 
aspirations for economic development. The intermediate 
policy variables between the (Japanese) government policy 
and the (Japanese) firm's decision to invest abroad (in 
Thailand) is one of cost efficiency. Due to the various 
safeguards which are legally required of firms manufacturing 
dangerous substances, it becomes cheaper for them to invest 
in a country where such safeguards do not exist or where, if 
they exist, enforcement is far from strict. Nevertheless, 
evidence for such a situation in Thailand;s emerging not 
only from the Japanese firms but also from those of other 
countries i.e., USA, UK, West Germany, etc. 
We now proceed to carry out an empirical study of the Thai 
situation by looking at the specific products produced in 
the Chemical sector by the firms from various countries 
between 1965 and 1980. We again use the BOI data as 
explained in Chapter 3. The information about which 
chemicals are poisonous and harmful are taken from 
'Hazardous Chemicals', by the Science Equipment Research 
Centre (1979). The hazardous chemicals used or produced in 
Thailand are listed in Table 9.2. Using the BOI data as our 
sample, we find that Japan is the biggest investor with 
roughly 17% of her total investment in the Chemical sector, 
followed by Taiwan (30% of her investment), USA with 15%, 
India with 24% and UK with 6%. In Table 9.1 we have listed 
the products which either use poisonous material or are 
themselves harmful chemicals. 
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There is no sharp dividing line between 'safe' and 
'dangerous' chemicals. Many chemicals have been classified 
as having properties which cause damage within a relatively 
short period of time whereas others have been shown to be 
dangerous only in very high doses over a long period of 
time. For example, many samples of compounds, particularly 
of certain dyestuffs themselves, may be thought to be 
relatively safe but can contain carcinogens as impurities. 
Some chemicals such as Phenol are known to cause physical 
impairment or death following an exposure of several weeks, 
months or a year to a low concentration. While toxic gases 
such as Hydrogen cyanide are very dangerous and these can be 
absorbed rapidly by the skin (including eyes and nervous 
membranes) which cause serious illness. 
First note that the chemicals or products which appear in 
Tabl.e 9.1 are not all directly harmful as they are. They 
appear because the chemical agents used to produce some 
apparently harmless products are harmful or dangerous. It is 
not possible here to go into details of chemical 
constitution of each product. However, using information 
from Table 9.2 we can directly see certain products produced 
to be clearly harmful. For example, hydrochloric acid (Japan 
1966 and Taiwan 1965), Ethyl alcohol (Japan 1976), Phenol 
(Japan 1974) Carbon Black (Switzerland 1980), Calcium 
Carbide (India 1975) etc.,. There is, thus, fair empirical 
evidence that foreign firms do produce harmful and dangerous 
chemicals in Thailand. For strong evidence, however, one 
would need to compare, say, the recent investments in Japan 
in dangerous chemicals with the Japanese investments in the 
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TABLE 9.1 
.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHEMICAL COUNTRY :YEAR 
RAW-MATERIAL 
EQUITY: EMPLOYMENT: LOCAL 
SHARE 
IMPORTED 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: AM'~ON IUr~ PARA TUNGSTATE USA 5% 76 :274050 5300 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: GREASE USA :1971 :99.99% 17 12583 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:PVA LATEX USA : 1970 100% 44 3763 60670 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:POLYSTYRENE FOR GENERAL PURPOSE USA :1978 100% 40 2899 234319 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:SEEDLAC USA :1975 25% 41 3306 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: PARAQUAT UK :1975 70% 66 40300 142300 
:---------------------------------~----------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:ENAMEL & EMULSION PAINT UK :1968 :99.98% 78 29808 37807 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:ENAMEL & EMULSION PAINT UK :1968 59 17740 9980 
:ENAMEL PAINT UK :1972 40% 26 2668 5376 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:PVA DISPERSION GERMANY :1970 40% 46 39965 70193 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:HOUSEHOLD INSECTICIDES GERMANY 100% 42 41475 43442 
====================================================================================================================== 
(Cont.) 
(\) 
(\) 
~ 
TABLE 9.1 (Cont.) 
.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHEMICAL 
RAW-MATERIAL 
. .. . 
. . .-------------------. 
: COUNTRY :YEAR : EQUITY: EMPLOYMENT: LOCAL : IMPORTED : 
: SHARE : 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:CAUSTIC SODA, LIQUID CHLORINE, HYDROCHLORIC ACID 
: FORMALDEHYDE 
: JAPAN :1966: 49% 463 : 195204: 16671 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:PLASTICIZER, UREA, PHENOL ; JAPAN :1974: 74% 118 : na na 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:CHEMICAL FOR TEXTILE : JAPAN :1975: 75% 30 : 1077: 16510 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:WARP SIZING AGENT : JAPAN :1976: 45% 25 : 8358: 7171 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:ETUYL ALCOHOL : JAPAN :1976: 40% 82 : 41353 : 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:CALCIUM CITRATE : JAPAN :1979: 7.5% : 225 : 14049 : 338 
· --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:CHErnCAL FOR METAL SURFACE TREATMENT : JAPAN : 1980 : 49% 24 : 2485: 1432 
· 
· 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:POLYURETHANE RESINS· : JAPAN :1975: 49% 54 : 1800: 33980 
:POLYVINYL CHLORIDE : JAPAN :1971: 25% 362 :123464 : 553796 
· --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
· :POLYESTER CHIP : JAPAN :1969: 45% : 1353 : 128569 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:FINISHING RESINS FOR POLYESTER RAYON : JAPAN :1974: 45% 41 : 2978: 5814 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
: ALKYD RESINS : JAPAN :1975: 49% 137 : 124974: 55432 
====================================================================================================================== 
(Cont.) 
I\) 
I\) 
V1 
TABLE 9.1 (Cont.) 
.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHEMICAL 
RAW-MATERIAL 
• ____________________ e 
.. . 
: COUNTRY :YEAR : EQUITY: EMPLOYMENT: LOCAL : IMPORTED : 
: SHARE : 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:DIMETHYLATED DiMETHYL UREA ; JAPAN :1975: 45% 43 : 19852 : 3500 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:NYLON CHIP : JAPAN :1970: 50% 349 : 15769: 296178 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:NP & NPK FERTILIZER : JAPAN :1975: 24% 367 : 9003: 1181586 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:ENAMEL & EMULSION PAINT : JAPAN :1970: 40% 118 : 70137: 55742 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: PIGMENT : JAPAN :1962: 80% 50 : 109962 
· --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
· :CALCIUM CARBIDE INDIA :1975: 5% 205 : 7891: 27380 
· --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:CHEMICAL PRODUCTS INDIA : 1975 : 49% 73 : 14035 : 117 
· ~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
· :BASIC CHROMIUM SULPHATE , . INDIA :1975 : 40% 72 : 15130 : 38300 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: REACT! VE DYES INDIA :1975: 50% 215 : 19021: 18992 
· --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:DYESTUFF INDIA :1975: 80% 133 : 126169 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:CAUSTIC SODA, HYDROCHLORIC ACID : TAIWAN :1965 :21.5% : 112 26579 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:CAUSTIC SODA : TAIWAN :1965 :21.5% : 171 : 5723: 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:CALCIUM CHLORIDE, MAGNESIUM CHLORIDE : TAIWAN :1974: 60% 51 : 5359: 
====================================================================================================================== 
(Cont. ) 
.TABLE 9.1 (Cont.) 
.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHEMICAL 
RAW-MATERIAL 
. . ._-------------------. . 
: COUNTRY :YEAR : EQUITY: EMPLOYMENT: LOCAL : IMPORTED : 
: SHARE : 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:EXPANDABLE POLYSTYRENE , : TAIWAN : - : 40% 62 : 148679 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:SYNTHETIC RESINS : TAIWAN : - : 49% 154 : 50100: 54000 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:CAUSTIC SODA, HYDROCHLORIC ACID : PORTUGAL :1968 :17.6% : 723 : 95390 : 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:OXYGEN, NITROGEN :AUSTRALIAN:1974 : 45% 156 : 4742: 
:-----~--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:ALUMINIUM HYDROXIDE :HONG-KONG :1975 : 35% 50 11930 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:ZINC OXIDE :AUSTRALIAN:1974 :21.14% : 29 : 9483: 14256 
. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:SORBITAL, MANITOL :HONG-KONG :1980 :35.72%: 80 : 9694: 
. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:ZINC OXIDE :AUSTRALIAN: - : 20% 50: 14198: 7910 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:CARBON BLACK : SWISS :1980 :13.8% : 204 342: 36944 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: ENAMEL & EMULSION PAINT : DUTCH : 1965 : 55% 56: na na 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:ENAMEL & EMULSION PAINT : SWISS :1970: 15% 67 : 21666 : 
:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:ENAMEL & EMULSION PAINT ;NORWEGIAN :1968 : 80% 67 : 36732: 39710 
:----------------------------------------------------------------------~---------------------------------------------: 
:ENAMEL & EMULSION PAINT :HONG-KONG :1968 :100% 146 : 71853: 41161 
====================================================================================================================== 
TABLE 9.2 
.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
CHEMICAL HAZARDS 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Caustic Soda (Sodium Hydroxide) 
· 
· :(Na OH) 
Skin contact is harmful. The solution can cause severe burns. Very 
dangerous to the eyes. 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Ethyl Alcohol (Ethanol) 
(C2 HS OH) 
High concentrations of vapour and concentrated solution are dangerous. Can 
be poisonous by skin absorption in large quantities. 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Formaldehyde (Urea & Phenol) Vapour and liquid are harmful to eyes, lungs, skin and other organs.: 
· : (Methanol) CH3 OH Prolonged exposure to low concentrations can cause serious illness.: 
Cumulative poison. Highly inflammable. 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
· 
:Calcium Citrate (Calcium Chlorate) 
:Ca Cl (ClO) 4H20 
Poisonous corrosive powder; emits Chlorine gas which is poisonous. Powder: 
is harmful to eyes, lungs, mouth, skin. Fire danger by chemical action if: 
in contact with combustible materials. Explosion hazard when the powder is: 
heated (oxygen emitted). Explosion when suddenly heated above 100 deg.C. 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: Paraquat Respiration problems. 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: Dye Carcinogenic 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:Hydrochloric Acid (Hel) Irritant vapour harmful to eyes, lungs and skin. The acid burns eyes and: 
skin. 
==================================================================================================================== 
(Cont. ) 
N 
(\.) 
CD 
TABLE 9.2 (Cont.) 
CHEMICAL 
:Formalin (Methanol) 
· 
: (HC HO) 
HAZARDS 
The vapour is very irritant to eyes and lungs. The solution (formalin) is: 
. 
. 
very irritant to skin. Vapour and concentrated solutions are flamnable.: 
Prolonged exposure can cause hypersensitivity, damage to lungs, and: 
cracking of skin. A suspected carcinogen of the lung. 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:Carbon Black (Charcoal) Dust is irritant if inhaled or goes into eyes. Slight explosion hazard in: 
the form of dust when exposed to heat or flame. Charcoal Blocks for oxide: 
reduction can cause fire if stored away after use without ensuring that: 
area used in reduction is properly cooled. 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Calcium Carbide (Calcium Dicarbide) 
· 
· : (Ca C2 ) 
Solid is not dangerous. Hazards are due to ethyne (acetylene) and Calcium: 
Hydroxi de formed \'Jhen in contact with \Ala ter or aci ds. Ethyne forms: 
explosive mixture with air. 
==================================================================================================================== 
(Cont.) 
T 
TABLE 9.2 (Cont.) 
CHEMICAL HAZARDS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
:Phenol (Carbide Acid) 
. 
Vapour is harmful to the eyes, lungs and skin. Solid or solution is very: 
poisonous if swallowed. Solid and solution are very corrosive, causing: 
whitening of the skin. Poisonous by skin absorption. Prolonged exposure to: 
low concentrations of mist or vapour very dangerous . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:Chlorine C1 2 ) Very poisonou·s. Chlorine water if concentrated emits Chlorine. Extremely: 
harmful to the eyes, respiratory tract and lungs. 
:Acetylene (Ethyne) It forms explosive mixture with air. Ethyne reacts with copper and copper: 
alloys containing more than 50% copper to form explosive carbides. 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: 
: Po lyurethane Gives off cyanide gas when burned. 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
: Acryl i c Gives off cyanide gas when burned. 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:Resins Allergic reaction 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:Chlormium sulphate Irritant to eyes, skin. 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:Crude Oil Harmful by inhalation and skin contact. Toxic fumes if heated to: 
decomposition. A recognised carcinogen. 
:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:PVC Carcinogenic in non-solid form. 
=====;============================================================================================================== 
LDCs in similar Chemical products. We end this section by 
noting an interesting finding of Westphal et. al (1979), 
viz, the share of 'Other Chemicals' (i.e., excluding Drugs, 
Fertilizer, and petroleum products) in the total foreign 
direct investment in Korea increased from 0% during 1962-66, 
to 13% during 1967-71, 9.9% during 1972-76 and 36.9% during 
1977-78. 
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SECTION 9.6: IMPACT OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
ON 
The numerous investments in the various sectors of an 
economy by numerous multinational firms from numerous 
countries, do add up to a significant aggregate sum in many 
countries. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert (as, say, 
Kojima (1973) does) that the aggregate foreign direct 
investment will have some impact on the macroeconomic 
variables of the economy. Earlier in this chapter we have 
discussed how neo-classical approach takes foreign direct 
investment as net addition to the economy's capital stock. 
This implies that foreign direct investment will affect the 
host country's domestic product and employment. Secondly, we 
also discussed how foreign direct investment is considered a 
vehicle of technology transfer in a situation where the 
investing foreign firms are oligopolistic firms with 
firm-specific advantages. This implies that foreign direct 
investment will have some impact on the host country's 
I 
exports or balance of trade (or payments). 
In this section we attempt to test the above hypotheses for 
Thailand. In a developing country, like Thailand, 
characterised by relative scarcity of 'capital equipment and 
new technology', one would expect to detect a fair impact of 
foreign direct investment on income and exports. Here we 
test three hypotheses, viz., (a) Gross domestic product 
(GOP) as a function of foreign direct investment (FDI), (b) 
Exports (EX) as a function of FDI, and (c) Balance of trade 
(BT) as a function of FOI. The tests constitute in 
regressing the dependent variables (GDP, EX or BT) on FOI. 
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However, regressing current GOP t on current FOrt only will 
be a misspecification since current For will continue to 
affect GOP for a few more years. Same is the case for EX 
and ST. Therefore, it becomes necessary to take into account 
the impact of past FDI or GOP t (EXt or BT t ). This is 
achieved by using the standard Koyck transformation with 
the implicit assumption that the coeffficients of past 
FOI t _1, FOI t _2 or FDlt _3 etc. decline geometrically. The 
regression equation (for GDP t ) then becomes: 
GOP t 
.where * 0<... 
= o! + 1\ GOPt_1 
= * ( 1-).,) and u t 
+ * P FOI t + ut 
= Ut A, Ut-1 
Similar specifications are postulated for EXt and BT t (as 
dependent variables) keeping in mind the usual statistical 
assumptions that go with Koyck transformation. 
example, Goldberger (1964), p.275). 
(See, for 
Table 9.3 presents Thailand's time-series data for 23 years 
on gross domestic product, exports, balance of trade, and 
foreign direct investment. All data are expressed at 
constant 1975 prices. 
The regression results are presented in Table 9.4. Before we 
discuss the results, it is necessary to comment on our 
estimation method. One consequence of our specification is 
that a lagged dependent variable appears as a regressor. 
This gives rise to another serious problem. Running a lagged 
dependent variable as an explanatory variable destroys the 
reliability of the OW statistic as test for autocorrelation. 
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TABLE 9.3 
($ million in 1975 prices) 
.-------------------------------------------------------. 
YEARS GOP EXPORTS BALANCE OF FOREIGN 
TRADE DIRECT: 
(EXPORTS - INVESTMENT: 
IMPORTS OF : 
MERCHANDISE) : 
-------------------------------------------------------
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
5150.06 1303.39 
5614.46 1157.28 
6097.41 1081.84 
6502.04 1290.54 
7016.80 1245.14 
7884.99 1209.91 
8517.39 1122.38 
9209.49 991.12 
9903.34 990.47 
10530.39 930.17 
11021.60 1038.99 
11550.55 1293.11 
12808.44 1711.48 
13688.83 2576.60 
14663.13 2177.00 
15923.53 2721.92 
17070.59 2963.79 
18852.28 3152.84 
19912.83 3846.55 
21000.20 4481.58 
21205.32 4456.21 
22300.45 4292.80 
23910.35 3744.06 
96.45 
-96.43 
-211.67 
-59.56 
-261.71 
-233.24 
121.71 
-621.79 
-607.89 
-626.44 
-453.43 
-344.91 
-361.50 
-415.69 
-661. 00 
-171.00 
-600.56 
-676.56 
-1116.72 
-1461.44 
-1250.95 
-459.11 
-1698.12 
16.53 
19.12 
48.45 
39.93 
58.07 
49.19 
72.69 
93.50 
73.64 
58.31 
50.53 
84.06 
86.99 
202.49 
86.00 
74.51 
89.24 
38.91 
37.48 
129.95 
185.99 
121.42 
218.57 
========================================================= 
Source: IMF Statistical Year Book. 
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This serious problem is solved by using the GIVE program 1 
which computes general instrumental variable estimates of 
linear equations with lagged dependent variables and 
autocorrelation errors. The regression equations, presented 
in Table 9.4, have been estimated by using the GIVE program. 
In Table 9.4, we present the OLS estimates as equation (1), 
(2) and (3). Instead of Durbin-Watson statistic, we present 
A ~ 
estimated ~and its significance level when ~ is estimated 
from the first-order autoregressive system ut =~Ut_1 where 
A 
Ut is the error term of the regression equation. When oGis 
significant, then the GIVE program uses the standard 
iterative process to yield estimates without 
autocorrelation. These estimates are presented in Table 9.4 
as (1a), (2a) and (3a). Also note that we have 23 
observations in Table 9.3. But one observation is used up 
because of one period lag, so that n = 22 in Table 9.4. 
1 The GIVE program has been developed by D.F. Hendry 
and F. Srba (1978) of the London School of Economics 
and Political Science. GIVE is designed to estimate 
equations of the general form: 
M ( 1 ) Yt = :z: , = 1 Pi Z j t + ut (t = 1. .... T) 
where 
( 2 ) ut = o<J ut + Vt ( G = 1 or 2 or ... 8) e -e 
and Vt r-..J NI 
If (1) and 
specification, 
asymptotically 
estimates and 
efficient. 
( 0 ~2 
, " 
(2) define the correct model 
then the resulting estimates are 
equivalent to Maximum Likelihood 
are constistent and asymptotically 
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TABLE 9.4 
:Oependent: Independent Variables 
· ------------------------------------
:Variable :Constant:Lagged FOI t : R2 
,"-
F -rati 0: eX..- n 
:dependent (t - 1): 
1 
· 394 1.06 · 3.70 0.996 3054 -0.13 22 
· · 
· :(2.14) (62.16) · (2.1) (0.53) 
· · 
:GOP t ------------------------------------
· 
373 1.06 · -3.35 
· · 1a : (2.20) (66.43) · (1. 83) 
· 
N 2 · 126 0.98 · 0.24 0.926 118 0.95 22 \.N 
· · IJ1 : (0.73) 02.39) · (0.13) (9.29) 
· 
:XPt ------------------------------------
: 2682 0.23 · 2.23 
· 2a :(0.80) (0.80) : (1. 46) 
. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------. 
3 · -37 · 0.39 · 2.23 0.451 7.8 0.72 22 
· · · 
· · 
(0.24) 
· 
(1.87) · (1. 46) (3.28) 
· · · · 
:BTt :------------------------------------: 
· -6.12 -0.38 · -3.21 
· · 3a :(1.18) (1.14 ) · (1. 76) 
· 
============================================================================================ 
First consider regression equation (1) (in Table 9.4) which 
~ 
shows the effect of FOr on GOP. However, ~ = 0.13 with a 
t-value of 0.53 so that there is no autocorrelation. The 
~O~ 
final coefficients as given by (la) are~very different from 
those in (1). These results are unacceptable. First of all, 
the estimated value of \ is greater than 1 and the 
coefficient of FOr has the wrong sign. This points towards 
empirical misspecification. A large part of GOP in Thailand 
comes from the agricultural sector. Also, foreign direct 
investment is relatively small in comparison to other 
variables (such as domestic investment or government 
expenditure) determining Thai GOP. Thus, in order to assess 
the effect of FOI on GOP one would require a more elaborate 
multi-equation macroeconomic model. 
However, equations 2 and (2a) gives results of the effect of 
FOr exports. We note that ~ = 0.95 with a t-value of 9.29 so 
that there is autocorrelation. The final results as given by 
2 (a) show that ~ = 0.23 and the coefficient of FOr is 2.23. 
Although it is not significant at 5% level. However it is 
reasonable to say that these do suggest an atn€l;el'ative 
effect of FOr on exports. The current FOr seems to be 
relatively more important. 
From equations (3) and (3a), we find that the estimated 
coefficients have wrong signs. This is, we think, because 
imports have very loose connections to FOr. The only direct 
connection (which may be of some importance) between imports 
(merchandise) and FDr can perhaps be seen in a situation 
when FOr is accompanied by imports of capital equipment. 
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This perhaps is one reason which partially can explain the 
negative sign of the coefficient of FDI in equations (3) and 
( 3a ) • 
We end this section with the conclusion that there is fair 
evidence of macroeconomic impact of aggregate foreign direct 
investment on exports although in our simple regression 
analysis the impact of FDI on GOP is not captured. 
SECTION 9.7: A COMPARISON OF THE DESIRED PATTERN OF 
INVESTMENT AND THE PATTERN OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
This section first discusses the desired pattern of 
investment as laid out in the Five Year Plans and there have 
been four Plans in Thailand during 1961-1981. Then, we 
would find the pattern of foreign direct investment from the 
BOI data for each Plan period so that a comparison could be 
carried out. This will enable us to examine whether the 
foreign direct investment in Thailand have been taking place 
according to the priorities and objectives of the Plans. In 
order to do so, it is necessary to briefly discuss the 
objectives and priorities of the Plans. 
The objective of the first National Economic Development 
Plan, 1961-1966, is to raise the standard of living of the 
people of Thailand by increasing the per capita output of 
goods and services. The key note of the development 
programme is to encourage the growth of domestic and foreign 
investment both in the agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors of the economy. The policies to promote industrial 
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expansion are as-follows. The state will assist and promote 
industries of various scales to suit the needs of the 
domestic markets. The state will not engage in activities 
competitive with the private enterprise and will follow the 
policy as set out in the Promotion of Industrial Act 1962. 
It created the Board of Investment which is concerned with 
the grant of promotional privileges permitted under this 
Act. 
The objectives of the second Five-Year National Economic and 
Social Development Plan (1967-1971) are: (1) to reduce 
income inequality, (2) to expand employment opportunities, 
(3) to accelerate private investment, (4) to develop 
intensive agriculture, and (5) to maintain financial 
stability. 
The major industrial development policy is to promote 
industrial investments, particularly, in those industries 
which utilize indigenous raw-materials and earn or save 
foreign exchange. In the second Plan, the Industrial 
Promotion Act was revised, partially to create a more 
favourable climate for private investment and partially to 
promote industrial activities outside Bangkok. 
The objectives of the Third -National E~onomic and Social 
Development Plan (19n-1976) are: (1) to restructure the 
economic system, (2) to maintain economic stability, (3) to 
promote economic growth in the rural areas and to reduce 
income disparities, (4) to promote social justice, (5) to 
develop manpower resources and to create employment, and (6) 
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to promote further the role of the private sector in 
economic development. 
In order to achieve these objectives, one of the important 
measures was to promote foreign investments by encouraging 
Joint-ventures between Thai and foreign entrepreneurs. 
However, the government did formulate a programme to protect 
the basic industries and to keep it from direct or indirect 
control of the foreign investors. And at the same time 
Investment Promotion Policy was redirected in favour of (a) 
industries utilizing local labour and raw-materials, (b) 
industries having favourable effects on balance of payments, 
(c) industries located in the rural areas, and (d) heavy 
industries with considerable local financial and 
administrative participation. 
The objectives of the Fourth Economic and Social Development 
Plan (1977-1981) are: (I) to accelerate economic recovery, 
(2) to reduce income disparities, (3) to reduce population 
growth rate, to improve manpower quality and to increase the 
level of employment, (4) to improve the management of basic 
resources and to rehabilitate environment conditions, and 
(5) to strengthen national security management. 
In order to achieve the objectives of this Plan, several 
measures have been taken. The output levels of the export 
industries, such as sugar, textiles and cement, were to be 
increased in accordance with the demand in world markets. 
Emphasis was placed on the development of agro-industries, 
such as paper, food canning and livestock feeding, which 
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could stimulate agricultural production and rural 
employment. Thirdly, small-scale import-substitution 
industries, which utilize indigenous raw-materials and 
labour, were to be expanded. 
Now move to compare the planned pattern of investment and 
the pattern of foreign direct investment for each Five Year 
Plan. Tables 9.5, 9.6, 9.7 and 9.8 present the relevant data 
respectively for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Five Year Plan. 
The first two columns of each Table present the percentage 
distribution of investments among the four broad categories 
(viz., Agriculture, Mining, Industries and Services). The 
last colomn of each Table presents the percentage 
distribution of workers employed by the 'foreign ' firms, 
i.e., firms which cause to exist through foreign direct 
investment. 
Careful inspection shows that there is a clear discrepancy 
between the ex ante or desired pattern of economy's 
investment and the pattern of the ~ post foreign direct 
investment. Consider the first Plan. The disired pattern 
emphasizes agriculture and services, while the foreign 
direct investments are channelled mostly to industries and 
mining. It is, of course, understood why the proportion of 
foreign direct investment in Services will be lower than 
that envisaged in the Plan. It is because Services include 
education services, social, medical services (apart from 
insurances services etc.) where one cannot expect a large 
proportion of foreign direct investment. However, only 6.29% 
of foreign direct investment has been chanelled to 
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TABLE 9.5 
1st National Economic & Social Development Plan (1961-1966) 
.----------------------------------------------------------. 
PLAN TARGET :FOREIGN DIRECT:LABOUR EMPLOYED : 
INVESTMENT :BY FOREIGN FIRMS: 
% % % 
----------------------------------------------------------
:AGRICULTURE: 42.84 6.29 6.40 
----------------------------------------------------------
:MINING 2.72 22.85 11.12 
----------------------------------------------------------
:INDUSTRIES 15.72 63.78 76.36 
: __________________________________________________________ e 
:SERVICES 38.72 7.08 6.13 
============================================================ 
TABLE 9.6 
2nd National Economic & Social Development Plan (1967-1971) 
.----------------------------------------------------------. 
PLAN TARGET :FOREIGN DIRECT:LABOUR EMPLOYED : 
INVESTMENT :BY FOREIGN FIRMS: 
% % % 
----------------------------------------------------------
:AGRICULTURE: 35.20 10.40 15.03 
----------------------------------------------------------
:MINING 2.74 24.82 11.78 
----------------------------------------------------------
:INDUSTRIES 18.36 59.46 68.78 
----------------------------------------------------------
:SERVICES 43.78 5.28 4.40 
============================================================ 
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TABLE 9.7 
3rd National Economic & Social Development Plan (1972-1976) 
.----------------------------------------------------------. 
PLAN TARGET :FOREIGN DIRECT:LABOUR EMPLOYED : 
INVESTMENT :BY FOREIGN FIRMS: 
% % % 
----------------------------------------------------------
:AGRICULTURE: 34.70 9.96 12.60 
:---------------------------------------------------------_. 
:MINING 1. 33 25.09 4.58 
----------------------------------------------------------
:INDUSTRIES 26.77 61. 38 79.53 
----------------~------------------------------------- ----
:SERVICES 37.20 3.57 3.29 
============================================================ 
TABLE 9.8 
4th National Economic & Social Development Plan (1977-1981) 
----------------------------------------------------------. 
PLAN TARGET :FOREIGN DIRECT:LABOUR EMPLOYED : 
INVESTMENT :BY FOREIGN FIRMS: 
% % % 
----------------------------------------------------------
:AGRICULTURE: 31. 55 9.75 29.67 
----------------------------------------------------------
:MINING 1.11 12.84 5.28 
----------------------------------------------------------
:INDUSTRIES 30.25 61. 66 59.64 
----------------------------------------------------------
:SERVICES 37.09 15.75 5.41 
============================================================ 
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agriculture although the planned target was 42.84%. 
remarkable that the same picture is true for the 2nd, 
and 4th Plan. These need not be discussed separately. 
It is 
3rd 
We conclude the section by noting that, the foreign direct 
investment has not been very useful in changing the pattern 
of the economy. A changed pattern of production, of course, 
will have a wide-spread consequences of income distribution, 
rural development etc. and failure to do so will have the 
consequences of not being able to deliver the goods to the 
masses of people. 
SECTION 9.8: POLITICAL EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
Economists have recognised that the interaction between the 
activities of the mUltinational and domestic economic 
policies gives rise to another type of problem, viz., 
political tensions. The problem arises mainly because of 
differences between the objectives of the mUltinational 
firms and the objectives of the host country's government. 
While the firms may be looking for profit maximization, the 
host government aims clearly to try to maximize the net 
'benefits from foreign direct investment to the economy. The 
response of the, hQst government is to try and control the 
multinational firms so that they behave in a way which is 
consistent with their policies. Host governments want to 
enjoy the benefits of knowledge, capital, entrepreneurship, 
management and marketing skills and economies of scales 
factors which can be provided by the multinationals. On the 
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other hand, host governments 
political consequences that 
political sovereignty. Also in 
do not want to accept the 
may start to erode their 
the minds of the leaders in 
developing countries, the power of a multinational firm has 
been associated with the power of the country where the 
parent company is located. 
Furthermore, owners and managers of foreign firms are less 
firmly under the jurisdiction of local governments than 
those in state enterprises or resident private enterprises. 
To some extent, foreign owners and managers are under some 
influence of the foreign governments of the developed 
countries. The investing country may use the economic power 
of its foreign investor to further its political ends~ e.g., 
overthrowing a government. The most frequently cited example 
of direct political intervention by a multinational is that 
of the American Company, ITT, which is alleged to have taken 
part in the overthrowing of the socialist government of 
President Allende in Chile at the beginning of the 1970s. 
These political consequences of foreign direct investment 
have been discussed by Behrman (1970) and Menderhausen 
(1969) among others. 
According to Stauffer (1979) the political attitude of 
mUltinationals toward host country governments can cause a 
serious concern for the host nations. Stauffer argues that 
the multinational firms seem to favour authoritarian regime 
in the third world countries. This is so because 
authoritarian regimes can often provide stable economic 
environment by depoliticizing workers demand and thereby 
244 
keeping wage cost low, and can grant concessions that in an 
open society would be difficult. 
The other important aspect is that, because of the greater 
effectiveness as producers and sellers, foreign affiliates 
may exploit more effectively if inconsistencies and gaps in 
the laws and regulations of the host countries (LDCs) are 
found. The existence of wide-spread bribery and corruption 
has been recognised but these have not been documented by 
any serious empirical studies. In fact, it is well known 
that neither the companies nor the governments are willing 
to be interviewed about corruption. ~ultinationals can 
corrupt the high-rank officers, the local civil servants 
and, by doing so, can devise a system in order to advance 
their interests. There are known examples of bribery given 
by the multinationals and accepted (in secret deals) by 
public figures of many LDCs (Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Philippines, Thailand etc.). Thailand has been ruled by 
military oligarchy, and hence, possesses all the classical 
attributes of a system, loved by the multinationals for 
exploitation by devious means. 
SECTION 9.9: SOCIAL EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
At the social level, foreign direct investment is often seen 
by most studies (e.g., Fayerweather (1982), Lewis (1966)), 
as a cost rather than a benefit to the host country. 
Fayerweather (1982) puts forward the following argument: 
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"Foreign direct investment as carried out by 
transnational business enterprises - involves not 
only capital, technology and similar resources, 
intended or not, it is usually accompanied by 
socio-cultura1 investments such as attitudes, values 
and behavioural patterns, production patterns and 
processes, consumption patterns and the like. When 
this occurs, the socio-cultural profile of the host 
country nations tends to lose its national 
characteristics and tends to acquire those of the 
home countries involved" (p.275). 
Also Lewis (1966) argues in the same fashion. 
Industrialization is accused of disturbing the syustem of 
traditional values, and thus causing the cultural dependency 
and change in the basic way of living. It aggravates the 
problems of urbanization with a conversion of rural 
'disguised ' unemployment into lopenl unemployment in the 
cities. And because the MNEs are seen as an engine of 
industrialization, they are taken as responsible for the 
social disturbances in the host country. 
Another interesting argument in this area can also be found 
in the work of Cox (1976). Cox argues that, even though the 
MNE might be beneficial to the host countries, the benefits 
so accrued are not equitably distributed among different 
social groups and geographical a rea s . This creates 
inequalities in the distribution of income between social 
groups within the countries. In some sectors (modern 
industuries) the entry of the multinationals has brought the 
demise of artisan and small-scale local producers. This 
event is basically like any displacement of a less 
efficient technology by a more efficient one, but of course 
the negative effects on the welfare of the displaced 
producers may be a matter of national economic and cultural 
concern. 
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Multinationals, generally, introduce a large range of new 
products such as electronics, cosmetics, pharmaceutical 
products, cigarettes, watches, motor-cycles, cameras, 
automobiles, stereos, soft drink, canned food where they 
have large market and effective sales organisation. The 
point is that these products are developed by the 
multinationals (in the industrialized countries) not with 
reference to the needs 6f the host LOC nations but to those 
of the home countries. The problems arise because most 
people in host (developing) countries live in poverty when 
even the most elementary needs (foods, clothing, shelter) 
remain unfulfilled. In all these countries, only a small 
fraction of people are able to purchase these products which 
are commonly used in industrialized nations. Consequently, 
the gap between the standard of living of the high and low 
income group will be sharpened. Many of these products being 
developed and promoted by foreign enterprises, sometimes, 
are of doubtful social value when they are sold to the poor 
in the ~eveloping countries. 
Multinationals often encourage the consumption of 
substitutes or processed variants for pre-existent products, 
or they introduce high priced products to replace indigenous 
cheap products. Unfortunately for the poor third world 
countries, these highly priced products have a lower 
sUbstantive value than the indigenous products that they 
have replaced in the markets of the host-nations. The 
obvious examples which can be pointed out here are the 'fast 
food' such as hamburgers, soft drinks; Pepsi, Cola, instead 
of local fruit juice. 
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There is no doubt that advertising practices, product 
differentiation (brand name and trade mark) has stimulated 
demands and moulded tastes for the foreign products in 
poor-income developing countries, particularly among the 
middle - and upper-income groups. The effects of MNEs of 
their products on social behaviour have been demonstrated by 
several studies. For example, Barnet and Muller (1974) 
recalled that a doctor in a rural Mexican village reported 
that it was the practice for a family to sell the few eggs 
and chickens it raised to buy coke for the father while the 
children wasted away from lack of protien. Soft drinks have 
become a regular part of the diet of middle-class children 
in Brazil, despite the fact that they suffer from vitamin 
defficiences and also symptoms of malnutritions. An ever 
increasing number of people have learned to consume soft 
drinks at an exorbitant price when inexpensive nutritive 
local drinks are available. This is also the case for having 
a higher status if you drink a soft drink i.e., Pepsi or 
Cola. 
Also studies by J.K Roy as reported in Barnet and Muller 
(1974, P.140), shows that poor families in Bangladesh, buy 
high priced baby foods instead of the much cheaper cow's 
milk. This often is also the case in the Caribbean and 
Africa. There is a grave potential danger for the health of 
the millions of new born children in many Third World 
countries in the absence of instructions by the manufacturer 
with respect to preparation, hygeine etc. 
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SECTIO~ 9~10:CONClUSIONS 
In this chapter we have summarized the main arguments about 
the economic effects. There are arguments based on, 
traditional neo-classical economics to support the 
beneficial economic effects. There are arguments, based 
primarily on the weaknesses of neo-classical economics, 
which challenge the ameliorating effects of foreign direct 
investments. We have empirically analysed some aspects of 
Thailand. It is found that, on a broad basis, Thailand has 
obtained gains mainly from foreign direct investment in the 
mining sector. We have also found fair evidence that 
aggregrate foreign direct investment has significant impact 
on Thai GOP and Thai exports. However, we have found that a 
lot of hazardous products are produced in Thailand by 
foreign firms investing in the Chemical sector. Furthermore, 
the pattern of foreign direct investment during each Five 
Year Plan have been different from the desired pattern as 
envisaged in the Plan. There are social and political 
consequences which are of doubtful benefits. 
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APPENDIX 1 
SUMMARY OF ALIEN BUSINESS LAW 
(N.E.C. Announcement No. 281) 
At present, the most important law governing alien 
controlled business in Thailand is the Alien Business law 
which came into force on November 26, 1972. Alien business 
falling into Categories A, B or C (set out below) are 
controlled by the law, subject to exemptions. The placing of 
businesses into Categories A, Band C are subject to change 
by Royal Decree. Although numerous questions of 
classification remain, it is clear that many businesses do 
not fall within any category under this law, including many 
manufacturing industries and lending activities, but some of 
these exempt businesses may be subject to restrictions under 
other laws, regulations and practices. 
Generally, Categories A and B businesses are closed to 
aliens, and Category C businesses are open, subject to 
Ministerial Regulations under the Law. Under a Royal Decree 
of 1973 an 'alien' enterprise, granted promotiona1 
privileges by the Board of Investment is permitted to engage 
in a Category B business. An alien desiring to engage in any 
business specified in Category C, must submit an application 
to the Department of Commercial Registration, and must 
receive a permit prior to commencing to do business. A 
permit will be valid for a fixed period or without limit, 
subject to the Ministerial regulations. 
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LIST OF BUSINESSES ANNEXED TO THE N.E.C. ANNOUNCEMENT NO.281 
CATEGORY A 
Chapter 1 - Agricultural Businesses 
( 1) Ric e Farm in g 
(2) Salt farming including salt mining except rock salt 
Chapter 2 - Commercial Businesses 
(1) Internal trade in local agricultural products 
(2) Land Trade 
Chapter 3 - Service Businesses 
(1) Accounti ng 
(2) Law 
(3) Architecture 
(4) Advertising 
(5) Brokerage or agency 
(6) Auctioning 
(7) Barbering, hair dressing and beautification 
Chapter 4 - Other Businesses 
(1) Building construction 
CATEGORY B 
Chapter 1 - Agricultural Businesses 
(1) Cultivation 
(2) Orchard farming 
(3) Animal husbandry including silk worm raising 
(4) Timbering 
(5) Fishing 
Chapter 2 - Industrial and Handicraft Businesses 
(1) Rice milling 
(2) Flour making from rice and other crash crops 
(3) Sugar milling 
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(4) Manufacturing of alcohlic and non-alcoholic drinks 
and beverages 
(5) Ice making 
(6) Manufacturing of pharmaceuticals 
(7) Cold storage 
(8) Timber processing 
(9) Manufacturing of gold, silver, neilloware and 
stone inlaid products 
(10) Manufacturing or casting of Buddha images and 
bowls 
(11) Wood carving 
(12) Lacquer-ware making 
(13) Match making 
(14) Manufacturing of white cement, portland cement and 
cement finished products 
(15) Dynamiting or quarrying of rocks 
(16) Manufacturing of ply wood, veneer wood, chipboard 
or hardboard 
(17) Manufacturing of garments or foot wear, except for 
exports 
(18) Printing 
(19) Newspaper publishing 
(20) Silk spinning, weaving or silk fabric printing 
(21) Manufacturing of finished product~ from silk 
fabric, silk yarn or silk cocoons 
Chapter 3 - Commercial Businesses 
(1) All retailing except those included in Catetory 
• C· 
(2) Ore trading except those included in Category ·C· 
(3) Selling of food and drinks except those included 
in Category ·C· 
(4) Trading of antique, heirloom or fine arts objects 
Chapter 4 - Services Businesses 
(1) Tour agency 
(2) Hotel, except hotel management 
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(3) All businesses under the law governing places of 
service 
(4) Photography, photographic processing and printing 
(5) Laundering 
(6) Dress making 
Chapter 5 - Other Businesses 
(1) Domestic land, water, and air transport 
CATEGORY C 
Chapter 1 - Commercial Businesses 
( 1 ) All domestic wholesaling except those included in 
Category I A I 
( 2 ) All exporting 
( 3 ) Retailing of machinery, equipment and tools 
( 4 ) Selling of food or beverages for promotion 
tourism 
Chapter 2 - Industrial and Handicraft Businesses 
(1) Manufacturing of animal feeds 
(2) Vegetable oil refining 
of 
(3) Textile manufacturing including yarn spinning, 
dyeing and fabric printing 
( 4 ) Manufacturing of glassware including light bulbs 
( 5 ) Manufacturing of food bowls and plates 
( 6 ) Manufacturing of stationery and printing paper 
( 7 ) Rock salt mining 
( 8 ) Mining 
Chapter 3 - Services Businesses 
(1) Businesses which are not included in Category IAI 
and Category IBI 
Chapter 4 - Other Businesses 
(1) Other constructions which are not included in 
Category I A I 
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FROM: THAILAND BUSINESS LEGAL HANDBOOK. (1976) 
(PREPARED BY: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COUNSELLORS THAILAND 
FOR: THE BOARD OF INVESTMENT & 
THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK; NA,BANGKOK BRANCH. 
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APPENDIX 2 
SUMMARY OF INCENTIVES UNDER INVESTMENT PROMOTION ACT B.E. 
2520 (1977) 
GENERAL INCENTIVES 
Guarantees 
Against nationalisation. 
Against competition of new state enterprises. 
Against monopolisation of sales of products. 
Against price control. 
Permission to export. 
Against imports by government agencies or state 
enterprises with taxes exempted. 
Protection Measures 
(Subject to justification and need). 
Imposition of a surcharge on foreign 
rate not exceeding 50% of the CIF value 
not longer than one year at a time. 
Import ban on competitive products. 
products at a 
for a period 
The Chairman is empowered to order any assisting 
actions or tax relief measures to be adopted for the 
benefit of promoted projects. 
Permissions 
To bring in foreign nationals to undertake investment 
feasibility studies. 
To bring in foreign technicians and experts to work 
under promoted projects. 
To own land for carrying out promoted activities. 
To take or remit abroad foreign currency. 
Tax Incentives 
Import duties and business taxes on imported machinery 
may be exempted or reduced by 50%. 
Import duties and business taxes on imported raw 
materials and components may be reduced up to 90% for 
one year at a time. 
Corporate income tax may be exempted for 3-8 years. 
Any losses incurred can be carried forward and 
deducted as expenses for up to 5 years. 
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Exemption of up to 5 years on witholding tax on 
goodwill, royalties or fees remitted abroad. 
Dividends derived from the promoted enterprises are 
excluded from taxable income during the income 
holiday. 
ADDITIONAL SPECIAL INCENTIVES 
1. For enterprises in Investment Promotion Zones. 
A maximum reduction of 90% of business tax on the 
sales of products for a period up to 5 years. 
A reduction of 50% of corporate income tax for 5 
years after the termination of normal income tax 
holiday or from the date of income earning. 
Permission to double the cost of transportation, 
electricity and water supply for a deduction from 
the corporate taxable income. 
Permission to deduct from the corporate taxable 
income up to 25% of the investment in the costs of 
installing infrastructural facilities for 10 years 
from the date of income earning. 
, 2. For export enterpri ses. 
Exemption of import duties and business taxes on 
imported raw materials and components. 
Exemption of import duties and business taxes on 
re-export items. 
Exemption of export duties and business taxes. 
Permission to deduct from corporate taxable income 
the amount equivalent to 5% of an increase in income 
derived from export over the previous year, 
excluding costs of insurance and transportation. 
FROM: OFFICE OF THE BOARD OF INVESTMENT, 1977 
Office of the Prime Minister, Bagkok, Thailand. 
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APPENDIX 3 
The following are the details of the products included in 
the sectors. 
SECTOR 1 
1.1 Large-Scale Cultivation 
1.2 Processing of Agricultural Products 
1.3 Processing or Preservation of Food 
1.4 Animal Feed 
1.5 Oil Production from Agricultural Products 
1.6 Corn Products 
1.7 Products from Stick Lac 
1.8 Rubber Products 
1.9 Livestock Raising or Meat Processing 
1.10 Animal Products 
1.11 Cultivation of Mulberry Trees and Silk Worm Farming 
1.12 Silk Reeling 
1.13 Deep-Sea Fishing and Off-Shore Fishing 
1.14 Slaughtering and Disemboweling of Chickens for 
Export 
1.15 Manufacture of Products Made from Rattan and Bamboo 
for Export 
1.16 Vegetable Seeds Production and Expansion 
1.17 Rabbit Raising and Processing for Export 
SECTOR 2 
MINERAL, METAL AND CERAMICS 
2.1 Mineral Ore Prospecting 
2.2 Mining or Dressing of Ores 
2.3 Smelting 
2.4 Processing of Metal 
2.5 Ceramic Products Industry 
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SECTOR 3 
CHEMICAL AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 
3.1 Chemical Products 
3.2 Soda Ash 
3.3 Carbon Black 
3.4 Petrochemicals 
3.5 Pharmaceutical Products 
3.6 Fertilizer 
3.7 Paints or Similar Products 
3.8 Paper Industry 
3.9 Carbon Paste Products 
3.10 Pulp Paper Products 
3.11 Acetylene Black Products 
3.12 Petroleum Products 
SECTOR 4 
MECHANICAL & ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 
4.1 Production or Assembly of Engines 
4.2 Production or Assembly of Mechanical Equipment 
4.3 Production or Assembly of Machinery or Electrical 
Equipment 
4.4 Production of Components and Parts of Machinery or 
Electrical Equipment 
4.5 Production of Component Parts for Vehicles 
4.6 Production or Assembly of Electronics 
SECTOR 5 
OTHER PRODUCTS 
5.1 Production or Assembly of Clock or Watches or the 
Component Parts 
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5.2 Production or Assembly of Cameras 
5.3 Manufacturing of Stationery and Educational 
Equipment or Parts or Components 
5.4 Manufacture of Sporting Equipment, Musical 
Instruments or Toys 
5.5 Manufacture of Medical Supplies or Medical or 
Scientific Equipment 
5.6 Plastic or Plastic-Coated Products 
5.7 Manufacture of Ornaments or Cutting and Polishing of 
Gem Stones 
5.8 Production of Umbrellas 
5.9 Rubber Tree Products 
5.10 Production of Lenses or Spectacles or Parts 
5.11 Production of Fire Hydrants or Component Parts 
5.12 Building and Repairing of Large Ships for 
International Sea Transportation 
5.13 Building and Repairing of Small Ships for 
International Sea Transportation 
5.14 Production of Arms and Ammunition 
5.15 Manufacture of Natural Fibre or Synthetic Fibre 
Products 
5.16 Tyre Cords 
5.17 Printing of Textiles 
5.18 Production or Assembly of Measuring and Testing 
Equfpment or Component Parts 
5.19 Production of Hand Tools 
5.20 Manufacture of Prefabricated Housing or Components 
5.21 Manufacture of Zips 
5.22 ~anufacture of Gloves 
5.23 Manufacture of Abrasive Sheets 
5.24 Manufacture of Matches for Export 
5.25 Artificial Flowers and Trees for Export 
5.26 Manufacture of Cellophane 
5.27 Scale Ice 
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5.28 Ferro-Cement Ship Building 
5.29 Manufacture of Socks 
5.30 Manufacture of Jute Woven Carpet 
5.31 Manufacture of Packaging Products 
5.32 Grinding Wheels 
5.33 Adhesive Tape Products 
5.34 Resin Rubber Soling Sheet 
5.35 Wall Cloth Covering Products 
5.36 Embroidered Cloth Products 
5.37 Synthetic Fibre Products 
5.38 Non-Dairy Creamer Products 
SECTOR 6 
SERVICES 
6.1 Industrial Estates 
6.2 Hotel 
6.3 Water Transportation 
6.4 Car Parking 
6.5 Repair Service for Vehicles, Machinery or Engines 
6.6 Warehousing 
6.7 Hospitals 
6.8 Cold Storage 
6.9 Loading and Unloading Facilities for Sea Transport 
6.10 Movies Making 
6.11 Tourist Promotion Services 
6.12 X-Ray Computer Center 
6.13 International Trading Enterprises 
6.14 Silo and Drying 
6.15 Manufacture of Modern Rice Mill 
6.16 Container Repair, Maintenance and Refurbishment 
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6.17 Modern Package of Vegetable and Fruit for Export 
6.18 Natural Gas Transport 
SECTOR 7 
OTHER INDUSTRIES (Industry which have not been Classified in Other Groups) 
7.1 Assembly of Vehicles Industry 
7.2 Spinning, Weaving or Knitting 
7.3 Bleaching, Dyeing 
7.4 Garments for Export Industry 
7.5 Domestic Tourist Promotion Services 
7.6 Gypsum Products 
7.7 Asbestos Products 
7.8 Veneer Industry 
7.9 Wood Parquet Products 
7.10 Production of Construction Material Utilising Wholly 
Domestic Raw Material 
7.11 Others 
From: OFFICE OF THE BOARD ~F INVESTMENT, 1982 
Office of the Prime Minister, Bangkok, Thailand 
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